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1Chapter 1 Introduction
Beliefs, preferences and constraints are the three fundamental determinants of decision 
making. Empirical economics has generally tried to explain behavior by collecting data on 
constraints and decision outcomes, and then analyzing these within the structure of a model 
that makes assumptions about beliefs and preferences. For a long time, economists were 
skeptical of attempts to collect data on beliefs and preferences. The costs of avoiding 
elicitation of these inherently subjective concepts are twofold. First, heavy reliance on 
assumptions that, at best, provide only a very crude approximation to the beliefs and 
motivations of many humans. Second, variation in behavior that is attributable to 
heterogeneity in beliefs and preferences is left unexplained. Growing recognition of these 
costs has convinced at least some economists that there is much to be gained from eliciting 
beliefs and preferences (DellaVigna, 2009; Manski 2004). In the last few decades, it has 
become much more common to collect data on beliefs and preferences in the context of 
surveys conducted in the field, and not only in the environment of lab experiments. Doing 
so throws up research challenges concerning the design of survey instruments that can 
deliver valid data that represent true beliefs and preferences.
This thesis contributes to the burgeoning research concerned with the elicitation and 
analysis of survey data on beliefs and preferences. It makes a few methodological 
contributions to elicitation methods for both beliefs and preferences. Most important among 
these is the introduction of a new survey method that corrects a common bias in reported 
probabilities (chapter 5). However, the main contribution of the thesis is to demonstrate the 
insight into economic behavior that can be gained through the elicitation of beliefs and 
preferences. Specifically, a unique collection of data on beliefs about households’ future 
spending on healthcare, alongside risk attitudes and time preferences, which was done 
purposefully for this thesis in the context of a nationwide survey in the Philippines, is used 
to explain a paradoxical, and yet common, phenomenon in low- and middle-income 
countries: low take-up of health insurance despite households facing substantial (objective) 
medical expenditure risk. One chapter (4) of the thesis does not use data on elicited beliefs 
and preferences. But it still examines the substantive issue of health insurance enrollment 
through a behavioral lens. It uses a nationwide, randomized field experiment in the 
Philippines to identify whether temporary inducements to insure continue to have an effect 
even after they have been withdrawn. 
2In this chapter, I will first motivate interest in the topic of health insurance 
enrollment. Then, I will briefly outline the behavioral economics approach I take to this issue 
before introducing each chapter and explaining how they are related.
In low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), where health insurance is often 
lacking, populations are at risk of facing medical expenses that can exhaust or even exceed 
their income (WHO, 2010; Wagstaff et al. 2017). Treating sickness might require selling 
productive assets or accumulating debt. If such coping strategies are not available, healthcare 
will have to be forgone and health will further deteriorate. Either way, the long-term 
consequences for welfare can be grave. 
Attempts to provide affordable voluntary health insurance to those not covered 
through either mandatory employment-based insurance or means-tested fully subsidized 
insurance has usually been unsuccessful due to low take-up (Acharya et al. 2013; 
Bredenkamp et al. 2015; Pettigrew & Mathauer 2016). This is inconsistent with estimates of 
large potential demand for, and gains from, health insurance (Limwattananon et al 2015; 
Pauly et al. 2009). In chapters 2-4, I examine the extent to which insights from behavioral 
economics can explain this discrepancy. 
Estimates of the potential demand for insurance are typically based on normative 
models built on the neoclassical paradigm, including human rationality. This assumes people 
are risk averse expected utility maximizers who base their perceptions of risk on the level 
and variability of medical expenses observed in a sample of similar individuals. Besides this,
it assumes they process and use all available information in making their decisions. Evidence 
from studies in psychology and behavioral economics raises serious questions about these 
assumptions (Manski 2004). Behavioral economics posits that people deviate from the 
rational ideal assumed in the standard model in three respects: non-standard preferences, 
non-standard beliefs and non-standard decision making (DellaVigna, 2009). I collect data 
that allow the role of the first two of these in explaining health insurance (and stockholding) 
behavior to be examined.
Preferences in relation to both risk and time are relevant to the decision to insure. In
each domain, preferences can be non-standard. The standard assumption about time 
preferences is that they are consistent. If a smaller-immediate reward is preferred over a 
larger-later reward, then the ordering will be preserved when both rewards are equally 
delayed. In fact, evidence shows that the preferences tend to be reversed when the rewards 
3are pushed back equally (Halevy 2015). Present bias induces this time inconsistency. Both 
standard exponential discounting and present bias are expected to reduce the demand for 
health insurance that requires paying an upfront premium to protect against the risk of future 
medical expenses after the passing of a period during which the newly insured is not 
permitted to make a claim.
The standard assumption about risk preferences is that people maximize expected 
utility (EU). That is, utility is a function of final wealth and is weighted linearly by the 
probability of each potential wealth outcome. In contrast, Prospect Theory (PT) assumes that 
utility is defined over changes in wealth with respect to a reference point. The same person 
can be risk averse with respect to gains in wealth but risk seeking over losses (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). PT also deviates from EU by assuming 
that the utility of each prospect is weighted non-linearly by the probability that it occurs
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Both risk seeking in the 
domain of losses and nonlinear weighting of probabilities potentially contribute to low 
demand for insurance.
For this thesis, I elicited non-standard preferences related to risk and time, and used 
them to explain enrollment in (chapter 2) and (for risk preferences) the valuation of (chapter 
3) health insurance in the Philippines. The elicitation was done by designing and fielding 
modules that required respondents of a nationwide, representative household survey to make 
hypothetical choices between lotteries and time-contingent payments. This contrasts with 
much of the existing evidence on these preferences in developing countries that is obtained 
from samples of students, farmers or households in small communities interviewed in an 
experimental context with ample time for delivery of instructions and completion of the task 
(e.g. Vieider et al. 2015a). It required the design of tasks that were sufficiently rich to identify 
the non-standard preference parameters, and yet were also feasible for mostly low-educated 
respondents to complete within a short response time. 
Chapter 2 uses the elicited (non-standard) risk and time preferences to explain health 
insurance enrollment in the Philippines. Individuals who discount future returns more 
aggressively are less likely to enroll. Insurance take-up is only related to present bias among 
individuals with some knowledge of how health insurance operates. Consistent with PT, the 
majority of respondents are risk seeking for losses. Those who exhibit more risk seeking in 
the loss domain are more likely to insure. This is counterintuitive, although it is consistent 
with evidence on risk preferences and demand for other forms of insurance. Respondents 
4who overweight moderate and large probability losses are more likely to purchase health 
insurance, which is consistent with the relatively high average probability of medical 
expenditure in our sample. 
Beliefs are fundamental to economic decisions, not least those concerning insurance. 
An individual deciding whether or not to insure must consider the extent to which they are 
exposed to risk of medical expenses without insurance, and form beliefs about the degree to 
which insurance will cover this risk. The standard model assumes that this is done rationally 
using all available information. Even if an analyst follows this approach, elicited beliefs 
about future spending are useful since they potentially incorporate private information about 
own health that would not be available to an econometrician predicting an individual’s future 
medical expenditure on the basis of observable characteristics that will not fully capture 
health issues known to the individual. Beyond that, subjective beliefs can reflect proneness 
to optimism or pessimism that potentially affects the decision to purchase health insurance. 
A large body of evidence shows that, on average, people are optimistic, leading to irrational 
expectations (Sharot, 2011; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Weinstein, 1980).
I designed a visual aid to elicit beliefs about medical expenditures and used this to 
derive a household-specific subjective distribution of those expenditures without asking the 
respondent to report probabilities, or even chances, which they may not have had a 
conceptual understanding of. These distributions provide, along with the elicited risk 
preferences, the information basis for a new behavioral decomposition of the willingness to 
pay (WTP) for insurance that is introduced in chapter 3. WTP is decomposed into its fair 
price and four behavioral deviations from that price that arise from subjective beliefs about 
the distribution of medical expenses, the two dimensions of risk attitudes consistent with 
prospect theory (utility curvature and probability weighting) and a residual term representing 
determinants not captured by the behavioral model. The purpose of this decomposition is to 
gain further insight into the low valuation, and so low take up, of health insurance. Findings 
show low WTP is not explained by downwardly biased expectations of medical 
expenditures. Both convex utility in the domain of losses and the transformation of 
probabilities into decision weights push the WTP below the fair price, reducing the demand 
for insurance. WTP is further reduced by other factors not included in our model. The 
decomposition could be adopted by other researchers aiming to understand the demand for 
insurance products.
5As mentioned above, understanding of preferences and beliefs regarding medical 
expenditure risk can be used to (better) design policy interventions that aim to raise health 
insurance take up. Increasingly, randomized field experiments are being conducted to test 
the effectiveness of inducements to enroll. There is some evidence of a positive immediate 
effect (Asuming et al 2017; Capuno et al., 2016; Chemin 2018; Thornton et al 2010). But 
this may be insufficient to establish cost-effectiveness if the effects last only as long as the 
interventions are offered. In Chapter 4, I use a randomized experiment to establish whether 
a one-off premium subsidy of up to 50% and another intervention that reduced the indirect 
costs of enrollment by providing one-time assistance with the insurance application had 
sustained effects on enrollment up to four years after the inducements were withdrawn. 
Although the second intervention had the stronger impact in the short term, only the effect 
of the premium subsidy was maintained in the long run. This shows that the short-term 
effects of interventions may not be indicative of their long-term impacts.
Elicitation of preferences and beliefs often involves respondents undertaking tasks 
that requires them to make decisions. If they do so using heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974), then the design of the task could affect the results. Careful thought needs to be given 
to how to elicit preferences and beliefs, and how to interpret the data obtained. A common 
bias in the reporting of probabilities is subadditivity: the reported probability of the union of 
two disjoint events is smaller than the sum of the reported probabilities of those events 
(Fischhoff et al. 1978; Tversky and Kahneman 1983; Johnson et al. 1993; Tversky and 
Koehler 1994; Tversky and Fox 1995). Chapter 5 introduces a new method that can easily 
be used in survey research to correct this common bias. The method is simple. It requires the 
addition of only one question to the standard module used to elicit subjective probabilities. 
Using it avoids the common practice of dropping a substantial fraction of respondents who 
display the bias, so preserving sample power and representativeness. An application 
demonstrates that reported probabilities of stock market returns that are purged of 
subadditivity explain stockholding better than the biased reported probabilities. This chapter 
makes a methodological contribution to survey research.
The roadmap of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 explains the methods of eliciting 
risk and time preference parameters before using these explain health insurance enrollment. 
Chapter 3 introduces the new behavioral decomposition of WTP for insurance and uses this 
to explain the valuation of health insurance in the Philippines based on the elicited data on
households’ subjective distributions of medical expenditures. Chapter 4 presents the 
6evaluation of the long-term impact of temporary inducements for health insurance in the 
Philippines. Chapter 5 introduces the new method of identifying and purging subadditivity 
bias in reported probabilities and applies it using data from a purposefully collected survey 
of the stock holding behavior of Erasmus School of Economics alumni. Finally, chapter 6
concludes with potential implications of the findings of this thesis and suggested avenues
for future research.
7Chapter 2
Do (non-standard) risk and time preferences explain 
health insurance enrollment?
Joint work with Baillon, A., O’Donnell, O. and Quimbo, S. 
82.1 Introduction
Voluntary health insurance enrollment is typically low in developing countries (Acharya et 
al. 2013; Bredenkamp et al. 2015; Pettigrew and Mathauer 2016). Premium subsidies, 
information on insurance and assistance with enrollment often have only limited, if any, 
effects on take-up (Capuno et al., 2016; Chemin 2018; Das and Leino 2011; Thornton et al 
2010; Wagstaff et al. 2016).1 Take-up of highly subsidized health insurance available to low-
income households in the US has also been remarkably low (Bundorf and Pauly 2005; 
Chernew et al 1997; Currie and Gruber 1996; Levy and DeLiere 2008). Given widespread 
exposure to risks of substantial out-of-pocket medical expenses in low-income populations, 
the lack of demand for insurance appears inconsistent with standard economic theory. 
Insurance demand is usually analyzed using a single-period expected utility (EU) 
model under the assumption that people are risk averse, typically characterized by a concave 
utility function defined over final wealth. With this set up, low take-up of health insurance 
is puzzling (Baicker et al 2008). Even stranger is evidence that more risk averse individuals 
are less likely to purchase insurance for medical expenses (Dercon et al 2015) and other risks 
(Cole et al., 2013; Giesbert et al., 2011; Giné et al., 2008) in low-income settings. To explain 
this inconsistency with the standard model of insurance, recent papers have argued that 
insurance itself is a risky product for individuals who lack experience of it and trust in it 
(Chemin 2018; Cole et al 2013; Dercon et al 2015). In these circumstances, the risk averse 
will be leery of insurance. Instead of assuming individuals perceive a fundamentally 
different product that exacerbates rather than ameliorates uncertainty, this chapter considers 
whether the low take-up of health insurance can be explained by suitably specified 
preferences related to risk and time. First, concavity of utility over final wealth may be an
inadequate characterization of the risk preferences that govern the insurance decision. More 
pertinent may be preferences in the domain of losses and nonlinear weighting of the 
probabilities of losses. Second, health insurance involves a trade-off between paying a 
premium now and possibly receiving benefits in the future. Yet, the role of time preferences 
in the uptake of health insurance is underexplored. This may miss an important dimension 
1 There is some experiment-based evidence of strong impacts of insurance inducements on enrollment. Large 
premium subsidies of at least 30 percent have been found to raise enrollment substantially in Ghana (Asuming
et al 2017), Kenya (Chemin 2018) and Nicaragua (Thornton et al 2010). More modest subsidies of 10-20
percent had proportionately marked impacts in another study in Kenya (Dercon et al 2015). Information on the 
operation and benefits of insurance raised take-up to a lesser extent in Ghana (Asuming et al 2017) and 
Nicaragua (Thornton 2010).
9of the decision problem for households on the margins of dire poverty that are focused on 
making ends meet from day to day (Schilbach et al 2016). 
The study presented in this chapter elicits (non-standard) preferences concerning 
both risk and time and examines their associations with voluntary health insurance
enrollment in the Philippines. Growing literatures use elicited risk and time preferences to 
explain persistent poverty in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) (Binswanger, 1980; 
Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008 and 2013; Tanaka et al, 2010; Vieider et al., 2015b) and 
unhealthy behavior in high-income countries (Anderson and Mellor 2008; Barsky et al. 
1997; Cutler and Glaeser, 2005; Fuchs, 1982; Khawaja et al, 2007; Komlos et al, 2004; Sutter 
et al., 2013). To the best of our knowledge, there has been no empirical examination of the 
roles played by both risk and time preferences in explaining the low demand for health 
insurance in low- and middle-income, or indeed in high-income, countries. We elicit four 
dimensions of risk and time preferences that go beyond utility curvature and standard 
constant discounting. 
Prospect theory (PT) is known to provide the best description of decision making 
under risk (Barberis 2013; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). It 
characterizes risk attitudes by three non-standard features. First, utility is not defined over 
final wealth but with respect to deviations from a reference point, with losses looming larger 
than gains. Second, if utility is concave for gains, implying risk aversion in that range, it can 
be convex for losses, implying risk seeking in that domain. Third, probabilities are 
transformed by a weighting function that captures limited discrimination between likelihood 
levels (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Application of PT to 
the explanation of behavior outside of the laboratory is not straightforward. The theory’s 
predictions have been tested in the field only recently (Barberis, 2013; Schmidt, 2016; 
Tanaka et al, 2010). The few studies applying PT to insurance find that probability weighting 
plays a role in home and automobile insurance decisions in the US (Barseghyan et al., 2013; 
Sydnor, 2010). We investigate whether this finding holds with respect to the demand for 
health insurance in a middle-income country.
Evidence from low-income settings that insurance demand is low among 
predominantly risk averse individuals (Chemin 2018) and that demand is decreasing with 
risk aversion (Cole et al 2013; Dercon et al 2015; Giesbert et al., 2011; Giné et al., 2008) is 
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based on preferences elicited through Holt and Laury (2002) lotteries with positive payoffs.2
This delivers risk attitudes in the domain of gains, which may be less relevant to the 
insurance decision than risk preferences over losses. At least some low income individuals 
with little or no experience of insurance appear to perceive it as a risky proposition (Chemin 
2018). If they do not fall sick, then they get nothing back for the money spent on insurance. 
If they do get sick, then they may be unsure whether the insurance will deliver on the promise 
to cover their medical expenses. Their choice is between a certain loss (the premium) with 
an uncertain benefit (reimbursed medical expenses) and an uncertain loss (uninsured medical 
expenses). Consistent with this perspective, we elicit risk preferences in the domain of 
losses.
To examine the role of time preferences, we elicit the parameters of a quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model, which has been repeatedly shown to describe behavior better 
than constant exponential discounting (Anderson et al. 2008; Burks et al., 2012; Dupas 2011; 
Frederick et al., 2002; Laibson, 1997; Wang et al., 2016). This model allows for present bias: 
preference for a smaller-immediate reward over a larger-later reward is reversed when both 
rewards are equally delayed (Halevy 2015). This trait motivates the design of commitment 
devices, which have been demonstrated to encourage savings, investment and healthy 
behavior in developing countries (Ashraf et al., 2006; Brune et al., 2016; Duflo et al., 2011; 
Giné et al., 2010). Its relevance in such settings plausibly derives from the cognitive load of 
coping with life on the breadline, which can result in dominance of intuitive, reactive and 
error-prone decision making over deliberative, consistent and unbiased decision making 
(Mullainathan and Shafir 2014; Schilbach et al 2016). If present bias is an important 
influence on health insurance decisions, then offering the possibility to commit to enrollment 
at a later date could be successful in raising take-up.
We elicit risk and time preferences in a large, nationwide household survey in the 
Philippines. This contrasts with much of the existing evidence on these preferences in 
developing countries that is obtained from samples of students, farmers or households in 
small communities interviewed in an experimental context with ample time for delivery of 
instructions and completion of the task (e.g. Vieider et al. 2015a). We design and implement 
2 Dercon et al (2015) elicit preferences from choices between lotteries in the loss, as well as the gain, domain. 
Inconsistent with the findings of many experiments, they find risk aversion in the loss domain. In fact, the point 
estimates suggest greater risk aversion in the loss domain, although the difference is not significant. The paper 
shows a positive association between insurance enrollment and risk aversion in the gain domain.
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a method that aims to identify sophisticated preference parameters and yet be 
comprehensible for less educated respondents in a survey conducted with limited time and 
budget. 
We find a positive association between insurance enrollment and the constant 
discount factor, indicating that those who choose not to purchase insurance discount the 
future more. While the analysis does not support causal inference, this is at least consistent 
with aggressive discounting of benefits that are enjoyed, if at all, at some time in the future 
being one reason many Filipinos do not take out health insurance. In the full sample, there 
is no evidence that enrollment is significantly related to the degree of present bias. In fact, 
the majority of respondents do not display present bias. However, when attention is restricted 
to respondents with some knowledge of how health insurance operates, there is clear 
evidence that those with more present biased preferences are less likely to take out insurance.
In line with PT, we find that respondents generally exhibit risk seeking behavior for 
losses, which is represented by strong convex curvature of the utility function in that domain. 
Respondents who are more risk seeking with respect to losses, along with those who 
overweight moderate and large probabilities, are more likely to purchase health insurance. 
However, after controlling for socio-economic factors, there is no significant association 
between risk preference parameters and insurance enrollment. 
Section 2.2 defines the risk and time preference parameters we elicit. Section 2.3
provides background on health insurance in the Philippines. Section 2.4 describes the survey 
data and our sample. Section 2.5 outlines the preference elicitation method. Section 2.6
presents the results on the associations between preferences and insurance enrollment. 
Section 2.7 discusses the findings and relates them to the literature. 
2.2 Characterization of preferences
We consider the preferences of an individual facing risky or delayed outcomes, which are 
real numbers denoted ݔ, ݕ or ݖ. Let ݔ௣ݕ denote a prospect yielding ݔ with probability ݌ and 
ݕ otherwise. We denote ݔ௧ for an outcome obtained at time ݐ ൒ 0 (ݐ = 0 indicates the 
present).
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2.2.1 Risk preferences
In PT, risk attitudes are represented through an S-shaped utility function ݑ(ݔ) and a 
probability weighting function ݓ(݌) (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). The utility function is concave for gains but convex for losses, capturing 
diminishing sensitivity to both gains and losses. It is steeper for losses than for gains, 
capturing loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The weighting function maps 
cumulative probabilities into decision weights. It is increasing, and satisfies ݓ(0)  =  0 and 
ݓ(1)  =  1. Under PT, the status quo is typically taken as the reference point (Sydnor 2010; 
Wakker et al., 1997). In an insurance setting, this is initial wealth –the state in which medical 
expenses are not incurred. We are then only concerned with utility in the loss domain because 
the choice is between a small certain loss (the insurance premium) and a larger uncertain 
loss (medical expenses). The loss prospects are valued as:
ܲܶ൫ݔ௣ݕ൯ = ݓ(݌)ݑ(ݔ) + ൫1 െݓ(݌)൯ݑ(ݕ), (2.1)
where 0.x yd d
To make preference elicitation tractable, we select the one-parameter functional 
forms for ݑ and ݓ that have been demonstrated to perform best among (combinations of) 
the most popular specifications (Scott 2006). For utility, we use a power function
ݑ(ݔ) = െ(െݔ)௥ , (2.2)
where ݎ indicates the curvature of the value function for losses. Utility is convex if ݎ ൑ 1.
Loss aversion is omitted because it can be determined only in the presence of both gains and 
losses, and we are concerned only with the latter. 
We use the one-parameter form of the probability weighting function introduced by 
Prelec (1998),
ݓ(݌) = exp(െ(െ ln ݌ )ఈ), (2.3)
Where ߙ captures likelihood insensitivity. If ߙ <  1, the weighting function has an inverse 
S-shape, overweighting small probabilities and underweighting large probabilities. If ߙ >
 1, the weighting function has an S-shape overweighting moderate and large probabilities 
and underweighting small probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). With ߙ =  1 the 
probability weighting function is linear and the model reduces to Expected Utility (EU).
13
Prospect theory predicts convex utility curvature for losses, generally resulting in 
risk seeking behavior. Within this framework, the weighting of probabilities can explain the 
demand for insurance in addition to utility curvature. In the literature, inverse-S weighting 
(ߙ < 1) is typically associated with a high demand for insurance (Wakker 2010). Indeed, in 
the case of a binary outcome with a small probability of a loss (typically below 1/3) and no 
expenditure otherwise, take-up of insurance can be explained by overweighting the small 
probability. The prediction is reversed if the probability of the loss is moderate or high,
which is the case for the chance of incurring any medical expenditures. In our sample, about 
80% incur medical expenditures in a year (see Chapter 3 for more details). With such a risk, 
overweighting large probabilities of losses (ߙ > 1) would increase the demand for health 
insurance, whereas underweighting them (ߙ < 1) would decrease the demand. However, 
this is a crude prediction because medical expenditure risks are not binary and perceptions 
of the risks may deviate from the objective probabilities. In Chapter 3, I will explore how 
probability weighting interacts with beliefs about the distribution of medical expenditures 
and utility to influence the valuation of health insurance at the individual level. For a given 
weighting function, less convex utility (expressed by a larger value of ݎ) indicates less risk 
seeking and would be expected to increase the likelihood of taking up health insurance.
2.2.2 Time preferences
We consider time preferences in the gain domain because pretesting indicated this decreased 
the cognitive burden on respondents. Normative economic theories prescribe no differences 
in discount factors for gains and losses. However, gains are generally discounted more than 
losses (Benzion et al., 1989; Thaler, 1981; Yates and Watts, 1975). Caution should therefore 
be exercised in interpreting absolute values of the discount factor. Since we are interested in 
the relative difference in discount factors between people with and without health insurance, 
this should be less of a concern.
We model time preferences using the quasi-hyperbolic (QH) discounting model 
(Laibson, 1997), defined as:
ܳܪܦ(ݔ௧) = ൜ ݑ(ݔ) if ݐ = 0ߚ ή ߜ௧ݑ(ݔ) if ݐ > 0 (2.4)
with ݔ ൒ 0. 7KHSDUDPHWHUį(0 < ߜ < 1) captures conventional time discounting with a 
smaller value indicating greater discounting of the future. The parameter ߚ < 1 captures 
preferences for the present relative to all future periods. When offered a choice between 
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monetary amounts in the present or in the future, the discount factor is ߚߜ௧. When offered a 
choice between prospects at different dates in the future, the impact of ߚ cancels out and the 
discount factor is ߜ௧. If ߚ = 1, then there is no present bias and discounting is exponential.
Both greater discounting of the future (smaller ߜ) and more present bias (smaller ߚ)
could reduce the likelihood of purchasing health insurance. Insurance involves transferring 
resources from the present to (some possible) future states. Decreases in both parameters 
increase the weight on the present and decrease that on the future.
2.3 Health insurance in the Philippines
The Philippines National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) initially (1995) covered civil 
servants and required that formal sector salaried workers enroll (Bredenkamp and Buisman, 
2016; Capuno et al., 2016). Soon after its creation, an indigent program was launched to 
provide fully subsidized health insurance for the poor. This program was extended to provide 
the near-poor with fully subsidized cover in 2014, the year before our data were collected 
(2013 Amendment to the National Health Insurance Act of 1995 (RA 10606)). Since January 
2015, all senior citizens (>= 60 years) are covered through a fully tax-financed program 
(PHIC 2014). Those not covered through these program nor some others that provide fully 
subsidized insurance to certain groups can insure through the NHIP voluntarily. We seek to 
explain voluntary enrollment among those not eligible for cover through some other NHIP 
program. The premium for voluntary enrollment cover is PHP 2,400 per year ($50) for those 
with an average monthly individual income up to PHP 25,000 ($540). At higher incomes, 
the annual premium is PHP 3,600. Coverage through all programs extends automatically to
the legal spouse, children (<21 years old) and parents (>= 65 years) of the person qualifying 
or paying the premium for voluntary enrollment. 
As of 2014, NHIP programs covered 86 million beneficiaries, which is around 85 
percent of the population, according to the national insurance agency’s database (PHIC 
2014). However, survey estimates based on the number of respondents reporting they are 
covered put population coverage at only 61 percent (Bredenkamp and Buisman, 2016). 
These estimates reveal that coverage is lowest in the middle of the income distribution. That 
is, among informal workers and the self-employed who do not get mandatory cover through 
employment and are insufficiently poor to qualify for fully subsidized cover. Voluntarily 
enrolled members from these groups account for only about 10 percent of all those covered 
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by NHIP programs, which is very little considering they account for more than 50 percent 
of the labor force (Bredenkamp and Buisman, 2016; Manasan, 2011). 
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Sample design
Data on risk and time preferences were collected in a nationwide survey of Filipino 
households conducted in July-August 2015. The survey was a follow-up of a baseline carried 
out in 2011 in the context of a randomized experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of 
interventions designed to raise insurance enrollment (Capuno et al., 2016). The baseline 
survey used multi-stage cluster sampling to randomly select 2,950 households that were 
nationally representative (excluding the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao).3
The follow-up survey aimed to include all households from the baseline that were 
not covered by the NHIP at baseline, plus those that had cover either through the fully 
subsidized program for the poor or by voluntary enrollment. Follow-up interviews were 
conducted with 1513 households in these groups. The attrition rate was about 24 percent 
(Bredenkamp et al 2017)4. The remainder of the follow-up sample consists of a random 
sample of 267 households with NHIP cover at baseline through formal sector employment 
or via programs for overseas workers and retired formal sector workers. These households 
were included in order to obtain a nationally representative sample (after application of 
weights) that could be used in analysis of smoking behavior, which was one purpose of the 
follow-up survey. In order to reach the target sample size, any selected household that could 
not be traced or interviewed was replaced with another random draw from the initially 
mandatorily insured households.5
3 See Chapter 4 and Capuno et al. (2016) for a detailed description of the sampling method.
4 Maintaining a nationally representative sample is not critical to the validity of our analysis. 
Nonetheless, Appendix Table A2.1 presents balancing tests. There are some differences between households 
that were interviewed at follow-up and those that were not. In particular, households lost to follow-up were 
more likely to be urban, located in the capital region, richer, better educated and have fewer children. Generally, 
these are characteristics of more mobile households.
5 There are only a few significant differences between the sample of households from this group that 
was interviewed at follow-up and those that were not. Those not followed-up were less likely to be located in 
an urban setting and the capital region.
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2.4.2 Sample characteristics
For each of the 1780 households interviewed at follow-up, we define its insurance status 
according to the cover of the respondent from whom we elicited the risk and time 
preferences6. Our analysis of the association between preferences and insurance cover is 
restricted to 774 households that either had voluntarily purchased health insurance (n=172) 
or were without health insurance (n=602). Out of the 172 with voluntary insurance, 151 were 
enrolled in the NHIP, 17 obtained cover through a private insurance plan and 4 reported both 
types of insurance. The remaining 1006 households that are not used in the analysis report 
having mandatory cover, fully subsidized cover or not knowing if they are covered. 
Enumerators were instructed to interview the person who was the original household 
respondent in the baseline survey or, if that person was unavailable, their spouse. In the 
baseline survey, the enumerator was instructed to interview the head of the household or 
spouse if the head was unavailable. Only if it was impossible to interview either of them was 
another household member above 21 years old interviewed. The majority of respondents are 
either the household head (277/774) or the spouse of the head (400/774). Table 2.1 reports 
means of covariates for the analytical sample separately by voluntary insurance cover. The 
majority of respondents are married and female. Households are roughly evenly divided 
between urban and rural locations, with a higher share of urban among the insured (not 
significant). A little less than a quarter of respondents have at least some college education, 
and the proportion is higher among the insured. The education distribution in the sample is 
in line with national figures, although the sample does have a slightly higher proportion of 
respondents that completed high school (PSA, 2015). 
Out-of-pocket (OOP) medical expenditure does not differ significantly between the 
insured and uninsured7. This may seem surprising. It could be that the coverage of medical 
expenses by insurance is offset by higher gross expenses of the insured due to adverse 
selection. In the whole sample, 34 percent of respondents believe the risk their household 
will spend more than 8000 pesos out-of-pocket on healthcare in the next year is smaller than 
the risk of similar households spending that above that amount. The fraction that puts their 
6 Any cases in which the respondent was not involved in the decision to obtain their insurance cover 
will add noise to the analysis.
7 Neither does income. This is not shown. We do not include income in our regressions because of the 
large number of missing variables. As a robustness check we run all regressions with a control for income in a 
smaller sample. This makes no difference to our results.  
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risk above that of similar households is only 19 percent. This suggests that, on average, the 
respondents are optimistic, and is consistent with a very large body of evidence that 
documents optimism bias (Weinstein, 1980; Sharot, 2011). Despite their lack of protection, 
the uninsured are more likely than the insured to report a smaller than average chance of 
incurring OOP spending of at least 8000 pesos. This is consistent with optimism bias 
contributing to the decision not to purchase insurance, but it could also be attributable to 
selection out of insurance on the basis of good health.  
Table 2.1 Means of covariates by insurance cover
Variable takes value of 1 (0 otherwise) if: All Uninsured Voluntarily 
Insured 
Demographics (respondent)
Male 0.284 0.301 0.227
Married 0.725 0.721 0.738
Age 45.46 45.32 45.94
Demographics (household)
Urban 0.484 0.468 0.541
Number of household members 4.990 4.993 4.977
Number of household members aged <15 1.491 1.528 1.360
Number of household members aged >=65 0.209 0.203 0.233
Socioeconomic status
Highest attained education of respondent 
No education 0.173 0.185 0.129
Completed elementary school 0.233 0.245 0.193
Completed high school 0.493 0.495 0.485
College graduate + 0.101 0.075 0.193
Health care, expenditure and insurance
At least one hospital inpatient stay in past year (household) 0.072 0.073 0.070
Household OOP medical expenditure (OOP) last year
0 pesos 0.234 0.231 0.244
1-4000 pesos 0.519 0.530 0.483
4001-8000 pesos 0.125 0.126 0.122
> 8000 pesos 0.121 0.113 0.151
Perceive risk of spending > 8000 pesos on healthcare compared 
with similar household to be: 
smaller (optimistic) 0.341 0.364 0.262
same (neutral) 0.468 0.457 0.506
larger (pessimistic) 0.191 0.179 0.233
Health insurance literacy (respondent)
Low 0.304 0.311 0.279
Medium 0.526 0.523 0.535
High 0.171 0.166 0.186
Knowledge of NHIP benefits
Low 0.296 0.302 0.273
Medium 0.342 0.349 0.320
High 0.362 0.349 0.407
Treatment site of health insurance experiment 0.786 0.762 0.866
N 774 602 172
Note: Significant differences between insured and uninsured in bold (5%). There are 771 observations with 
education information in the sample; 600 uninsured and 171 insured. For other variables, sample sizes are as 
in bottom row. Precise definitions of the variables related to risks of medical spending, health insurance literacy 
and knowledge of NHIP benefits are given in Appendix table A2.2.
18
Those with insurance are ten percentage points more likely to be located in randomly 
selected municipalities where households eligible for the voluntary enrollment program at 
baseline were offered a premium subsidy of up to 50%, information on the program and, in 
some cases, assistance with enrollment. Not all of the households in these municipalities at 
follow-up were offered the inducements at baseline. Some were ineligible for the voluntary 
enrollment program at that time8. Still, the marked difference between voluntarily insured 
and uninsured households at follow-up in the proportion resident in the original treatment 
sites suggests that the inducements may have had lasting effects on insurance enrollment. I 
test this in Chapter 4.
2.5 Preference elicitation
2.5.1 Risk preferences
Elicitation of risk preferences is known to produce data containing a large amount of noise 
(Wakker, 2010; Chuang and Schechter, 2015). Estimation of prospect theory parameters 
demands some sophistication on the part of respondents (Charness et al., 2013). This poses 
a challenge in the context of low- and middle-income countries. Visual supports can make 
the task more feasible, although this is usually done in an experimental context in which 
there is time for elaborate instructions. We aimed to develop a method that is sufficiently 
comprehensible to be applicable in a time constrained survey administered to low educated 
respondents. 
To elicit the risk parameters of utility curvature (ݎ) and probability weighting (ߙ),
we designed two independent sets of hypothetical lottery choices in the domain of losses 
summarized in Figure 2.1. The survey respondent of each household was asked to choose 
between two jars, from which a ball would be drawn randomly. The jar representation 
avoided making reference in the questions to probabilities, which respondents may not have 
understood. The exact protocol used and an example of the visual support can be found in 
appendices A2 and A3 respectively. 
8 In fact, 50% of those insured through voluntary insurance at follow-up and located in the treatment 
sites did not receive any health insurance inducements at baseline since they were not considered eligible for 
the voluntary program at that time.
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Figure 2.1 Summary of lottery choices to elicit risk preferences
Lottery 1
Lottery 2
There were two sets of choices, each corresponding to a pair of jars. In the first set, 
we elicited a loss ݔ that the respondent was indifferent between incurring with certainty and 
facing a 50% chance of losing 400 pesos.
Lottery 1: ݔ~ െ 400଴.ହ0
In the second set, we elicited the loss ݖ such that the respondent was indifferent between 
facing a 50% chance of incurring that loss and facing a 25% chance of losing 400.
Lottery 2: ݖ଴.ହ0~െ 400଴.ଶହ0
Under expected utility, ݔ = ݖ. A difference between the two amounts identifies probability 
weighting.
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We started each elicitation process with a choice between two options with the same 
expected value9. Depending on the answer, we then either increased or decreased the 
expected value of the second option while keeping the first option constant until the 
respondent switched from one to the other. If there was no switching, then the procedure 
ended after offering four choices. Figure 2.1 depicts the process.
In the first set of questions, 14 respondents reached question G and did not switch. 
These respondents make a dominated choice, preferring a loss of 400 pesos for sure over a 
50% chance to lose 400 pesos or nothing otherwise. In the second set, more respondents (71) 
make a dominated choice. This is not surprising since the second set of questions demands 
more understanding. We exclude respondents who make a dominated choice in either set of 
questions (76 respondents) from the analysis. In Appendix table A2.7.1, we compare these 
respondents with those used in the analysis on observable characteristics. Most importantly, 
the proportion voluntarily insured is similar in the two groups. On most other characteristics 
they do not differ either. We do not exclude respondents who exhibit what appear to be 
extreme risk seeking preferences implied by reaching question D and not switching at that 
point. Around 40 percent of respondents give this sequence of responses in set 1, and 35 
percent do so in set 2. Pretesting revealed that respondents making this sequence of choices 
did appear to understand the task, while this was not true of those who reached question G 
and did not switch. Those not switching at D explained their choices by an attraction to 
gambling. While one may doubt that the degree of risk seeking implied by not switching at 
D is a true reflection of preferences, this does not undermine our purpose. We are interested 
in the association between risk preferences and insurance uptake, and not in the estimate of 
the magnitude of utility curvature. However, we do test robustness of the preference-
insurance correlation to excluding respondents who do not switch at D.
From the switching point we infer a range of possible values containing the point of 
indifference between the two options.10 We chose the midpoint of this range as a 
respondent’s point of indifference. For each combination of points of indifference ݔ and ݖ
9 The expected value of this choice, 200 pesos, coincides with the monthly premium for those with an 
average monthly income of no more than PHP 25,000 ($540)
10 For those who do not switch in Question D we infer a switching point of -0.5. 
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we can determine the parameters ݎ and ߙ, indicating the curvature of the utility function and 
probabilistic sensitivity respectively.11 These are shown in Appendix table A2.7.2.
2.5.2 Time preferences
To elicit time preferences we offered two independent sets of hypothetical choices between 
monetary amounts to be received at different points in time.12 The first set of choices is 
designed to elicit the amount ݔ଴ that if received now (ݐ = 0) would leave the respondent 
indifferent with respect to receiving 200 pesos in half a year from now (ݐ = 1/2). 
Choice 1: ݔ଴~200ଵ/ଶ.
The second question elicits the amount ݕ that if received in half a year from now 
(ݐ = 1/2) would leave the respondent indifferent with respect to receiving 200 pesos in one 
year from now (ݐ = 1). 
Choice 2: ݕଵ/ଶ~200ଵ.
We use a bisection method depicted in Figure 2.2 to infer a range of possible values 
containing the points of indifference x0 and y from the choices at which the respondent 
switched between options.  We use the midpoint of this range as the respondent’s point of 
indifference.13 Appendix A2.3 contains the exact protocol used. 
Having elicited two points of indifference ݔ଴ and ݕ, the parameters ߚ and ߜ can be 
determined using the model for quasi-hyperbolic time preferences.14 It can be done directly 
if utility is linear (ݎ = 1). Appendix table 2.7.3 gives the values for the parameters ߚ and ߜ
for ݎ = 1 which we will refer to as ߚ௟ and ߜ௟. Although linear utility is typically assumed 
when identifying time preferences, utility curvature might have a confounding effect 
(Anderson et al. 2008; Andreoni et al. 2015). We therefore estimate the parameters over 
utility as opposed to income assuming the power utility function u(ݔ௧) = ݔ௧௥  , in, inferring r 
from the simultaneously elicited data on risk preferences using prospect theory as described 
in section 2.5.1.
11 The derivations can be found in Appendix A2.5
12 Eliciting time preferences tends to be simpler than that of risk preferences (Chuang and Schechter, 
2015) and we therefore didn’t include any dominated choices to test for inconsistencies 
13 For respondents that prefer 250 now (in half a year) from 200 in half a year (in a year) we infer a 
switching point of 275.
14 The derivations can be found in Appendix A2.6
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Figure 2.2 Summary of the two sets of choices used to elicit time preferences
Choice 1
Choice 2
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Raw data
The median point of indifference is -50 for lottery 1 and -125 for lottery 2. Hence, for both 
lotteries, a majority prefers a riskier choice indicated by a point of indifference greater than 
-200. Many respondents choose the same point of indifference for both lotteries (Table 2.2), 
which implies linear probability weighting. However, on average, the point of indifference 
23
is somewhat larger in the first (x) than in the second lottery (ݖ), which indicates non-linear 
probability weighting. The mean difference between the two lotteries is -22 and statistically 
significant (p<0.01) while the median difference is 0. 
Table 2.2 Frequencies of points of indifference derived from risk questions
Lottery 2 0.5 0.250~ 400 0z  N
Lottery 1 0.5~ 400 0x  -350 -275 -225 -175 -125 -50 -0.5
-350 1 3 4 2 0 0 1 11
-275 0 3 11 6 5 3 2 30
-225 1 9 49 17 6 4 10 96
-175 1 8 21 22 12 7 5 76
-125 3 5 22 14 32 8 9 93
-50 5 8 15 16 12 39 20 115
-0.5 2 12 20 9 22 18 194 277
N 13 48 142 86 89 79 241 698
Lottery 1 Lottery 2
Median -50 -125
Mean -92.4 -114.5
Standard Deviation 97.2 103.6
Table 2.3 presents the points of indifference from the two choices used to elicit time 
preferences. 
Table 2.3 Frequencies of points of indifference for time preference questions
Choice 2 1/2 1~ 200y N
Choice 1 0 1/2~ 200x 12.5 37.5 62.5 87.5 112.5 137.5 162.5 187.5 225 275
12.5 174 18 4 13 7 2 1 0 13 6 238
37.5 14 42 4 27 7 4 1 4 6 1 110
62.5 5 4 8 17 3 1 2 1 2 0 43
87.5 5 11 5 57 10 5 5 6 3 3 110
112.5 0 1 0 6 1 0 2 1 1 0 12
137.5 0 1 0 2 2 0 2 1 2 0 10
162.5 0 1 1 1 3 0 2 0 1 0 9
187.5 2 1 1 5 0 1 1 8 1 6 26
225 6 4 1 6 1 1 6 7 25 7 64
275 4 6 1 2 1 3 1 7 13 38 76
N 210 89 25 136 35 17 23 35 67 61 698
Choice 1 Choice 2 
Median 62.5 87.5
Mean 91.4 97.2
Standard Deviation 91.7 87.3               
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On average, respondents are indifferent between receiving 91 pesos now and 200 pesos in 
half a year, indicating very high discounting of future rewards. The average respondent is 
indifferent between 97 pesos to be received in half a year and 200 pesos to be received in 
one year. The fact that preferences for sooner gratification are only slightly more intense 
when the earlier period is the present (compare 91 with 97), indicates that, on average, there 
is only a small degree of present bias, which is, however, significant15. The medians differ 
more, indicating stronger present bias. However, the median difference is 0.
2.6.2 Bivariate analyses of association between insurance and preferences 
Figure 2.3 presents cumulative distributions of the utility curvature (r) and probability 
weighting (Į) parameters for respondents with and without health insurance. Parameters of 
the respective distributions are given in Table 2.4. The utility curvature distributions are very 
similar at the extremes (i.e. high degrees of convexity and concavity). They appear to diverge 
elsewhere, although the null of equality of the distributions is not rejected16. The sample 
mean of the utility curvature parameter is smaller for those with insurance, which indicates 
more risk seeking for a given the probability weighting function (Table 2.4). However, this 
difference it not significant (p=0.361). 
From the right-hand figure and from Table 2.4, it can be observed that the proportion 
of sample respondents with ߙ>1 is higher among those who purchase insurance (24.2%) 
than it is among those without insurance (18.0%). However, there is no significant difference 
in the distribution of observations over the categories of alpha (<1, =1, >1) and in the 
GLVWULEXWLRQRIDOSKDE\LQVXUDQFHVWDWXV3HDUVRQȤ2(2) = 2.945, p=0.229). The mean alpha 
is slightly larger among the insured, indicating less of a tendency to overweight small 
probabilities, and this difference is marginally statistically significant (p=0.067). The steps 
in the functions at ߙ=1 indicates that a large proportion of respondents do not weight 
probabilities. For both the insured and uninsured, the median and mean Į is close to 1 
indicating that, on average, there is no deviation from Expected Utility. 
15 The mean difference between the two points of indifference of 5.84 pesos is significantly different 
from 0 (p<0.05)
16 A two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test fails to reject the null of equality against the alternative 
of inequality at a 5% level of significance (Bennett, 2013).
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Figure 2.3 Cumulative distributions of risk preference parameters17
3a Utility curvature: r 3b Probability weighting: Į
Figure 2.4. Cumulative distributions of time preference parameters18
4a Discount factor: į 4b Present bias: ȕ
Figure 2.4 shows the cumulative distributions of the time preference parameters split 
by insurance status, and parameters of the distributions are again shown in Table 2.4. The 
empirical distribution of the discount factor (left-hand) for those without insurance lies 
below that for those with insurance at the bottom of the distributions, although the null of 
equality is not rejected at the 5% level of significance19. The sample mean and median of 
this parameter are both smaller for those with no insurance, indicating they discount the 
future more, however this difference is not significant. The distributions of the present bias 
17 The distribution for r is truncated at 3 (7 observations total). The distribution for Į is truncated at 4 
(2 observations total). The median, mean and standard deviation are computed before truncation.
18 7KHGLVWULEXWLRQVIRUįDUHWUXQFDWHGDWREVHUYDWLRQVWRWDO The distributions for ȕare truncated 
at 3 (15 observations total). The median, mean and standard deviation are computed before truncation.
19 A two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test does reject the null of equality against the alternative 
of inequality at a 10% level of significance (Bennett, 2013).
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parameter ȕ are very similar for the insured and uninsured. Equality of the distributions is 
not rejected at the 5% level. The step in the functions at ȕ=1 indicates that a large fraction 
of respondents discount exponentially (Table 2.4). The proportion of respondents exhibiting 
present bias (ȕ<1) (29%) is only slightly larger than those that are future biased (ȕ>1) (20% 
and 22% for the uninsured and insured respectively). 
Table 2.4 Risk and time preferences by insurance status
(1) Uninsured (2) Insured (1) = (2)
p-value
Risk preferences
Utility curvature (r)
Mean 0.544 0.498 0.361
Std. Dev. 0.562 0.511
Median 0.377 0.377
3UREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJĮ
Mean 0.993 1.108 0.067
Std. Dev. 0.663 0.758
Median 1 1
< 1 (%) 32.48 30.07
= 1 (%) 49.54 45.75 0.229+
> 1 (%) 17.98 24.18
Time preferences
'LVFRXQWIDFWRUį
Mean 0.648 0.712 0.332
Std. Dev. 0.754 0.610
Median 0.563 0.615 0.164
3UHVHQWELDVȕ
Mean 1.105 1.172 0.563
Std. Dev. 1.176 1.567
Median 1 1
< 1 (%) 28.62 28.76
= 1 (%) 51.38 49.02 0.811++
>1 (%) 20.00 22.22
ȃ 545 153
+ 3HDUVRQȤ ++ 3HDUVRQȤ 
2.6.3 Multivariate analyses of the association between insurance and preferences
To investigate further whether insurance is associated with preferences, we regress voluntary 
health insurance status on all four parameters simultaneously. We enter all the parameters, 
except the probability weighting ߙ, as continuous variables. According to theory, insurance 
demand does not increase or decrease monotonically with ߙ. As explained in section 2.2.1,
RYHUZHLJKWLQJ ODUJH SUREDELOLWLHV RI ORVVHV Į! ZLOO LQFUHDVH WKH GHPDQG IRU KHDOWK
insurance of respondents who perceive themselves to face a high probability of incurring 
PHGLFDOH[SHQVHV8QGHUZHLJKWLQJ ODUJHSUREDELOLWLHV ĮZLOOGHFUHDVH WKHGHPDQGRI
those who perceive their risk to be high and increase the demand of those who perceive their 
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risk to be low. We include ߙ < 1 and ߙ > 1 as separate categories with linear probability 
weighting (ߙ = 1) as reference. 
The first column of Table 2.5 gives estimates with control only for demographics 
and an indicator of whether the household is located in a randomly selected municipality 
where households eligible for the voluntary insurance program received inducements to 
enroll in it four years previously. The second column adds controls for socioeconomic 
characteristics and indicators of past health care use and expenditure, beliefs about 
comparative risk of incurring high medical expenditure in the future, health insurance 
literacy and knowledge of the NHIP. This specification potentially eliminates correlation 
that derives from an impact of preferences on insurance through socioeconomic factors, such 
as education, as well as the medical expenditure related variables. On the other hand, without 
controlling for these potential determinants of insurance demand there is risk that any 
association between insurance and preferences is spurious.   
The estimates obtained conditioning only on demographics and the treatment site 
indicator reveal that respondents with a higher value for the utility curvature parameter, ݎ,
are less likely to purchase voluntary health insurance. Counterintuitively, this means that 
respondents with more convex utility for losses are more likely to take up health insurance. 
This is similar to the puzzling result found by others that individuals who are more risk 
averse in the domain of gains are less likely to insure (Cole et al 2013; Dercon et al 2015; 
Giesbert et al., 2011; Giné et al., 2008). A potential explanation for both results is that 
insurance is viewed as a risky prospect among those with little experience of it. Only those 
prepared to gamble on receiving compensation promised by the insurer should they incur 
medical expenses enroll (Dercon et al 2015). Respondents with a value for ߙ larger than 1, 
overweighting large probabilities of losses are more likely to insure than those who weight 
probabilities linearly. The effect sizes for the risk preference parameters drop and they lose 
significance when additional controls are included. This might be interpreted as indicative 
of a spurious relationship between insurance and risk preferences arising from correlation of 
each with socioeconomic factors, such as education. However, it could also be that risk 
preferences influence insurance partly through socioeconomic characteristics. Most studies 
on correlates of risk preferences are cross-sectional and it is therefore hard to determine 
whether socioeconomic characteristics antecede risk preferences or vice versa.  
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Table 2.5 Variation in probability of health insurance enrollment with risk preference, time 
preferences and covariates (Probit marginal effects)
(1) (2)
r (utility curvature) -0.076** -0.059
(0.037) (0.037)
Į3UREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ 0.014 0.010
(0.034) (0.033)
Į!3UREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ 0.107** 0.083*
(0.047) (0.046)
įGLVFRXQWIDFWRU 0.043** 0.041**
(0.022) (0.020)
ȕSUHVHQWELDV 0.009 0.010
(0.012) (0.011)
Treatment site of health insurance experiment 0.122*** 0.140***
(0.040) (0.039)
Male -0.064* -0.067*
(0.036) (0.035)
Married 0.029 0.026
(0.035) (0.035)
Age 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Urban 0.039 0.019
(0.031) (0.031)
Number of household members 0.005 0.004
(0.008) (0.008)
Number of household members aged <15 -0.017 -0.011
(0.015) (0.015)
Number of household members aged >=65 0.001 -0.004
(0.034) (0.032)
Completed elementary school 0.038
(0.053)
Completed high school 0.070
(0.047)
College graduate + 0.258***
(0.057)
At least one hospital inpatient stay in past year -0.031
(0.061)
1-4000 pesos OOP past year -0.052
(0.040)
4001-8000 pesos OOP past year -0.095*
(0.056)
>8000 pesos OOP past year -0.048
(0.058)
Optimistic -0.110***
(0.037)
Pessimistic 0.026
(0.041)
Low health insurance literacy -0.008
(0.036)
High health insurance literacy 0.007
(0.042)
Aware of NHIP 0.085
(0.058)
Low knowledge of NHIP benefits 0.042
(0.047)
High knowledge of NHIP benefits 0.034
(0.036)
Observations 695 695
Notes: (1) Estimates are marginal effects averaged over sample. Robust std. err.in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. (2) Three observations are excluded in both specifications due to missing educ. variable.
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We find a positive association between insurance enrollment and the discount factor 
that is robust in size and significance to controlling for other preference parameters and both 
VHWVRIFRYDULDWHV7KHSUHVHQWELDVSDUDPHWHUȕLVQRWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKKHDOWKLQVXUDQFHLQ
either specification.
In Table 2.6 we examine robustness of the associations between insurance and 
preferences to excluding respondents who a) give responses that imply extreme risk seeking 
behavior, and b) have poor knowledge of the operation of health insurance. Respondents are 
categorized as a) if they arrive at D in lottery 1 and/or lottery 2 and do not switch at that 
point. After excluding these respondents, utility curvature is no longer significantly 
associated with health insurance take up. This is mainly due to a loss of power as the sample 
size falls by almost half. The magnitude of the association decreases only modestly. Hence, 
it does not appear to be only the extreme risk seekers that generate the association between 
insurance and convex utility in the full sample. After dropping the extreme risk seekers, the 
effect of probability weighting for those with an S-shaped probability weighting function 
(ߙ > 1) increases in size and remains significant when including additional controls. In 
addition, respondents with an inverse S shaped probability weighting function (ߙ <
1) appear more likely to buy insurance. The association between insurance and the discount 
factor is robust in size and significance to this exclusion.
The estimates presented in the middle panel of Table 2.6 are obtained excluding 
respondents who could not answer at least two out of five questions about basic 
characteristics of health insurance correctly (see Appendix Table A2.2 for precise 
definitions). The right-hand panel gives estimates obtained with both extreme risk seekers 
and the health insurance illiterate excluded. Dropping those with poor health insurance 
literacy again results in the loss of significance of the negative association between insurance 
and utility curvature. Clearly, this is the least robust relationship. And the positive 
association between insurance and the discount rate is the most robust. With both exclusions 
applied, those who weigh probabilities are significantly more likely to insure than those who 
behave as assumed in EU and do not. Perhaps the most interesting result to emerge when 
those with poor health insurance literacy are dropped is that the present bias parameter is 
significantly negatively associated with insurance.
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Table 2.6 Variation in probability of health insurance enrollment with extreme risk seekers 
and/or health insurance illiterate excluded (Probit marginal effects)
Extreme risk seekers 
excluded
Health insurance 
illiterate excluded
Both extreme risk 
seekers and health 
insurance illiterate 
excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
r (utility curvature) -0.064 -0.055 -0.069 -0.056 -0.042 -0.033
(0.058) (0.058) (0.047) (0.046) (0.062) (0.058)
Į(Probability weighting) 0.074* 0.074* 0.025 0.015 0.099* 0.105**
(0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.052) (0.048)
Į!3UREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ 0.128** 0.126** 0.108* 0.099* 0.131* 0.150**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.068) (0.067)
įGLVFRXQWfactor) 0.045* 0.045* 0.048* 0.042* 0.053* 0.049*
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025)
ȕSUHVHQWELDV 0.010 0.012 0.042** 0.043** 0.045*** 0.043***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Control for:
Demographics and location Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 372 372 481 481 248 248
Notes: See appendix Table A2.7.5 for full results. Estimates are marginal effects averaged over the sample. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Extreme risk seekers are those who 
arrived at D in lottery 1 and/or 2 and did not switch. Health insurance illiterate are those who could not answer 
at least two out of five questions about basic characteristics of health insurance correctly. ‘Demographics and 
location’ correspond to the controls in column (1) of Table 2.5. ‘All covariates’ are those in column (2) and 
Table 2.6.
This holds irrespective of the covariates controlled for and whether or not extreme risk 
seekers are also excluded. Once we restrict attention to respondents who have minimal 
knowledge of how health insurance operates, it is clear that health insurance enrollment 
varies with both dimensions of time preferences. Those who discount delayed rewards more 
aggressively are less likely to insure. On top of this, those who have a greater tendency 
toward present bias are less likely to insure. The positive association between the propensity 
to insure and the present bias parameter does not necessarily imply that those with present 
biased preferences insure less than those who do not. Around 18 percent of respondents who 
have some health insurance literacy display future bias. To determine whether insurance 
demand varies with present bias, future bias or both we re-HVWLPDWHZLWKLQGLFDWRUVRIȕ
DQGȕ!UHIHUHQFHȕ UHSODFLQJWKHȕHQWHUHGDVDFRQWLQXRXVYDULDEOH:HGRWKLVLQWKH
sample that includes only observations with some health insurance literacy. This reveals that 
the signs of the effects are as expected: present biased respondents are less likely to insure 
voluntarily while future biased respondents are more likely to (see Appendix Table A2.7.6). 
The effects are, however, not significant, which may simply be due to loss of power. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
We elicited risk and time preferences in a nationwide household survey in the Philippines 
and investigated their associations with health insurance enrollment. We consistently find 
that individuals who discount the future more are less likely to insure. This suggests that one 
reason many Filipinos do not take out health insurance is because they value the premium 
they must pay when enrolling above the highly discounted benefit they will only enjoy, if at 
all, at some time over the course of the following year. Note that in the Philippines’ NHIP, 
as with most health insurance, new enrollees must wait for a period (3 months) after paying 
the premium before any claim can be made. 
Evidence on the role of present bias in the insurance decision is mixed. In the full 
sample, about 20% of respondents are future biased: they are more impatient in the future 
than in the present.20 This is consistent with several studies that allow for future bias (Attema 
et al 2010; Bleichrodt et al. 2016; Delaney and Lades, 2015; Loewenstein 1987; Sayman and 
Öncüler, 2009; Scholten and Read, 2006; Takeuchi, 2011). Insurance does not vary with the 
present bias parameter in the full sample. This suggests that a financial device that facilitates 
commitment to enrollment at a later date would not necessarily raise take-up. People would 
refuse to commit for the same reason that they decline to purchase insurance at a point in 
time; the future benefits are not considered to be worth the costs incurred at the time that 
insurance must be paid for. This conclusion appears contrary to evidence that commitment 
devices are effective in raising saving and the propensity to quit smoking, including in the 
Philippines (Ashraf et al, 2006; Brune et al., 2016; Duflo et al., 2011; Giné et al., 2010). The 
difference between this chapter and these other studies is that we measure time preferences 
directly and use these to draw inferences about the potential effectiveness of policies. The 
other studies infer in the opposite direction. They estimate the effectiveness of policy 
interventions and draw conclusions about preferences consistent with this effectiveness. A 
potential problem with this line of argument is that the commitment devices may work for 
reasons other than present bias (Delaney and Lades, 2015; Giné et al., 2018). However, we 
do find that being more present biased is associated with not taking out health insurance 
among individuals who have some knowledge of how the product operates. This suggests 
20 A bias toward the present or future is often interpreted as time inconsistency while it could also 
follow from time invariant preferences resulting from e.g. fluctuations of cash flows (Halevy, 2015; Janssens 
et al., 2017). Our design did not allow testing for this.
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that the order in which health insurance inducements are introduced may be important to 
their effectiveness. First, make people aware of how insurance operates. Then offer devices 
that commit them to enrolling. 
Our findings are in line with evidence from randomized experiments demonstrating 
that reducing the indirect costs of insurance (application) at enrollment can be highly 
effective in increasing take-up (Thornton et al., 2010; Capuno et al., 2016).21 Households on 
the margins of poverty may be expected to discount the future aggressively and to weigh 
heavily any costs, including time costs of applying for insurance through bureaucratic 
procedures that divert resources and energy from fending off destitution (Mullainathan and 
Shafir 2014; Schilbach et al 2016)). 
Consistent with prospect theory, the majority of respondents have a strong convex 
curvature of the utility function in the domain of losses. Given this, insurance can only be 
explained by the non-linear weighting of probabilities. We find that respondents who 
overweight moderate and large probabilities, as well as those with more convex utility, are 
more likely to purchase insurance. This is can be consistent with theory if these individuals 
perceive a moderate to large chance of incurring medical expenditures in excess of the 
insurance premium. It is also in line with the finding that individuals have a greater demand 
for insurance for high probability-low consequence events (e.g. bicycle theft) than for low 
probability-high consequence events (e.g. floods) (Browne, 2015). However, after 
controlling for socioeconomic factors, insurance is not associated with either risk preference 
parameter in our full sample. The associations that exist in the absence of these controls 
could be spurious arising from the joint association of both insurance and risk preferences 
with socioeconomic characteristics. Alternatively, it may be that those characteristics, as 
well as insurance, are (in part) determined by risk preferences. Restricting attention to 
respondents with some understanding of how insurance operates and who do not exhibit 
extreme risk seeking preferences reveals a stronger role for probability weighting. In this
restricted sample, those who overweight moderate to large probabilities of losses are more 
likely to insure than those who weight probabilities linearly. This is consistent with our 
prediction since the probability of having medical expenditures is relatively high with about 
80% of people reporting out of pocket medical expenditures in the past year (see Chapter 3 
21 Asuming et al (2017) find that assistance with enrollment has no impact on insurance uptake in Ghana, while 
price subsidies and information do. 
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for more details). In some of our restricted estimations, we also find the probability of having 
voluntary insurance is higher among those who overweight small probabilities. Insurance 
demand does not appear to be monotonic in the probability weighting parameter. 
Understanding this better would require developing a model of insurance against a non-
binary loss that allows the subjective distribution of those losses to deviate from the objective 
distribution, which the individual cannot observe. Chapter 3 partially addresses this research 
challenge. 
The role for utility curvature and probability weighting in explaining health insurance 
choices certainly deserves further research, but attention should also be given to other 
explanations relating to risk preferences. We follow the common approach of taking initial 
wealth –the state in which medical expenses are not incurred- as the reference point (Sydnor 
2010; Wakker et al 1997). As such, we are only concerned with utility in the loss domain; 
the choice is between a small certain loss (the insurance premium) and a larger uncertain 
loss (medical expenses). However, we cannot be sure about the reference point that people 
actually use. This is one of the main reasons that application of prospect theory is challenging 
(Barbaris, 2013). 
Elicitation of risk and time preferences in large household surveys in low- and 
middle- income countries is still very rare. We introduced a method that is applicable in a 
time constrained survey administered to low educated respondents. There is scope to further 
improve the methodology. We found that a large proportion of respondents have a preference 
for extremely risky choices. Our measure could be refined to allow for more discrimination 
in this part of the distribution of preferences. We used hypothetical lottery choices which are 
sometimes found to increase risk seeking (e.g. Holt and Laury 2002). This is less of a concern 
because we are not interested in the absolute value of the risk parameters but rather how they 
differ between individuals with and without insurance. However, hypothetical questions 
could also increase noise. Incentivizing the respondents would be preferable, but is seldom 
feasible in the context of a large survey (Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008; Murphy et al. 2005). 
We elicited time preferences in the gain domain, as opposed to the loss domain, to reduce 
the cognitive burden for the respondents. Although normative economic theories prescribe 
no differences in discount factors for gains and losses, losses are generally discounted less 
than gains (Benzion et al., 1989; Thaler, 1981; Yates and Watts, 1975). Again, this is not a 
major concern because we are interested in differences in discount factors as opposed to the 
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absolute values, but it would be interesting to see whether our results replicate with time 
preferences elicited in the loss domain.
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Appendices Chapter 2
Appendix A2.1 Balancing tests of attrition 
Balancing tests of attrition on baseline characteristics
Followed up Not Followed up p-value
Informal sector/poor at baseline
Urban 0.424 0.617 0.000
Head is working 0.876 0.844 0.079
Head has poor health 0.028 0.039 0.220
Head had at least college education 0.077 0.130 0.000
Has available health facility within 15 min 0.721 0.749 0.240
Has other insurance 0.026 0.043 0.065
Number of children under 21 1.851 1.517 0.000
Experienced adverse health outcome in the last year 0.264 0.268 0.864
National Capital Region 0.112 0.245 0.000
Rest of Luzon 0.440 0.483 0.103
Visayas 0.226 0.087 0.000
Mindanao 0.223 0.186 0.093
N 1513 462
Formal sector at baseline
Urban 0.652 0.523 0.000
Head is working 0.891 0.912 0.314
Head has poor health 0.026 0.023 0.740
Head had at least college education 0.202 0.254 0.090
Has available health facility within 15 min 0.772 0.733 0.220
Has other insurance 0.127 0.093 0.118
Number of children under 21 1.843 1.952 0.355
Experienced adverse health outcome in the last year 0.255 0.270 0.635
National Capital Region 0.213 0.100 0.000
Rest of Luzon 0.554 0.436 0.001
Visayas 0.090 0.260 0.000
Mindanao 0.142 0.203 0.029
N 267 708
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Appendix A2.2 Definitions of measures of perceived risk of medical spending, health 
insurance literacy and knowledge of national health insurance program benefits
Perceived comparative risk of medical spending
Respondents were asked: 
“Compared with other households similar to yours, do you think the chance that your household will incur 
more than 8000 pesos out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare, medicines and maintenance drugs in the next 
year is” 
x Smaller 
x The same 
x Larger
Health insurance literacy
Respondents were asked to judge whether each of five statements relating to health insurance was true or false. 
They also had the option answer “don’t know”. The statements were as follows:
x Health insurance is a financial arrangement where an individual contributes a small certain payment 
on a regular basis in exchange for reductions in medical expenses in case of illness or hospitalization.
x Health insurance contribution is something you must pay only in months when you use medical 
services.
x With health insurance, the insurer pays for a portion of your medical expenses in case you get sick.
x A health insurance is an individual savings account from which you can withdraw the total amount of 
your contributions in times of illness and hospitalization.
x An insured person can claim back her health insurance contributions for the year if she did not get ill or 
hospitalized and did not claim benefits.
A respondent is categorized as having low, medium or high health insurance literacy if s/he  correctly answers 
0-2, 3-4 or 5 questions respectively. The restricted sample of those with a minimal level of health insurance 
literacy consistent with those in the medium and high categories.
Knowledge of national health insurance program benefits
Respondents were asked whether the NHIP (fully or partially) covers 18 medical treatments/services. Answers 
could be “yes”, “no” or “don’t know”. A respondent is categorized as having low, medium or high knowledge 
of NHIP benefits if s/he correctly answers 0-6, 7-12 or 13-18 questions respectively. 
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Appendix A2.3 Protocol for elicitation of time and risk preferences 
TIME PREFERENCE (1)
SHOWCARD
Now I will ask you to make some choices between receiving money at different points in time, either now or 
half a year from now. There is no right or wrong answer, I am just curious to hear what you prefer. If you were 
to choose between the following two options, which one will you choose? 
A.
Receive 200 pesos now 1 CONTINUE TO B 
Receive 200 pesos half a year from now 2 SKIP TO I
B.
Receive 100 pesos now 1 CONTINUE TO C
Receive 200 pesos half a year from now 2 SKIP TO F
C.
Receive 50 pesos now 1 CONTINUE TO D 
Receive 200 pesos half a year from now 2 SKIP TO E
D.
Receive 25 pesos now 1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Receive 200 pesos half a year from now 2 PROCEED TO  NEXT SET
E.
Receive 75 pesos now
1 PROCEED TO NEXT 
SET
Receive 200 pesos half a year from now
2 PROCEED TO NEXT 
SET
F.
Receive 150 pesos now 1 CONTINUE TO G
Receive 200 pesos half a year from now 2 SKIP TO H
G.
Receive 125 pesos now 1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Receive 200 pesos half a year from now 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
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TIME PREFERENCE (2)
SHOWCARD.
Again, I will ask you to make some choices between receiving money at different points in time, now they 
concern choices between half a year from now and one year from now. Again, there is no right or wrong 
answer. If you were to choose between the following two options, which one will you choose? 
H.
Receive 175 pesos now 1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Receive 200 pesos half a year from now 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
I.
Receive 250 pesos now 1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Receive 200 pesos half a year from now 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
A.
Receive 200 pesos half a year from now 1 CONTINUE TO B 
Receive 200 pesos one year from now 2 SKIP TO I
B.
Receive 100 pesos half a year from now 1 CONTINUE TO C
Receive 200 pesos one year from now 2 SKIP TO F
C.
Receive 50 pesos half a year from now 1 CONTINUE TO D 
Receive 200 pesos one year from now 2 SKIP TO E
D.
Receive 25 pesos half a year from now
1
PROCEED TO NEXT 
SET
Receive 200 pesos one year from now
2
PROCEED TO NEXT 
SET
E.
Receive 75 pesos half a year from now 1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Receive 200 pesos one year from now 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
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RISK AVERSION (1)
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Present the respondent with the visual support. The visual support 
for option 1 stays the same throughout the question, but the visual support for option 2 needs to be 
changed for every sub question.
I am now going to ask you some questions which are a little bit similar to “pera o bayong”, but they are about 
losing money as opposed to winning money. There is no right or wrong answer, I am just curious to hear what 
you prefer.
F.
Receive 150 pesos half a year from now 1 CONTINUE TO G
Receive 200 pesos one year from now 2 SKIP TO H
G.
Receive 125 pesos half a year from now 1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Receive 200 pesos one year from now 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
H.
Receive 175 pesos  half a year from now 1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Receive 200 pesos one year from now 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
I.
Receive 250 pesos half a year from now 1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Receive 200 pesos one year from now 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
A.
I am going to ask you to make the choice between two options, represented by these two jars. The first jar 
contains 4 balls.  If you choose the first jar, one ball will be drawn from the jar. If a black ball is drawn you 
will lose 400 pesos and if a white ball is drawn you will lose nothing. This means there is an equal chance 
of losing 400 pesos and losing nothing (fifty-fifty). If you choose the second jar you will lose 200 pesos for 
sure. If you were to choose between these two jars, which one would you choose? 
An equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 400 pesos and losing
nothing
1 CONTINUE TO B
Lose 200 pesos for sure 2 SKIP TO E
B.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same, but if you choose the second jar you will now lose 150 pesos for sure. If 
you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, an equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 400 pesos and losing
nothing
1 CONTINUE TO C
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Lose 150 pesos for sure 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
C.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same, but if you choose the second jar you will now lose 100 pesos for sure. If 
you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, an equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 400 pesos and losing
nothing
1 CONTINUE TO D
Lose 100 pesos for sure 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
D.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same, but if you choose the second jaryou will now lose 1 peso for sure. If you 
were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, an equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 400 pesos and losing
nothing
1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Lose 1 peso for sure 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
E.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same, but if you choose the second jaryou will now lose 250 pesos for sure. If 
you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, an equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 400 pesos and losing
nothing
1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Lose 250 pesos for sure 2 CONTINUE TO F
F.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same, but if you choose the second jaryou will now lose 300 pesos for sure. If 
you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, an equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 400 pesos and losing
nothing
1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Lose 300 pesos for sure 2 CONTINUE TO G
G.
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RISK AVERSION(2)
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Present the respondent with the visual support. The visual support 
for option 1 stays the same throughout the question, but the visual support for option 2 needs to be 
changed for every sub question.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same, but if you choose the second jaryou will now lose 400 pesos for sure. If 
you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, an equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 400 pesos and losing
nothing
1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
Lose 400 pesos for sure 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
A.
In this question I am again going to ask you to make the choice between two options, represented by these 
two jars. The first jar again contains 4 balls. If you choose the first jar, one ball will be drawn from the jar. 
If a black ball is drawn you will lose 400 pesos and if a white ball is drawn you will lose nothing. This means 
there is a chance of 1 out of 4 (25%) of losing 400 pesos and 3 out of 4 (75%) losing nothing. The second 
jar also contains 4 balls. If you choose the second jar also one ball will be drawn from the jar. If a black ball 
is drawn you will lose 200 pesos and if a white ball is drawn you will lose nothing. This means there is an 
equal chance of losing 200 pesos and losing nothing (fifty-fifty). If you were to choose between these two 
jars, which one would you choose?
A chance of 1 out of 4 (25%) of losing 400 pesos and 3 out of 4 
(75%) losing nothing 
1 CONTINUE TO B
An equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 200 pesos and losing 
nothing 
2 SKIP TO E
B.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same but the second jar changes? If a black ball is drawn from the second jar 
it now means you lose 150 pesos. If you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, a chance of 1 out of 4 (25%) of losing 400 pesos and 3 out 
of 4 (75%) losing nothing
1 CONTINUE TO C
An equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 150 pesos and losing 
nothing
2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
C.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same but the second jar changes? If a black ball is drawn from the second jar 
it now means you lose 100 pesos. If you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, a chance of 1 out of 4 (25%) of losing 400 pesos and 3 out 
of 4 (75%) losing nothing
1 CONTINUE TO D
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An equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 100 pesos and losing 
nothing
2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
D.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same but the second jar changes? If a black ball is drawn from the second jar 
it now means you lose 1 peso. If you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, a chance of 1 out of 4 (25%) of losing 400 pesos and 3 out 
of 4 (75%) losing nothing
1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
An equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 1 peso and losing nothing 2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
E.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same but the second jar changes? If a black ball is drawn from the second jar 
it now means you lose 250 pesos. If you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, a chance of 1 out of 4 (25%) of losing 400 pesos and 3 out 
of 4 (75%) losing nothing  
1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
An equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 250 pesos and losing 
nothing
2 CONTINUE TO F
F.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same but the second jar changes? If a black ball is drawn from the second jar 
it now means you lose 300 pesos. If you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, a chance of 1 out of 4 (25%) of losing 400 pesos and 3 out 
of 4 (75%) losing nothing
1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
An equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 300 pesos and losing 
nothing
2 CONTINUE TO G
G.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: Change the visual support for only the second option
What if the first jar stays the same but the second jar changes? If a black ball is drawn from the second jar 
it now means you lose 400 pesos. If you were to choose between these two jars, which one will you choose? 
Again, a chance of 1 out of 4 (25%) of losing 400 pesos and 3 out 
of 4 (75%) losing nothing
1 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
An equal chance (fifty-fifty) of losing 400 pesos and losing 
nothing
2 PROCEED TO NEXT SET
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Appendix A2.4 Example of visual support risk elicitation 
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Appendix A2.5 Derivations risk parameters
First, note that ݔ, ݖ < 0. Under PT, ݑ(0) = 0 and we can fix its value at another 
point. We fix ݑ(െ400) =  െ1.
(1) First indifference 
ݔ~െ 400଴.ହ0
ݑ(ݔ) =  െݓ (0.5)
(2) Indifference choice question 2
ݖ଴.ହ0~െ 400଴.ଶହ0
ݓ (0.5)ݑ (ݖ) =  െݓ (0.25)
ݑ(ݖ) =  െ  ݓ(0.25)ݓ 0.5)
Applying power utility and Prelec’s weighting function, the first indifference implies:
(െݔ)௥ =  exp(െ(െ ln 0.5 )ן)
ݎ ln(െݔ) = െ (െ ln 0.5 )ן
The second indifference implies :
(െݖ)௥ =   exp(െ(െ ln 0.25 )
ן)
exp(െ(െ ln 0.5 )ן)
ݎ ln(െݖ) = (െ ln 0.5 )ן െ (െ ln 0.25 )ן
Combining these results gives:
ݎ (ln(െݔ) + ln(െݖ)) =  െ(െ ln 0.25 )ן
ln(െݔ) 
ln(െݔ) + ln(െݖ) =  
(ln 0.5 )ן
(ln 0.25 )ן
Hence,
ן =
ln ൬ ln(െݔ) 
ln(െݔ) + ln(െݖ)൰
ln ቀ ln 0.5
ln 0.25
ቁ
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and
ݎ =  െ(െ ln 0.5 )
ן
ln(െݔ) .
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Appendix A2.6 Derivations time parameters
First indifference:
ݔ଴~200ଵ
Second indifference
ݕଵ~200ଶ
Applying the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model:
ݔ௥ = 200 ߚߜଵ/ଶ
ݕ௥ߚߜଵ/ଶ = 200ߚߜଵ ֞ ݕ௥ = 200 ߜଵ/ଶ
Hence,
ߜ =  ൬ ݕ
௥
200
൰
ଶ
and
ߚ =  ݔ
௥
ݕ௥
Assuming linear utility
ߜ௟ =  ቀ
ݕ
200
ቁ
ଶ
and
ߚ௟ =  
ݔ
ݕ
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Appendix A2.7 Additional Tables
Table A2.7.1 Comparisons by item response on elicitation of risk parameters
Risk parameters 
elicited 
No Yes p-value
Enrolled in voluntary health insurance 0.250 0.219 0.540
Treatment site in health insurance experiment 0.737 0.791 0.277
Demographics (respondent)
Male 0.303 0.282 0.709
Married 0.724 0.725 0.982
Age 44.46 45.56 0.467
Demographics (household)
Urban 0.500 0.483 0.776
Number of household members 5.105 4.977 0.624
Number of household members aged <15 1.382 1.503 0.461
Number of household members aged >=65 0.197 0.211 0.822
Socioeconomic status
Highest attained education of respondent 
No education 0.224 0.167 0.214
Completed elementary school 0.263 0.230 0.520
Completed high school 0.447 0.498 0.404
College graduate + 0.066 0.105 0.282
Health care, expenditure and insurance
At least one hospital inpatient stay in past year (household) 0.053 0.074 0.485
Household OOP medical expenditure (OOP) last year
0 pesos 0.276 0.229 0.358
1-4000 pesos 0.513 0.520 0.909
4001-8000 pesos 0.079 0.130 0.199
> 8000 pesos 0.132 0.120 0.776
Perceive risk of spending > 8000 pesos on healthcare compared with similar 
household to be: 
smaller (optimistic) 0.408 0.334 0.196
same (neutral) 0.382 0.477 0.113
larger (pessimistic) 0.211 0.189 0.653
Health insurance literacy (respondent)
Low 0.263 0.308 0.420
Medium 0.526 0.526 0.993
High 0.211 0.166 0.330
Aware of national health insurance program (NHIP) 0.737 0.858 0.005
Knowledge of NHIP benefits
Low 
Medium 0.382 0.287 0.085
High 0.276 0.350 0.202
N 76 698
Note: For education there are 695 observations for those with parameters for risk. 
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Table A2.7.2 Utility curvature (ݎ) and probability weighting (ߙ) for all combinations of 
answers 
Table A2.7.3 Parameters ߜ௟ and ߚ௟ for all combinations of answers to the choice questions 
with r=1 (linear utility)
r Į
Set 2 Set 2
-0.5 -50 -125 -175 -225 -275 -350 -0.5 -50 -125 -175 -225 -275 -350
-0.5 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 -0.5 1.00 0.39 0.23 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.03
Set 1 -50 0.22 0.33 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.47 Set 1 -50 2.08 1.00 0.64 0.48 0.35 0.24 0.09
-125 0.31 0.50 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.74 0.81 -125 2.75 1.48 1.00 0.77 0.58 0.40 0.16
-175 0.38 0.62 0.76 0.84 0.91 0.99 1.12 -175 3.18 1.81 1.27 1.00 0.76 0.54 0.22
-225 0.45 0.77 0.97 1.09 1.20 1.33 1.56 -225 3.66 2.21 1.60 1.28 1.00 0.72 0.30
-275 0.57 0.99 1.26 1.44 1.63 1.85 2.27 -275 4.24 2.71 2.04 1.68 1.34 1.00 0.44
-350 0.94 1.70 2.25 2.64 3.10 3.69 5.19 -350 5.67 4.05 3.28 2.85 2.41 1.93 1.00
Set 2 
12.5 37.5 62.5 87.5 112.5 137.5 162.5 187.5 225 275
0.00 0.04 0.10 0.19 0.32 0.47 0.66 0.88 1.27 1.89
Set 2 
12.5 37.5 62.5 87.5 112.5 137.5 162.5 187.5 225 275
Set 1 12.5 1.00 0.33 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05
37.5 3.00 1.00 0.60 0.43 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.14
62.5 5.00 1.67 1.00 0.71 0.56 0.45 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.23
87.5 7.00 2.33 1.40 1.00 0.78 0.64 0.54 0.47 0.39 0.32
113 9.00 3.00 1.80 1.29 1.00 0.82 0.69 0.60 0.50 0.41
138 11.00 3.67 2.20 1.57 1.22 1.00 0.85 0.73 0.61 0.50
163 13.00 4.33 2.60 1.86 1.44 1.18 1.00 0.87 0.72 0.59
188 15.00 5.00 3.00 2.14 1.67 1.36 1.15 1.00 0.83 0.68
225 18.00 6.00 3.60 2.57 2.00 1.64 1.38 1.20 1.00 0.82
275 22.00 7.33 4.40 3.14 2.44 2.00 1.69 1.47 1.22 1.00
49
Table A2.7.4 Regressions of risk and time parameters
Utility 
curvature
r
Probability 
weighting
Į
Discount 
factor
į
Present 
bias
ȕ
Treatment site of health insurance experiment -0.013 0.009 -0.146 0.048
(0.058) (0.063) (0.096) (0.102)
Male -0.053 -0.055 0.010 0.037
(0.044) (0.057) (0.062) (0.134)
Married -0.091* -0.047 -0.041 -0.045
(0.054) (0.060) (0.065) (0.114)
Age -0.004* 0.000 -0.002 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Urban 0.009 0.070 -0.038 0.022
(0.044) (0.054) (0.055) (0.104)
Number of household members 0.005 -0.012 -0.011 0.019
(0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.024)
Number of household members aged <15 -0.014 -0.025 -0.010 -0.039
(0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
Number of household members aged >=65 -0.017 0.035 -0.042 0.082
(0.039) (0.065) (0.047) (0.087)
Completed elementary school -0.203*** -0.029 -0.120 0.223
(0.068) (0.089) (0.085) (0.147)
Completed high school -0.132** -0.079 -0.036 0.092
(0.067) (0.066) (0.086) (0.091)
College graduate + -0.177** 0.103 -0.076 0.122
(0.089) (0.105) (0.110) (0.151)
At least one hospital inpatient stay in past year 0.012 0.076 0.171 0.160
(0.115) (0.114) (0.146) (0.201)
1-4000 pesos OOP past year -0.076 0.005 -0.132* -0.239
(0.053) (0.058) (0.075) (0.192)
4001-8000 pesos OOP past year -0.060 -0.043 -0.152 -0.093
(0.067) (0.089) (0.095) (0.257)
>8000 pesos OOP past year -0.031 -0.084 -0.059 -0.309
(0.080) (0.102) (0.099) (0.246)
Optimistic 0.023 0.018 0.053 0.028
(0.050) (0.066) (0.064) (0.119)
Pessimistic 0.084 0.040 0.067 0.001
(0.062) (0.078) (0.078) (0.154)
Low health insurance literacy 0.036 -0.025 0.010 0.185
(0.048) (0.055) (0.074) (0.125)
High health insurance literacy -0.045 0.060 -0.138** 0.187
(0.051) (0.092) (0.055) (0.178)
Aware of NHIP -0.227*** -0.144* 0.070 -0.110
(0.081) (0.086) (0.121) (0.161)
Low knowledge of NHIP benefits -0.016 -0.155** -0.036 -0.134
(0.058) (0.075) (0.069) (0.151)
High knowledge of NHIP benefits -0.016 -0.029 -0.033 -0.119
(0.051) (0.070) (0.065) (0.135)
Constant 1.149*** 1.324*** 1.087*** 1.461***
(0.182) (0.178) (0.287) (0.408)
Observations 695 695 695 695
R-squared 0.062 0.028 0.035 0.024
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A2.7.5 Variation in probability of health insurance enrollment  – extreme risk 
seeking respondents and health insurance illiterate excluded (Probit marginal effects)
        A         B         C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
r (utility curvature) -0.064 -0.055 -0.069 -0.056 -0.042 -0.033
(0.058) (0.058) (0.047) (0.046) (0.062) (0.058)
ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ 0.074* 0.074* 0.025 0.015 0.099* 0.105**
(0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.052) (0.048)
Į!SUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ 0.128** 0.126** 0.108* 0.099* 0.131* 0.150**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.068) (0.067)
įGLVFRXQWIDFWRU 0.045* 0.045* 0.048* 0.042* 0.053* 0.049*
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025)
ȕSUHVHQWELDV 0.010 0.012 0.042** 0.043** 0.045*** 0.043***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Treatment site of health insurance 
experiment
0.209*** 0.244*** 0.100** 0.120** 0.180** 0.227***
(0.058) (0.055) (0.048) (0.047) (0.070) (0.065)
Male -0.032 -0.024 -0.071 -0.055 -0.061 -0.017
(0.048) (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.061) (0.056)
Married 0.056 0.062 0.071 0.058 0.131** 0.144**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.061) (0.058)
Age 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban -0.010 -0.039 0.063* 0.046 0.035 0.009
(0.040) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.049) (0.049)
Number of household members -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.011
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of household members aged 
<15
0.003 0.010 -0.010 -0.000 0.011 0.020
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
Number of household members aged 
>=65
-0.000 -0.007 0.014 0.021 -0.017 0.003
(0.044) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.056) (0.052)
Completed elementary school 0.050 0.063 0.121
(0.067) (0.063) (0.078)
Completed high school 0.089 0.062 0.112
(0.057) (0.057) (0.070)
College graduate + 0.254*** 0.241*** 0.267***
(0.075) (0.069) (0.093)
At least one hospital inpatient stay in 
past year
-0.046 -0.046 -0.027
(0.082) (0.067) (0.089)
1-4000 pesos OOP past year 0.025 -0.053 -0.009
(0.053) (0.048) (0.063)
4001-8000 pesos OOP past year 0.032 -0.105 -0.021
(0.071) (0.064) (0.086)
>8000 pesos OOP past year 0.105 -0.033 0.079
(0.074) (0.069) (0.091)
Optimistic -0.078 -0.118*** -0.133**
(0.049) (0.043) (0.055)
Pessimistic 0.010 0.054 0.045
(0.053) (0.050) (0.065)
Low health insurance literacy 0.006
(0.046)
High health insurance literacy 0.018 -0.002 0.011
(0.053) (0.043) (0.053)
Aware of NHIP 0.072 0.135* 0.064
(0.066) (0.076) (0.081)
Low knowledge of NHIP benefits 0.080 0.088 0.116*
(0.058) (0.054) (0.065)
High knowledge of NHIP benefits -0.006 0.073* 0.033
(0.050) (0.042) (0.058)
Observations 372 372 481 481 248 248
Notes: Estimates are marginal effects averaged over the sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel a) Extreme risk seekers excluded. Panel b) health insurance illiterate excluded. Panel c) Both 
extreme risk seekers and health insurance illiterate excluded
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Table A2.7.6 Variation in probability of health insurance enrollment - ȕDVFDWHJRULFDO
variable, health insurance illiterate excluded (Probit marginal effects)
(1) (2)
r (utility curvature) -0.058 -0.044
(0.044) (0.042)
ĮSUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ 0.028 0.015
(0.041) (0.039)
Į!SUREDELOLW\ZHLJKWLQJ 0.111** 0.098*
(0.056) (0.054)
įGLVFRXQWIDFWRU 0.042* 0.036
(0.025) (0.023)
ȕSUHVHQWELDV -0.034 -0.026
(0.041) (0.040)
ȕ!IXWXUHELDV 0.075 0.080
(0.056) (0.054)
Treatment site of health insurance experiment 0.102** 0.120**
(0.048) (0.048)
Male -0.067 -0.052
(0.044) (0.042)
Married 0.067 0.054
(0.045) (0.044)
Age -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Urban 0.061* 0.044
(0.037) (0.037)
Number of household members 0.003 -0.002
(0.010) (0.010)
Number of household members aged <15 -0.011 -0.002
(0.017) (0.017)
Number of household members aged >=65 0.014 0.023
(0.042) (0.039)
Completed elementary school 0.064
(0.064)
Completed high school 0.067
(0.058)
College graduate + 0.241***
(0.070)
At least one hospital inpatient stay in past year -0.039
(0.067)
1-4000 pesos OOP past year -0.056
(0.048)
4001-8000 pesos OOP past year -0.105*
(0.064)
>8000 pesos OOP past year -0.043
(0.070)
Optimistic -0.115***
(0.043)
Pessimistic 0.060
(0.049)
High health insurance literacy 0.013
(0.043)
Aware of NHIP 0.151*
(0.077)
Low knowledge of NHIP benefits 0.099*
(0.055)
High knowledge of NHIP benefits 0.072*
(0.042)
Observations 481 481
Notes: Estimates are marginal effects averaged over the sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Chapter 3
A behavioral decomposition of the willingness to 
pay for health insurance 
Joint work with Baillon, A., O’Donnell, O. and Kraft, A.
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3.1 Introduction
Despite widespread exposure to risks of substantial medical expenses in low- and middle-
income countries (LMIC), revealed willingness to pay (WTP) for health insurance has been 
low. Those not covered through either mandatory employment-based insurance or means-
tested fully subsidized insurance usually do not take up voluntary health insurance (Acharya 
et al. 2013; Bredenkamp et al. 2015; Pettigrew and Mathauer 2016). Inconsistent with this 
observation are estimates of large potential demand for, and gains from, health insurance of 
individuals assumed to be risk averse expected utility maximizers who rationally base their 
perceptions of risk on the level and variability of medical expenses observed in a sample of 
similar individuals (Limwattananon et al 2015; Pauly et al. 2009). This chapter aims to 
explain the discrepancy between the high WTP for health insurance derived from this 
normative model and the low WTP reported by individuals. We do this by introducing a new 
decomposition of the WTP for insurance into its fair price and four behavioral deviations 
from that price that arise from subjective beliefs about the distribution of medical expenses, 
two dimensions of risk attitudes consistent with prospect theory and a residual term 
representing all determinants of WTP not captured by our behavioral model. The fair price 
of insurance – the expected medical expenditure – is estimated by the mean spending across 
a group of individuals with common observable characteristics. The contribution of beliefs 
to the WTP is given by the deviation of the perceived fair price from the fair price. The 
former is derived from elicited beliefs about future spending that are used to estimate an 
individual’s subjective distribution of medical expenditures. Any discrepancy between the 
mean perceived fair price and the fair price indicates systematically biased beliefs, which 
can be in either an optimistic or a pessimistic direction. At the individual level, the perceived 
fair price can differ from the group level fair price because of within group heterogeneity in 
healthcare needs that is recognized by the individual: private information. The contributions 
of the two dimensions of risk preferences – utility curvature and probability weighting – are 
identified using elicitations of those parameters obtained for each individual from their 
choices in hypothetical lotteries in combination with their estimated subjective distribution 
of medical expenditures. Finally, the residual term is equal to the difference between the 
directly elicited WTP and that derived indirectly from the behavioral model. We obtain all 
the data required for the decomposition -- actual medical expenditures, elicited beliefs about 
future medical expenditures, risk preferences and the directly elicited WTP – from a 
nationwide household survey conducted in the Philippines. Comparing WTP and its 
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decomposition for insured and uninsured households allows us to identify some factors that 
may contribute to the low take-up of voluntary insurance in that country, and to rule out 
other potential explanations for this phenomenon. 
Our approach to deriving WTP indirectly from a model differs in a number of 
respects from that usually followed. First, an individual’s exposure to medical expenditure 
risk is commonly based on the cross-sectional distribution of that expenditure. But only 
under strong assumptions is the cross-section distribution indicative of the risk of volatile 
medical expenses faced by any individual. And even if these assumptions did hold, 
additional assumptions are required: people must have access to statistical information on 
the cross-sectional distribution and they must use it to form rational expectations about the 
medical risks they face. These assumptions are unlikely to hold (Manski 2004). Elicited 
beliefs about future medical expenditures can potentially yield additional predictive power 
regarding the value of insurance. 
Second, behavior might deviate from that characterized by the expected utility (EU) 
model. Prospect theory (PT), the most descriptively valid model of choice under risk, 
assumes that people maximize utility defined over changes in wealth with respect to a 
reference point, which is typically assumed to be the status quo (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). If this is the state in which medical expenses are not 
incurred, then we are only concerned with utility in the loss domain, where PT predicts 
convex utility, implying risk seeking. A demand for insurance can still arise in this model 
through the transformation of probabilities by a weighting function that captures limited 
discrimination between likelihood levels and could, for example, involve overweighting of 
low probability, high medical expense scenarios. 
We show that the difference between the directly reported WTP for insurance and 
the fair price is equal to the sum of four components, which we call premiums. First, we 
estimate the belief premium as the difference between the perceived fair price based on 
subjective beliefs of medical expenditure risk and the fair price based on the empirical 
distribution of expenditures across households. Second, we incorporate utility for losses, 
estimated under PT, and compute the WTP for insurance based on each individual’s elicited 
utility curvature and their beliefs about the distribution of expenses faced. We call the 
difference between this computed WTP and the perceived fair price the u-premium; it 
captures the impact of utility. Then we add probability weighting to the model and re-
compute WTP. The change in value, which is due only to the additional of probability 
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weighting, gives us what we call the w-premium. Finally, we take the difference of the WTP 
computed with our complete model and the WTP reported directly by the respondent to get 
the İ-premium. This captures what we cannot explain by our model, such as time preferences, 
self-insurance and any influence of the budget constraint that is taken into account by the 
respondent in the reported WTP but not in the beliefs about future spending.
We elicit subjective beliefs by following a common approach using visual aids 
(Delavande et al. 2011b) but adapt this to the context of medical expenditure and the 
Philippines. Respondents were given 10 sticks and were asked to distribute these across four 
cups representing different intervals of medical expenditures in accordance with how likely 
they were to spend in each interval. The responses along with a distributional assumption 
allows us to estimate the first two moments of the subjective distribution of medical 
expenditures for each household. To elicit risk preferences, we design and implement a 
method that aims to identify sophisticated preference parameters under PT and yet be 
comprehensible for less educated respondents.
We establish the validity of the belief elicitation method by showing that the 
subjective beliefs of medical expenditures correlate with various factors, including past 
medical spending. The WTP decomposition reveals three main findings. First, low reported 
WTP cannot be explained by the belief premium, which is positive. That is, the subjective 
expectation of medical expenses exceeds the objective expectation, on average, and yet 
reported WTP falls short of the fair price. The belief premium is close to zero for the 
uninsured indicating that distorted beliefs is not the reason that they choose not to insure. 
Any strategy to communicate to this group the risks they face is unlikely to be effective in 
raising their enrollment. It is something other than biased beliefs that causes them not to 
insure. Second, negative u- and w- premiums explain a large part of shortfall of reported 
WTP from the fair price. A large negative u-premium, which comes from risk seeking in the 
domain of losses, calls for framing insurance in terms of gains as opposed to losses, focusing 
more on the reimbursements received if insured, as opposed to the expenditures one may 
LQFXULIXQLQVXUHG)LQDOO\ZHILQGDQHJDWLYHİ-premium, which is especially large for the 
poor. A likely explanation for this finding is that self-insurance options reduce the WTP. In 
addition, the poor may pay more attention to their tight budget when reporting WTP than 
when reporting beliefs about future spending. And they may feel entitled to subsidized 
insurance and therefore report low willingness to pay for insurance.
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Section 3.2 explains how we decompose WTP. Section 3.3 provides background on 
the Philippines health insurance setting. Section 3.4 presents the data and methods we use to 
obtain the parameters needed to estimate the premiums in the decomposition. Section 3.5
assesses the validity of the elicited beliefs and section 3.6 presents the results of the 
decomposition. The final section concludes with a summary and interpretation of the main 
results, plus acknowledgement of limitations. 
3.2 Decomposition of willingness to pay
Assume we use an individual’s observable characteristics to estimate their medical 
expenditure risk, which is given by a probability mass at 0 and a density for non-zero 
expenditures. Let ݌଴ be the probability of zero expenditure and ݂ be the density conditional 
on facing any expenditure, with ݉ ܽݔ being the maximum possible value. Both ݌଴ and ݂ vary 
with the observable characteristics. Working with negative values of expenditure to highlight 
similarity with the computation of WTP to come, the actuarially fair price for health 
insurance (μ) based on the individual’s observable characteristics is given by:
െɊ = (1െ ݌଴) ׬ ݔ݂(ݔ)݀ݔ଴ି௠௔௫ , (3.1)
with ݔ a generic integration variable. Under EU, the WTP for health insurance of an 
individual with wealth W and utility over final wealth is determined by:  
ܷ(ܹെܹܶ ாܲ௎) = ݌଴ × ܷ(ܹ) + (1െ ݌଴) ׬ ܷ(ܹ + ݔ)݂(ݔ)݀ݔ଴ି௠௔௫ . (3.2)
The difference between ܹ ܶ ாܲ௎ and the fair price is the standard risk premium, which 
is positive if and only if U is concave. This model, represented in Figure 3.1, would predict 
a relatively high WTP of a risk averse (U concave) individual facing sizeable and variable 
medical expenditures. This is difficult to reconcile with the low enrollment rates in (low 
cost) voluntary health insurance programs (Acharya et al. 2013; Bredenkamp et al. 2015; 
Pettigrew and Mathauer 2016).
There are several reasons why an individual’s WTP may differ from that predicted 
by the EU model applied to their medical expenditure risk estimated from the observed 
distribution of expenditures over individuals with similar characteristics. First, private 
information about their health, as well as their proneness to optimism or pessimism, may 
cause their beliefs to deviate from the risk estimated on the basis of their observable 
characteristics. Assume we can model beliefs by probabilities and let ݌଴௦ and ݂௦ be the 
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subjective equivalent of ݌଴ and ݂ respectively. Substituting ݌଴௦ and ݂௦ for their objective 
counterparts in Eq. 3.1 gives the perceived fair price of insurance (Ɋs). We call the difference 
between this and the fair price based on observable characteristics the belief premium 
(ߨ௕ = Ɋ௦ െ Ɋ). It can be positive or negative, depending on the agent’s private information 
and degree of optimism.
Figure 3.1 Traditional model of WTP
Second, behavior may deviate from EU. Under PT (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
the most compelling descriptive model of choice under risk, people do not maximize utility 
over final wealth but over changes in wealth with respect to a reference point. Let ݑ be PT 
utility, with ݑ(0) = 0. It is concave for gains but convex for losses (implying risk seeking 
for losses), and it is steeper for losses than for gains (loss aversion). The reference point is 
typically assumed to be the status quo (Sydnor 2010; Wakker et al., 1997), which in an 
insurance setting can be defined as initial wealth – the state in which medical expenses are 
not incurred. We are then only concerned with utility in the loss domain. With this 
representation of utility, WTP is determined by.
ݑ(െܹܶ ௨ܲ) = ݌଴௦ × ݑ(0) + (1െ ݌଴௦) ׬ ݑ(ݔ)݂௦(ݔ)݀ݔ଴ –௠௔௫
= (1െ ݌଴௦) ׬ ݑ(ݔ)݂௦(ݔ)݀ݔ଴ –௠௔௫ .
(3.3)
We call the difference between ܹܶ ௨ܲ and the perceived fair price the u-premium 
(ߨ௨ =ܹܶ ௨ܲ െ Ɋ௦). This is negative for people with convex utility in the loss domain, as 
predicted by PT. Hence, it can potentially contribute to low WTP.  
fair price
WTPEU
risk
premium
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According to PT (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), the second way in which behavior 
can deviate from EU, and so WTP differ from WTPEU, is through the transformation of 
probabilities into decision weights. Here we use Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) 
cumulative PT, in which cumulative probabilities are transformed, because the 1979 version 
could lead to inconsistent predictions.22 Let ܨ௦ be the cumulative distribution function 
associated with ݂௦. The subjective probability of incurring expenditure greater than -ݔ is  
(1െ ݌଴௦)ܨ௦(ݔ) .23 In cumulative PT, this (cumulative) probability is transformed through a 
weighting function ݓ. Therefore, its derivative, the density (1 െ ݌଴௦)݂௦(ݔ) in Eq. 3.3, must 
be replaced by the derivative of ݓ൫(1െ ݌଴௦)ܨ௦(ݔ)൯, that is (1െ ݌଴௦)݂௦(ݔ)ݓԢ൫(1െ
݌଴௦)ܨ௦(ݔ)൯. We obtain
ݑ(െܹܶ ௨ܲ&௪) = (1 െ ݌଴௦)׬ ݑ(ݔ)݂௦(ݔ)ݓԢ൫(1െ ݌଴௦)ܨ௦(ݔ)൯݀ݔ଴ ି௠௔௫ .         (3.4)
We call the difference between  ܹܶ ௨ܲ&௪ and  ܹܶ ௨ܲ, which captures the impact of 
probability weighting, the w-premium (ߨ௪ =ܹܶ ௨ܲ&௪ െܹܶ ௨ܲ).
The sign of w-premium depends on a combination of factors. The function ݓ has 
been found to be typically inverse-S, i.e., overweighting small probabilities (typically, below 
1/3) and underweighting large ones. Then, in the case of a binary prospect, with a probability 
smaller than 1/3 to bear a fixed amount of expenditure as opposed to incurring no 
expenditure, ݓ will increase the WTP and the w-premium will be positive. For distributions 
that are not binary, the implication of ݓ is less obvious as shown by the role of  ݓԢ in Eq.3.4. 
The derivative of an inverse-S weighting function is larger than 1 for low and high values of 
the cumulative distribution and is smaller than 1 for intermediary values. Hence, the 
probability of extreme outcomes in both directions (expenses of max but also 0) will be 
overweighted, while the intermediary expenses will be underweighted. The global impact of  
ݓ thus depends on the whole distribution of expenses perceived by the individual.
Finally, the WTP given by Eq. 3.4 can be compared with the WTP reported by the 
individual through a direct elicitation task (ܹܶ ௥ܲ). We call this difference the İ-premium
(ߨఌ =ܹܶ ௥ܲ െܹܶ ௨ܲ&௪). It includes everything that influences the individual’s reported 
valuation of insurance that is not captured by our model. For instance, a budget constraint 
22 The original version of PT can lead to violations of stochastic dominance. See Wakker (2010, 
Appendix 9.8) for a discussion of the issue.
23 Keep in mind that x is the negative valued loss corresponding to expenditure of –x.
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the individual does not fully take account of when stating subjective probabilities of future 
medical expenditure but which is respected when reporting WTPr for health insurance 
(decreasing WTP), savings, assets and credit opportunities that can be used to self-insure 
medical expenditure risks (decreasing WTP), ambiguity aversion (increasing WTP) and time 
discounting (decreasing WTP). 
An alternative risk premium equal to the difference between an individual’s reported 
WTP and the fair price of insurance based on their observable characteristics can be written, 
after sequential substitution, as the sum of the four premiums defined by the behavioral 
model.
ܹܶ ௥ܲ െ Ɋ = ߨ௕ + ߨ௨ + ߨ௪ + ߨఌ (3.5)
This decomposition of the WTP into the fair price and the various premiums is 
illustrated in Figure 3.2. It is worth noting that the signs of the premiums are difficult to 
predict because they depend on beliefs and private information. An exception is the u-
premium ʌu, which is likely to be negative according to PT. Figure 3.2 displays the case of 
an individual expecting to spend more than is predicted on the basis of their observable 
characteristics ʌb>0), which may be due to pessimism and/or private information about the 
likelihood of illness, who has convex PT utility for losses ʌu<0), who has a lower WTP 
because of reduced sensitivity to the probability of higher medical expenditures resulting in 
a negative w-premium ʌw<0) DQGZKRDOVRKDVDQHJDWLYHİ-premium ʌİ<0).
Figure 3.2. Behavioral decomposition of WTP
fair price
WTP
belief
premium
u-premium
w-premium
഍-premium
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Determining the relative importance of the four sources of difference between the 
reported WTP and the fair price can potentially help identify broad strategies that could 
increase health insurance uptake. For instance, a positive average belief premium would 
suggest that communicating information on the medical expenditures that can be incurred 
would not raise the demand for insurance. It may well do the opposite. A large negative u-
premium would suggest that framing insurance in terms of gains instead of losses by 
informing of reimbursement to be received if insured instead of expenditures that would be 
incurred if uninsured may be an effective strategy to raise demand. A negative w-premium
would suggest that in spite of expecting high expenditures on average, there is overweighting 
of the chance of having no expenditures. Finally, a negative İ-premium for low-income 
groups may suggest that their demand for insurance is limited by a tight budget constraint, 
possibly reinforced by preference for self-insurance that offer protection against multiple 
risks and not only medical expenses (Gollier 2003).
3.3 Health insurance in the Philippines
Most Filipino households are covered by the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) 
through an employed-based program that is mandatory for formal sector employees, fully 
subsidized indigent and sponsored programs that cover the poor and near poor respectively,
a senior citizens program, an overseas workers program and a voluntary program that offers 
cover to informal sector workers and the self-employed. Coverage through all programs 
extends automatically to the legal spouse, children (<21 years old) and parents (>= 65 years) 
of the person qualifying. According to the NHIP database, by 2015, 89.4 million individuals 
were covered in a population of around 100 million (Bredenkamp et al 2017). However, 
survey data consistently show a coverage rate that is lower by about 20 percentage points 
(Bredenkamp and Buisman 2016; Bredenkamp et al 2017)24. The remaining gap in coverage 
is mainly because of low take-up of the voluntary program among those engaged in the 
informal sector of the economy. For those with an average monthly individual income of no 
more than 25,000 pesos ($540), the premium for voluntary enrollment is 2,400 pesos per 
year ($50). At earnings above 25,000 pesos, the premium is 3,600 pesos per year.
24 The discrepancy partly arises because fully subsidized members, such as the poor and senior 
citizens, who are automatically enrolled are not be aware of their insurance cover. 
62
The NHIP benefit package includes a wide range of inpatient treatments at accredited 
public and private sector providers. Coverage of outpatient services and primary care is more 
limited. Despite the breadth of population coverage, the NHIP appears to provide only 
limited financial protection (Bredenkamp and Buisman 2016). This results from the limited 
coverage of ambulatory care and medication, and also from the latitude of providers to 
charge in excess of the reimbursement ceilings set by NHIP. Patients must pay out-of-pocket 
(OOP) to cover the difference. In principle, providers are prevented from charging indigent 
and sponsored program members (i.e., the poor and near poor) in excess of the 
reimbursement ceiling. However, this prohibition does not appear to be well enforced 
(Bredenkamp and Buisman 2016). In sum, in addition to the medical expenditure risk faced 
by the uninsured in the informal sector, those insured through the NHIP are also likely to be 
exposed to considerable medical expenditure risk. 
3.4 Data and method 
3.4.1 Sample design 
Data were collected through a nationwide survey of 1780 Filipino households conducted in 
2015. This was a follow-up to a baseline survey carried out in 2011 as part of a randomized 
health insurance experiment (Capuno et al., 2016). The baseline had a multi-stage cluster 
sampling design to randomly select 2,950 households that were nationally representative 
(excluding the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). The follow-up targeted all 
households that, at baseline, were not covered by any NHIP program, plus those that were
covered either by the programs for the poor and near poor or through voluntary enrollment. 
Interviews were conducted with 1513 households from these three groups. The attrition rate 
was about 24 percent (Bredenkamp et al 2017).25 In addition, a random sample of 267 
households with mandatory, employment-based NHIP cover at baseline was selected for 
follow-up in order to increase the sample size. In order to reach the target sample size, any 
25 Maintaining a nationally representative sample is not critical to the validity of our analysis. Nonetheless, 
Appendix Table A3.5.1 presents balancing tests. There are some differences between households that were 
interviewed at follow-up and those that were not. In particular, households lost to follow-up were more likely 
to be urban, located in the capital region, richer, better educated and have fewer children. Generally, these are 
characteristics of more mobile households. 
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selected household that could not be traced or interviewed was replaced with another random 
draw from the initially mandatorily insured households.26
In the follow-up, the intention was to interview the person who was the original 
household respondent in the baseline survey or, if that person was unavailable, their spouse.
In the baseline survey, the enumerator was instructed to interview the head of the household 
or spouse if the head was unavailable. Only if it was impossible to interview either of them 
was another household member above 21 years old to be interviewed. 
We restrict the sample to respondents who answer all the questions needed to 
construct all components of the WTP decomposition (Eq. 3.5). We are left with 1565 
observations out of the total of 1780. The 215 who are excluded are all dropped due to 
missing data on risk preferences.27
3.4.2 Elicitation of beliefs about future medical expenditure
Accumulating evidence demonstrates the feasibility and value of eliciting subjective 
expectations about various prospects in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) 
(Attanasio, 2009; Delavande et al. 2011b; Delavande 2014). This is only the second study to 
elicit subjective probabilities of future spending on medical care (Yilma et al 2018). We 
follow a common approach of using a visual aid to reduce the cognitive effort required to 
complete the task (Delavande et al. 2011b). Respondents were asked to think of all 
expenditures on medical care and medicines that their household could incur in the next 12 
months, excluding expenditures that would be reimbursed from health insurance. They were 
then presented with four cups labelled to represent ranges in which their household’s total 
out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure on healthcare over the next twelve months could fall: 0, 1-
4000 pesos, 4001-8000 pesos and > 8000 pesos. They were given ten sticks and asked to 
distribute them by placing more sticks in a cup if they thought it more likely that their 
household’s healthcare spending would lie in the range indicated by that cup.28 This 
procedure, which is similar to one that has been used to elicit the subjective probability 
26 There are only a few significant differences between the households from this group that were interviewed 
at follow-up and those that were not. Those not followed-up were less likely to be located in an urban setting 
and the capital region.
27 See Chapter 2 section 2.2.5 for characteristics of these observations. 
28 To elicit a subjective probability distribution of a continuous variable, survey respondents have 
typically been asked to distribute 10 or 20 items (Delavande 2011a). One experiment finds similar distributions 
irrespective of whether 10 or 20 beans are allocated (Delavande et al. 2011b). 
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distribution of a continuous variable in other LMIC settings (Delevande et al. 2011a; 
Delevande et al. 2011b), avoids making reference to the concept of probability, or even 
chance, that is unlikely to be understood by many of the respondents. The exact protocol 
followed is set out in Appendix A3.1.
The intervals of expenditure offered to respondents were selected on the basis of the 
cross-section distribution of expenditures in the baseline survey. Despite the right-skewed 
nature of the cross-section distribution, the middle two intervals were intentionally made of 
equal size to facilitate comprehension and to test for random distribution of the sticks. If 
beliefs are at least partly based on realized expenditures, then the sticks should not be 
distributed equally over the middle two intervals. We allow respondents to indicate a 
perception of a right-skewed distribution but do not impose this shape on the subjective 
distribution. The last interval was left open to capture perceptions of the probability of 
extremely high expenditures. 
After completing the task designed to elicit their subjective probability distribution 
of medical expenditures, the respondent was asked to make a comparative assessment of 
their household’s medical expenditure risk. Specifically, they were asked whether they 
thought the chance that their household would spend more than 8000 pesos on healthcare in 
the next year was smaller, the same or larger than the risk for households similar to them 
(see Appendix A3.2). 
3.4.3 Estimation of perceived fair price
We use each household’s subjective distribution of medical expenditures to estimate its 
perceived fair price for health insurance that fully covers the risk it faces. We interpret a 
respondent’s allocation of sticks to each of the four cups as corresponding to their perception 
of the likelihood that their household’s medical expenditure over the next twelve months 
will fall in the respective interval. 
Let ܿ௜ denote the number of sticks placed in cup ݅, where i=0, 1, 2 and 3 for the cups 
indicating 0, 1-4000 pesos, 4001-8000 pesos and >8000 pesos respectively. As explained in 
section 3.2, we model each respondent’s beliefs as a probability of not incurring any medical 
expenses ݌଴௦ and a conditional distribution ݂௦ of non-zero expenditures. The value ݌଴௦ is 
given by 
௖బ
ଵ଴. We allow for the possibility that the respondent is entirely certain of having no 
medical spending, i.e. ݌଴௦ = 1. If ݌଴௦ ് 1, we use nonlinear least squares to fit a lognormal 
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distribution (adapted to negative values29) on the conditional cumulative probabilities 
defined by
ܨ௦(െ4000 × ݅) = 1 െ σ ௖ೕ
೔ೕసభ
ଵ଴ି௖బ (3.6)
We choose a lognormal distribution since this allows for a long tail without having to fix the 
maximum. Advantages of the lognormal relative to two other distributions we considered 
(piecewise uniform and beta) are set out in Appendix A3.4.
We did not ask respondents to report their maximum possible expenditure. Even if 
we had, the reported amount could not be interpreted literally as the maximum (Delavande
et al 2011a; Manski 2004). Besides, medical expenditures are known to have a long right 
tail. Note that Eq. 3.6 implies ܨ௦(െ12000) = 0 for i=3. Using this point in the fitting helped 
prevent the distribution being too fat at extremely high values given that the lognormal has 
a long tail. We report checks of the sensitivity of our estimates to fixing the point ܨ௦(ݔ) =
0 at other values of x in Appendix A3.4.
We enter the estimates of ݌଴௦ and ݂௦into Eq.3.1 to obtain the perceived fair price of 
insurance. This is also the subjective expectation of medical expenditures and we will denote 
it ߤ௦. The square root of the second moment of the subjective distribution of expenditures, 
ߪ௦ , is given by:
ߪ௦ = ൬(1െ ݌଴) ׬ ݔଶ݂(ݔ)݀ݔ଴ି௠௔௫ െ (ߤ௦)ଶ൰
భ
మ
 (3.7)
In all computations, we set ݉ܽݔ = 500,000, truncating the lognormal at that value. This 
was large enough to have negligible impact on our results.
3.4.4 Estimation of fair price 
After reporting their expectations of future spending on healthcare, respondents were asked 
how much they spent OOP over the past 12 months. Specifically, they were asked in which 
of the same four intervals (0, 1-4000, 4001-8000, >8000) was their household’s total 
spending on healthcare net of any insurance reimbursements (see Appendix A3.2). This 
allows us to directly compare the sample empirical distribution of past expenditures with the 
subjective probability distributions of future expenditures averaged over the sample. It also 
29 Let ܩ be the cumulative distribution of the lognormal. We used ܨ௦(ݔ) = 1െ ܩ(െݔ).
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makes it possible to estimate a fair price for insurance based on expenditure in the past year 
averaged over all households with the same observable characteristics. We use the sample 
means for groups characterized by their insurance cover.30 Each mean is obtained by fitting 
a lognormal distribution to the cumulative frequencies of households within a group who 
report spending in the last year in each of the four intervals. 
3.4.5 Elicitation and specification of risk preference
Risk preferences were elicited using an instrument designed to identify utility curvature 
separately from the weighting of probabilities and yet be comprehensible for less educated 
respondents, as well as feasible in the limited time available in a field survey (see Chapter 
2). Respondents were offered two independent sets of hypothetical lottery choices in the loss 
domain. Each choice was visualized using two jars from which respondents were told a ball 
would be drawn randomly. The task is described in Chapter 2, section 2.5.1.
One set of lotteries identified the sure loss that the respondent found equivalent to 
facing a 50% chance of another loss. This was used to identify utility curvature. The second 
set identified the loss faced with a 50% probability that the respondent was prepared to 
accept rather than take a lottery over two losses with unequal probabilities. The losses and 
probabilities were fixed such that an EU maximizer would have the same point of 
indifference in both sets of lotteries. Hence, the difference between the selected points of 
indifference identifies probability weighting. See Chapter 2, Appendix A2.5 for details of 
the derivation.
We assume power utility ݑ(ݔ) = െߣ(െݔ)௥, with ߣ the loss aversion parameter. The 
latter drops out of the equation for WTP because loss aversion is only identified in the 
presence of both gains and losses. Indeed:
ܹܶ ௨ܲ = ൬(ଵି௣బ
ೞ)׬ ିఒ(ି௫)ೝ௙ೞ(௫)ௗ௫బ ష೘ೌೣ
ିఒ ൰
భ
ೝ
= ൬(1െ ݌଴௦)׬ (െݔ)௥݂௦(ݔ)݀ݔ଴ ି௠௔௫ ൰
భ
ೝ
(3.8)
We used the one-parameter weighting function ݓ(݌) = exp(െ(െ ln(݌))ఈ)
introduced and axiomatized by Prelec (1998), which gives ݓᇱ(݌) =
30 It would be possible to allow for further heterogeneity by estimating a conditional mean function over other 
covariates, including age composition of the household, health status, income, etc. However, but for income, 
the premiums charged by the NHIP do not vary with such characteristics. 
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ఈ
௣ (െ ln(݌))ఈିଵ exp(െ(െ ln(݌))ఈ). Substitution of this and the power utility function into 
Eq. 3.4 and inverting givesܹܶ ௨ܲ&௪.
3.4.6 Elicitation of willingness to pay
WTP for health insurance was elicited in two ways that were randomized between 
respondents. One used an iterative bidding approach. It started by asking the respondent 
whether they would pay 500 pesos per month for health insurance that would cover all 
medical expenses for their entire household. Depending on whether the hypothetical offer 
was accepted or rejected, it was subsequently raised or lowered and the bidding continued 
until the respondent changed their response to the offer. If the respondent claimed to be 
willing to pay (WTP) more than 900 pesos, they were asked to state the amount they would 
pay. 
The other method involved listing a number of WTP intervals each with a range of 
100 pesos and asking the respondents to pick the one closest to their WTP. The intervals 
listed amounts up to 900 pesos, with a final option to indicate the WTP amount if it exceeded 
that value. The protocol for the WTP questions is set out in Appendix A3.3.
The respondent is asked how much they would be willing to pay for insurance that 
would cover all the medical expenses their household will incur. The question is not explicit 
about whether it is referring to expenses gross or net of those that would be reimbursed 
through any insurance the household currently has. If the respondent interprets the question 
as asking about gross expenses, then for households with insurance there is an inconsistency 
between this directly elicited WTP and both the estimated fair price and the perceived fair 
price of insurance, each of which is derived from a distribution (empirical and subjective) of 
OOP expenditures net of insurance reimbursement. It is impossible to know how each 
respondent interprets the WTP question. Since they are asked to state WTP for insurance 
covering expenses they will incur, it may be reasonable to assume that they will factor out 
expenses that will be covered by their current insurance. In that case, there is no problem. 
Otherwise, for insured households, the reported WTP will be inflated relative to the 
estimated fair price and this upward biDVZLOOEHFDSWXUHGE\DODUJHUSRVLWLYHİ-premium 
(ʌİ) in the decomposition given by Eq. 3.5. However, this bias would not affect the other 
three components of the decomposition. And it is not present for uninsured households.
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3.4.7 Sample characteristics 
The vast majority of respondents are either the household head (545/1565) or their spouse 
(839/1565). Table 3.1 reports means of other characteristics. The majority of respondents 
are female. Their average age is about 45 years. They are approximately evenly divided 
between urban and rural locations. About one tenth have at least some college education
Table 3.1. Sample characteristics 
Mean Std. Dev.
Demographics
Male (respondent) 0.276
Age (respondent - years) 46.8 13.0
Urban 0.454
Number of household members 5.14 2.27
Number of household members aged <15 or >=65 1.82 1.51
Socioeconomic status
Highest education (respondent)
No education completed 0.201
Elementary school completed 0.255
High school completed 0.440
College completed or more 0.104
Log of per capita household income (continuous) 10.230 1.06
Healthcare behaviors, knowledge, beliefs and preferences
At least one hospital inpatient stay in past year (household) 0.100
OOP healthcare expenditure in the past year (household)
None 0.211
1-4000 pesos 0.534
4001-8000 pesos 0.141
> 8000 pesos 0.114
Health insurance (respondent)
No insurance 0.348
Voluntary 0.086
Employment-based(mandatory) 0.194
Sponsored (near-poor, 100% subsidized) 0.113
Indigent (poor, 100% subsidized) 0.147
Other insurance 0.079
Don't know if insured 0.033
Perceived risk of spending > 8000 pesos on healthcare compared with similar 
households (respondent), 
Smaller 0.339
Same 0.484
Larger 0.177
Risk preference: Utility power (ȡ, continuous) 0.487 0.491
Risk preference: Prelec alpha (Į, continuous) 1.029 0.739
WTP for insurance(pesos per month) 171 149
N 1565
Notes: Unless otherwise stated variable takes value of 1 if characteristic is present and is 0 otherwise. For 
education there are 1558 observations. For Log of average per capita household income there are 1462 
observations. For other variables, sample sizes are as in bottom row. Other insurance includes those with more 
than one type of insurance. 
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A majority of respondents reported that their household spent 1-4000 pesos on 
healthcare in the past year. A little more than a fifth reported spending nothing and 11 percent 
spent more than 8000 pesos. Consistent with an optimistic bias (Weinstein 1980; Weinstein 
and Klein 1996), the fraction (33.9%) perceiving their risk of incurring medical expenses in 
excess of 8000 pesos to be smaller than that for similar households is approximately double 
the fraction (17.7%) that perceives their risk to be greater. 
Respondents were asked whether each member of the household was covered by 
health insurance. We use the insurance status of the respondent to categorize households as 
insured or uninsured. Two thirds are insured. Since NHIP cover is extended to the spouse, 
children and parents of a member, there is little intra-household variation in insurance. When 
the respondent is insured, on average, 90% of other individuals in their household also have 
cover. When the respondent is not insured, on average, 89% of those in their household are 
also without cover. We further separate the insured by the type of program through which 
they obtain cover: employment, poverty (indigent program), near poverty (sponsored 
program) and voluntary. One fifth of the sample is covered through employment, about 15% 
is covered by the indigent program, 11% obtain cover through the sponsored program for 
the near poor and 9% is enrolled voluntarily. 
Consistent with PT, on average, respondents are risk seeking for losses as 
characterized by utility curvature (r<1). The mean of Prelec’s alpha is close to 1 indicating 
that, on average, there is no deviation from EU. Finally, the average WTP for health
insurance coverage is 171 pesos per month, which is about 30 pesos less than the premium 
for low income households joining the NHIP voluntarily. This is also far below both the 500 
pesos starting point in the iterative bidding elicitation of WTP and the midpoint (450 pesos) 
with the showcard approach. This suggests there was little anchoring on the starting value in 
the first case and no strong tendency to gravitate to the middle value in the second.
3.5 Elicited beliefs and subjective distributions of medical expenditures
Before presenting the behavioral decomposition of WTP for insurance, we first examine the 
elicited beliefs about future medical expenditures that are critical to the decomposition. We 
start by presenting the raw data on the elicited beliefs and then show estimates of the 
perceived fair price of insurance and moments of the subjective probability distributions of 
medical expenditures derived from them. We then assess whether and how these moments 
correlate with past medical spending and other covariates in order to establish the 
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information respondents appear to use in forming the beliefs they report. The raw data and 
estimates of the risk preference parameters that are used to calculate the u-premium and w-
premium components of the WTP decomposition are presented in Chapter 2, section 2.6.
3.5.1 Raw belief data 
All respondents answered the questions designed to elicit their subjective distributions of 
spending on medical care. On average, respondents put most sticks (4.4/10) in the cup 
indicating spending of 1-4000 pesos (Figure 3.3). This implies that, on average, the 
respondents perceived a 44 percent chance of incurring medical expenses in that range. This 
is 10 percentage points less that the fraction of households that did spend in that interval in 
the previous year (Table 3.1). Nonetheless, the fact that the respondents, on average, attribute 
the greatest likelihood to spending in the range that has that greatest density in the empirical 
distribution of actual spending suggests that there is a degree of correspondence between the 
subjective and objective distributions. 
Figure 3.3. Distribution of sticks allocated to each cup representing a range of medical 
expenditure
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On the basis of the allocation of the sticks, spending between 4001 and 8000 pesos 
has the next highest average perceived likelihood (2/10), followed by no spending 
whatsoever (1.9/10). The fact that sticks were not divided evenly over the four cups provides 
further indication that respondents did not allocate them randomly. The data may well 
contain information on beliefs held with respect to future medical spending.
In total, 671 out of 1565 respondents put all 10 sticks in one cup, which, according 
to the instructions they were given, indicates certainty that their spending would fall in that 
range. About half (350) of these respondents put all sticks in the cup indicating spending 
between 1 and 4000 pesos. The propensity to allocate all the sticks to one cup may result 
from the relatively broad intervals of spending represented by each.
Many respondents do not place any sticks at all in at least one of the cups, which 
indicates that they rule out the possibility of that level of spending. This tendency is most 
common at the two extremes. Nearly a thousand of the respondents indicate that there is no 
chance that they will incur no medical expenses whatsoever, and nearly a thousand rule out 
spending more than 8000 pesos. There are 587 respondents who do not place any sticks in 
either of the cups representing the two extremes. These respondents appear to perceive 
limited exposure to medical expenditure risk defined in terms of the volatility of expenses.
3.5.2 Estimates of subjective distributions
Table 3.2 shows statistics from the sample distribution of the estimates of the first moment 
(ߤ௦) and square root of the second moment (ߪ௦) of the subjective distribution of medical 
expenditures for each household.31,32
Table 3.2. Estimates of first two moments of subjective probability distribution of 
household medical expenditure – sample statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Percentiles
p25 p50 p75 p90 N
First moment (ߤ௦) 3,341 3,291 78 3,217 5,670 8,171 1,565
Second moment (ߪ௦) 1,323 1,868 51 274 2,891 4,409 1,565
Notes: Columns give summary statistics of the sample distribution of household-specific estimates of the first two 
moments of the subjective distribution of healthcare expenditures. The square root of the second moment (standard 
deviation) is given.
31 To enhance readability, we will refer to the ‘second moment’ rather than the ‘square root of the second 
moment’.
32 See Appendix Table A3.4.1 for the sensitivity of our estimates obtained to assuming beta and the piecewise 
uniform distributions and bounds of 20,000 pesos and 50,000 pesos on the upper interval presented to 
respondents.
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The sample mean of the estimates of the first moment of the household-specific 
subjective distribution of OOP healthcare expenditures (i.e. the mean of subjectively 
expected expenditure) is 3,341 pesos. This is reasonably close to the sample mean of actual
spending, 3,146 pesos. The mean of actual spending is lower because 330 respondents 
reported having spent nothing on healthcare in the previous year, while only 96 were certain 
that they would spend nothing in the coming year. At the other extremity of the distribution, 
there is not such a large discrepancy between actual and expected spending. Specifically, 
178 reported spending more than 8,000 pesos in the previous year compared with 144 who 
claimed being certain that they would spend above this threshold.
The sample mean of the square root of the second moment of the subjective 
probability distribution is less than half the sample mean of the first moment. Yilma et al. 
(2017) – the only other study we know that has collected data on perceptions of future 
medical spending – also find that the standard deviation of the subjective distribution tends 
to be less than its expected value. In contrast, it is common to find that the standard deviation 
in OOP spending across households is substantially larger than the cross-section mean (e.g. 
Van Doorslaer et al, 2007). Indeed, we find that the standard deviation across the sample of 
spending incurred in the previous year is greater than the sample mean. The standard 
deviation is estimated to be 4114 pesos – 1.3 times the estimated sample mean (3,146 pesos). 
These findings indicate that attempts to approximate risk exposure from measures based on 
the cross-sectional variance of medical spending lead to substantial overestimation. 
Household-specific risk is confounded by predictable heterogeneity in spending across 
households. Separation of the two is a major advantage of collecting data on households’ 
perceptions of future spending prospects. 
3.5.3 Correlates of moments of subjective distributions
We first assess whether and how the subjective probability distributions of medical 
expenditures correlate with past medical spending. Then we look at the correlation with the 
comparative measure of medical expenditure risk. Finally in this sub-section, we turn to 
multivariate analysis of relationships between the first two moments of the subjective 
distributions and the covariates described in Table 3.1.
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3.5.2.1 Association with past medical expenditure
The rows of Table 3.3 split the sample into four categories according to spending in the 
previous year. The cells show the subjective probability of future spending falling in each of 
the same four categories averaged over the subsample defined by past expenditure. For 
example, the top left cell indicates that, on average, those with no OOP medical spending in 
the previous year believe they have a 43 percent chance of not incurring any expenses again 
in the coming year. As the level of spending in the previous year rises, the subjective 
probability of incurring no medical expenditure in the next year falls significantly, if not 
quite monotonically. This is consistent with the respondents believing that spending on 
healthcare is serially correlated and so using their past experience to forecast future expenses. 
Moving across the table confirms the positive association between forecast and past 
spending. In each column, the mean subjective probability of future spending lying in the 
interval differs significantly across the categories of past expenditure. The mean probability 
is nearly always largest on the diagonal: the subjective probability of future spending falling 
in an interval is highest among those who incurred expenses in that interval in the previous 
year. This indicates beliefs that medical expenditures are positively serially correlated.
Table 3.3 Mean subjective probabilities of future medical expenditure falling in intervals 
by past medical expenditure
Medical expenditure previous year
(pesos)
Medical expenditure next year (pesos) N
0 1-4000 4001-8000 > 8000
0 0.43 0.35 0.12 0.10 330
1-4000 0.15 0.55 0.19 0.11 836
4001-8000 0.07 0.39 0.36 0.18 221
> 8000 0.08 0.16 0.18 0.59 178
Test equal means: p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Each cell shows the subsample mean of the proportion of sticks placed in the cup corresponding to the respective 
interval of future medical expenditure. The bottom row gives the p-value of a one way ANOVA (F-test) of equality of the 
means across the four categories of past expenditure
Table 3.4 shows the distribution of households across categories of actual spending 
in the previous year (rows) and expected spending in the coming year (columns). The column 
into which a household is placed is determined by the first moment of its subjective 
probability distribution. The null of independence is strongly rejected. The clustering of 
observations close to the diagonal indicates that expected medical expenditure is strongly 
positively correlated with spending in the previous year. One slight deviation from this 
pattern is that among those with expected spending in the 4001-8000 interval, more had 
74
spent 1-4000 pesos than had spent 4001-8000 in the previous year. But the numbers in either 
of these categories of past expenditure are much greater than the numbers who previously 
spent nothing or more than 8000 pesos.
Table 3.4 Frequencies of households by categories of expected future and actual past 
medical expenditure
Medical expenditure previous 
year
(pesos)
Expected medical expenditure next year (pesos) N
0 1-4000 4001-8000 > 8000
0 69 181 58 22 330
1-4000 19 516 252 49 836
4001-8000 4 57 144 16 221
> 8000 4 25 51 98 178
N 96 779 505 185 1565
3HDUVRQȤ 661.7 p-value 0.000
Notes: Columns categorize households according to value of estimated first moment of subjective probability distribution 
of medical expenditure next year.
The correlation coefficient between expected spending and past spending calculated as the 
mid-point of the reported interval is 0.49.
3.5.2.2 Association with comparative assessment of future medical expenditure
If a respondent holds beliefs about their future spending on healthcare, then there should be 
consistency across their answers to different types of questions about that spending. Each 
respondent was asked whether the chance that they would spend more than 8000 pesos on 
medical care in the next year was smaller, the same or greater than that for similar 
households. Provided ‘similar households’ is not interpreted to mean households with the 
same needs for healthcare and an equal economic capacity to meet those needs, then, if the 
respondent’s beliefs are well-formed and they are able to express them through the answers 
given to both the subjective probability and comparative questions, we should observe that 
respondents who report a smaller chance of spending above 8,000 pesos tend also to give 
subjective probabilities that imply a lower expected level of expenditure. This is precisely 
what we see in Table 3.5. Both the sample mean and median of expected spending (first 
moment of subjective distribution) rise monotonically, substantially and significantly on 
moving from those reporting a smaller chance of spending more than 8000 pesos to those 
reporting a greater chance. This suggests that respondents do hold reasonably consistent 
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beliefs about future medical spending and that our method of eliciting those beliefs in the 
form of subjective probabilities is at least partially successful. 
Table 3.5 Expected medical expenditure (ߤ௦) by comparative assessment of future 
spending
Perceived chance of spending > 8000 pesos on healthcare 
compared with similar households is
Expected medical expenditure (ߤ௦)
   
Mean Std. Dev. Median N
Smaller 2014 2730 78 531
Same 3446 3055 3769 757
Larger 5601 3602 6085 277
Test of equality across groups – p-value 0.000 0.000
Notes: Expected expenditure is the first moment of the subjective distribution. The table shows the mean, standard deviation 
and median of these expectations across subsamples defined by the three categories of the comparative measure.
3.5.2.3 Multivariate analysis
The OLS regression estimates presented in Table 3.6 show that expected medical 
expenditure (ߤ௦) continues to be significantly associated with medical spending in the 
previous year after controlling for demographics and socioeconomic characteristics, and it 
is also correlated with insurance status. Expected spending rises monotonically and 
significantly in moving from those who reporting having spent nothing on medical care in 
the previous year to those who claim to have spent more than 8,000 pesos. On average, a 
respondent who reports that their household spent at least 8,000 pesos in the previous year 
expects to spend almost 5,000 pesos more over the next year than a household that spent 
nothing in the previous year. Again, it appears the respondents believe there is a high degree 
of positive serial correlation in medical expenditures. 
Rather surprisingly, expected spending on medical care does not seem to vary with 
income.33 But it does rise strongly with education. College graduates expect to spend around 
900 pesos more than those without any education. Urban dwellers expected to spend 400 
pesos less than those living in rural areas. This may be because transport costs are included 
in the healthcare expenditures.
33 This may be due to measurement error in the income variable. The variable includes the income 
from different sources including salary, entrepreneurial activities, remittances and other sources. 
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Overall, the covariates explain 20 percent of the sample variation in expected medical 
expenditure. This represents a good deal of systematic variation, indicating that by no means 
do the elicited subjective probabilities contain only noise.
The second moment of the distribution of subjective beliefs ߪ௦ is also found to be 
significantly associated with medical spending in the previous year. Compared with 
households who spent nothing in the previous year, those who spent in any of the other 
intervals report subjective probabilities that imply a more dispersed distribution and greater 
medical expenditure risk. Those who spent 4001-8000 pesos in the previous year perceive 
the highest volatility. Urban dwellers perceive less variation than those living in rural areas.
Table 3.6 OLS regressions of subjective beliefs of medical expenditure - first moment ߤ௦
and second moment ߪ௦
ߤ௦ ߪ௦
Medical expenditure in the past year (ref. = 0)
1-4000 pesos 593.7*** 384.0***
(199.6) (110.2)
4001-8000 pesos 2,506.9*** 991.7***
(254.1) (170.9)
> 8000 pesos 4,848.6*** 312.2*
(330.2) (165.9)
At least one hospital inpatient stay in past year 208.1 -188.2
(305.0) (192.0)
Log of per capita household income 49.9 2.8
(73.9) (49.0)
Urban -379.5** -362.1***
(157.5) (101.3)
Number of household members 60.3 -7.2
(46.9) (27.4)
Number of household members aged <15 or >=65 27.9 17.3
(68.4) (40.4)
Highest education (ref. no schooling)
Elementary school completed 380.0* 83.5
(222.8) (150.6)
High school completed 180.5 -159.1
(206.2) (136.7)
College completed or more 877.1*** 235.8
(306.9) (199.9)
Constant 1,088.1 1,111.8**
(832.4) (550.7)
Observations 1,456 1,456
R-squared 0.2237 0.0404
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.6 Willingness to pay for insurance and its decomposition
3.6.1 WTP for insurance
Table 3.7 gives estimates of WTP for insurance. The statistics in the top row are obtained 
from the empirical distribution of the WTP estimates obtained from Eq 3.4 in accordance 
with PT based on the elicited subjective distributions of medical expenditures and of risk 
attitudes. The mean estimate of ܹܶ ௨ܲ&௪ is about 200 pesos ($4) above the 2,400 pesos 
premium at which voluntary enrollment in the social health insurance fund is offered to lower 
income households. However, the median ܹܶ ௨ܲ&௪ is only 380 pesos and so the majority 
would not demand social insurance at the current (reduced) premium even if it could deliver 
full cover of all medical expenses, which it does not promise.
The bottom row gives WTP estimates obtained from the direct elicitation methods 
described in section 3.4.434.  The amount each respondent reported being willing to pay per 
month for insurance has been converted to the annual equivalent in order to make the 
magnitudes comparable with those obtained using our indirectly derived measure. The mean 
of the directly elicited WTP is lower than the estimate derived from the subjective 
distribution of medical expenditures while the median is higher.
Table 3.7. Estimates of willingness to pay for insurance 
Mean Std. Dev. Median N
Derived from subjective distribution (WTPu&w) 2,598 3,198 380 1,565
Directly elicited (WTPr) 2,057 1,789 1,200 1,565
There is positive correlation between the estimates of WTP elicited directly and those 
GHULYHGLQGLUHFWO\EXWLWLVVPDOOȡ S 
3.6.2 Decomposition of WTP
Table 3.8 presents our decomposition of WTP for health insurance (Eq. 3.5). We show means 
of the behavioral determinants of the WTP and compare these between the insured and the 
uninsured. We discuss, in turn, findings related to each component of the decomposition –
the belief premium, the risk attitude (u- and w-) premiums aQGWKHUHVLGXDOİ-) premium. 
34 WTP was elicited using two different methods. The average WTP using the bidding approach is 
2141 pesos while the average of the approach listing intervals is slightly lower at 1966 pesos (p=0.053). 
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Finding 1: positive belief premium
On average, respondents have a positive belief premium. This was already evident from the 
comparison of means in section 3.5.2: the amount respondents expect to spend on healthcare 
over the next year is greater than the sample average of expenses incurred in the past year. 
The average subjective expectation is greater than the objective expectation. If the 
respondents were risk neutral, then, motivated only by their expectations, on average, they 
would purchase insurance that is priced fairly for the average risk. The discrepancy between 
the perceived fair price and fair price does not result from pessimism about the likelihood of 
incurring high levels of expenditure. We established in section 3.4.8 that, on average, people 
are optimistic about avoiding such expenses. As noted in section 3.5.2, the subjective and 
objective distributions diverge most at the bottom. A substantial proportion of households 
incur no expenses but few report being certain of avoiding spending on healthcare 
completely.
The mean belief premium is larger for the insured in the sample than it is for the 
uninsured. While the difference is not statistically significant, the mean is significantly 
positive for the insured (p=0.004) but not significantly different from zero for the uninsured 
(p=0.878). One must keep in mind that the belief premium is obtained from the empirical 
and subjective distributions of OOP spending. It tells us about the discrepancy between the 
fair price and the perceived fair price of insurance that is supplementary to any insurance the 
household currently has. The positive mean belief premium of the insured implies that, based 
solely expectations, the average of these households would demand fairly priced 
supplementary insurance, were it available. Their positive belief premium may be because 
they do not fully appreciate the cover they get from their current insurance. On average, they 
Fair price WTPr
belief u w ڙ N
(r)=(6 (r)=(6 (r)=(6 (r)=(6
All 3146 196 -386 -358 -540 2057 1565
Insured (1) 3179 309 0.10 -382 0.71 -395 0.21 -669 0.11 2066 1514
Voluntary (2) 3263 803 0.02 -346 0.51 -496 0.25 -405 0.91 2818 135
Employer (3) 3201 56 0.88 -356 0.49 -295 0.99 -455 0.70 2151 304
Sponsored (4) 3944 222 0.48 -266 0.03 -561 0.07 -1372 0.00 1966 177
Indigent (5) 2304 852 0.00 -389 0.87 -372 0.51 -725 0.18 1670 230
Uninsured (6) 3086 21 -400 -294 -359 2054 545
Notes: The column labelled (r)=(6) gives the p-value of a t-test of equality of the mean for the group in row (r) with 
the mean for the uninsured in row (6). The test allows for unequal variances across groups.
Table 3.8 Decomposition of willingness to pay for health insurance
Premium
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expect to spend 3488 pesos on healthcare but they spent 309 pesos less than that in the last 
year.35
The expectations of the uninsured, on average, are unbiased.36 Their decision not to 
insure does not appear to be due to optimism. They are aware of the average risk of OOP 
expenditure and so efforts to communicate this risk would not be effective in encouraging 
them to insure. The mean perceived fair price of insurance for this group is 3107 pesos 
(=3086+21). This is greater than the 2400 pesos premium at which a low income household 
can enroll in the NHIP, but it is less than the 3600 pesos premium at which insurance is 
available to higher income households. Hence, according to these estimates, any low income 
uninsured household would have decided to insure if it were risk neutral or risk averse. Either 
risk preferences explain the behavior of these households, or there is some other explanation 
that is not captured by our model. High income, uninsured households would need to have a 
risk premium of at least 493 pesos (=3600-3107) in order to be persuaded to join the NHIP. 
Their revealed preference suggests that they are not so risk averse.
Among the insured, the average belief premiums are largest for the voluntarily 
insured and for the poor who get fully subsidized insurance through the indigent program. 
The substantial excess of the subjective expectation of OOP spending over the mean of actual 
spending suggests that pessimism could possibly contribute to the decision to enroll 
voluntarily. Even with insurance, this group still expects to be spending more than it did, on 
average, in the last year. Putting differences in the degree to which beliefs are pessimistic 
aside, the group that enrolls voluntarily still has more reason to do so than those who choose 
to not enroll. The fair price of insurance for those who enroll voluntarily is 177 pesos greater 
than that for those who remain uninsured. Bearing in mind that the former group will have 
additional medical expenses that are already reimbursed and so not reflected in this fair price 
for supplementary cover, it does appear to be the higher risk individuals who choose to 
enroll. The difference in the mean perceived fair prices is even greater (959 pesos). 
Consistent with adverse selection, the voluntarily insured seem to realize they are high risk, 
while the uninsured are aware that they are low risk. 
35 Insured households pay OOP for healthcare because insurance is incomplete in both the services covered 
and the expenses reimbursed. In particular, providers can, and do, charge in excess of reimbursement ceilings 
(Capuno et al 2016).
36 Strictly, this is true only if there is no change in the mean of actual spending from one year to the next.
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The large belief premium of those covered by the indigent program is puzzling. This 
group does not appear to appreciate the extent of the insurance cover they have. This might 
be because they do not realize that providers are prohibited from charging them fees on top 
of the reimbursement ceiling. However, this is not particularly compelling because of low 
compliance with the no balanced billing policy for the poor (Bredenkamp and Buisman 
2016). Another explanation could be that the indigent expect to need and pay for health care 
but when they fall sick they are constrained from seeking care by their extremely tight budget 
and possibly also because of procrastination. 
Finding 2: negative u- and w- premiums explain low WTP
The means of both risk attitude premiums are negative for all groups indicating risk seeking 
as opposed to risk aversion, on average. This explains a large part of the shortfall of WTP 
from the fair price. The sum of the two (mean) negative risk attitude related premiums is 
larger in magnitude than the positive belief premium. Hence, based on only their perceived 
fair price and their risk attitudes, the average household would not purchase actuarially fair 
insurance that fully covered their currently uninsured medical expenses. For those already 
partially insured, this means that they would not be interested in supplementary cover offered 
at a premium equal to their expected OOP payments which fully protected them from the 
residual risk they face because of gaps in their current cover. The risk related premiums do 
not differ so much between the insured and the uninsured except that the probability 
weighting premium is less negative, on average, among the uninsured, although only the 
difference from those covered by the sponsored program for the near poor is significant (at 
10%). 
)LQGLQJİ-premium large for the poor 
The difference between the WTP derived indirectly from the model of beliefs and risk 
attitudes (ܹܶ ௨ܲ&௪) and the directly reported WTPr JLYHV XV WKH UHVLGXDO İ-premium 
capturing whatever cannot be explained by the model. This is negative and large in 
magnitude relative to WTPr for all groups. Besides beliefs and risk attitudes, there are other 
factors that push the WTP for insurance below the fair price. One contributing factor could 
be opportunities for self-insurance. In a multi-period model, it is not optimal for a household 
holding a sufficient buffer stock of wealth and who is not liquidity constrained to purchase 
full formal insurance offered at an actuarially fair premium (Gollier 2003). Consumption can 
be maintained while spending on healthcare by drawing down savings and/or borrowing. 
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Respondents who have these self-insurance options would be expected to report a lower 
WTPr for health insurance for any given exposure to medical expenditure risk. Our measure 
of risk is the subjective distribution of medical expenditures derived from elicited beliefs 
about future spending. Respondents who have self-insurance options and who take account 
of them will forecast greater future spending. In our model, this will raise the perceived fair 
price of insurance (Ɋs). Self-insurance financed medical expenditures will also raise the fair 
price (Ɋ) and so it has no effect on the belief premium (Ɋs-Ɋ). The reduction in WTPr relative 
to ȝgenerated by self-LQVXUDQFHZLOOWKHUHIRUHSXVKWKHİ-premium in the negative direction. 
There is plenty evidence that self-insurance and informal insurance are important sources of 
financing medical expenses in LMIC (Genoni 2012; Gertler and Gruber 2002; Islam and 
Maitra 2012; Liu 2016; Mohanan 2013; Townsend 1994,). It is plausible that this contributes 
to the low value of WTPr DQGWKHODUJHQHJDWLYHYDOXHRIWKHİ-premium. However, the larger 
magnitude RIİ-premium among the poor and near-poor households covered by the indigent 
and sponsored programs respectively suggest that this is not the full story. According to the 
multi-period model with self-insurance options, the value of formal insurance is highest for 
those who have a smaller buffer stock of wealth and those who are liquidity constrained. 
Poorer households have both characteristics. Hence, their WTP relative to the risk they are 
exposed to should be higher. This would imply a larger, not a smalOHU İ-premium. One 
possible explanation is the poor respondents are cognizant of their tight budget constraint 
when reporting their WTP for insurance but pay less attention to it when forecasting their 
future spending on healthcare. Another possibility is that the poor feel entitled to the fully 
subsidized insurance they have and report a low willingness to pay (relative to their forecast 
expenditure) as a statement of that entitlement, or possibly as a strategy to maintain the 
subsidy. 
3.7 Conclusion
We have presented a new decomposition of the willingness to pay for insurance into its fair 
price and four behaviorally determined contributions that reflect the individual’s beliefs 
about their exposure to risk, two components of risk attitudes – utility curvature and 
probability weighting – consistent with prospect theory and a residual term that absorbs all 
determinants of WTP that are not captured by our single-period PT model, as well as 
measurement error. The motivation for this decomposition was to explain the discrepancy 
between low (revealed) WTP for health insurance relative to the substantial medical 
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expenditure risk households are exposed to in LMIC. We confirmed this discrepancy exists 
in the Philippines and implemented the WTP decomposition using a unique combination of 
data on elicited beliefs about future spending on healthcare, actual medical expenditure and 
elicited risk preferences that are obtained from a nationwide survey.
The average WTP in the sample is only about two thirds of the fair price of insurance. 
This deficit is not explained by downwardly biased expectations of medical expenditures. In 
fact, expectations are biased in a pessimistic direction. The mean subjective expectation of 
medical expenditures is 6.2% above the mean expenditure incurred by the households in the 
previous year. This positive belief premium is more than offset by negative premiums related 
to risk attitudes. Both convex utility in the domain of losses and the transformation of 
probabilities into decision weights push the WTP below the fair price, reducing the demand 
for insurance. On average, individuals are not risk averse. Risk seeking characterized as 
convex utility in the domain of losses is widely observed and is consistent with PT. The 
perhaps surprising result here is that this is not offset by probability weighting to generate a 
demand for insurance, on average. WTP is further reduced by other factors not included in 
our model. We suspect that time is a major missing element. The analysis presented in 
Chapter 2 found that time preferences were a stronger determinant of the demand for health 
insurance in the Philippines than risk preferences. Added to this, the self-insurance options 
that are available when medical expenditure risk is examined in a multi-period context are 
expected to reduce WTP for formal insurance.  
The mean directly elicited WTP is highest among the voluntarily insured and lowest 
among the poor with fully subsidized insurance. The low WTP of the poor is presumably a 
direct reflection of their limited purchasing power. After the poor, WTP is lowest among the 
uninsured. They do not differ from the voluntarily insured so much with respect to the two 
risk related premiums of the WTP decomposition. It does not appear to be the case that the 
opportunity to purchase insurance is forgone because of more risk seeking preferences or 
because there is less volatility in the subjective distributions of medical expenditures. Rather, 
it is with respect to subjectively expected medical expenditures that the uninsured differ most 
from the voluntarily insured. Objectively, the average expenses incurred by the uninsured 
are 5.4% below the average expenses of the voluntarily insured. Allowing for the fact that 
the latter have additional expenses that are covered by their insurance, this suggests that there 
is adverse selection in voluntary enrollment. But the larger difference is in the subjective 
expectations. The voluntarily insured overestimate their medical expenses by 25%, which 
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corresponds to a large positive belief premium. The belief premium of the uninsured is 
effectively zero. This difference in beliefs should not be used to explain why those who are 
voluntarily insured decided to take this cover since their beliefs are with respect to OOP 
medical expenses that are not covered by their insurance. But for the uninsured we can 
conclude that, on average, their expectations are unbiased. It is not distorted beliefs that are 
responsible for their decision not to enroll. This suggests that communicating information 
about exposure to medical expenses is unlikely to stimulate enrollment in health insurance. 
Preferences, along with the other factors captured by the residual term, appear to be 
responsible for the decision not to insure. Of course, besides the question of whether it is 
ethically defensible, it is far from easy to design a policy that influences preferences. 
We decompose WTP using beliefs modelled as subjective probabilities and 
preferences consistent with PT. Compared with relying on the assumptions that the cross-
sectional distribution provides an adequate approximation to the perceived distributions used 
by individuals in decision making and that EU is a descriptively accurate model of decision 
making, we believe our approach has advantages and that these are evident from partial 
success in explaining the low WTP for health insurance. However, we do not have any 
evidence that people are PT maximizers. We also had to assume specific functional forms 
(power utility and Prelec’s weighting function). We are not aware of evidence supporting 
these specifications in settings similar to that studied here. Most tests of the suitability of 
these functional forms have been conducted in western countries, and usually with student 
samples.
Our computed WTP relied on several measurements (beliefs, utility, probability 
weighting), each possibly subject to noise. It is thus not surprising to obtain relatively low 
cross-individual correlation between the indirectly derived and directly elicited WTP. 
However, it is reassuring that comparisons of groups formed on the basis of insurance cover 
give meaningful findings. Our model, which is purely based on risk perception and risk 
attitude, does not incorporate important factors, such as a time dimension, self-insurance 
options and liquidity constraints, that can explain the reported WTP, as well as its 
discrepancies from both the fair price and the perceived fair price of insurance. These 
abstractions obviously decrease the correlation that can be expected between the WTP 
derived from our model and those directly reported by the respondents. 
The extent to which we can use the analysis to explain the health insurance choices 
observed in the data is limited by the fact that beliefs about future spending on healthcare 
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were elicited after the purchase of insurance. Ideally, we would estimate a household’s 
subjective distribution before it had the opportunity to purchase health insurance. We do not 
know what an insured household’s beliefs would have been if it had not been covered. 
Correcting this weakness is a priority for future research. In a context where there is ex ante 
elicitation of beliefs and preferences as well as ex post observation of who takes up an offer 
to insure, our decomposition could be used to explain variation in the observed insurance 
behavior.
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Appendices Chapter 3
Appendix 3.1 Protocol for elicitation of subjective distribution of medical expenditures
I am interested in the amount your household expects to spend out-of-pocket on medical and dental care, 
medicines and maintenance drugs, including transportation costs to health facilities in the next 12 months (1 
year).
Out-of-pocket expenditures include spending from salary/income, loans, savings and donations or charity 
assistance, but exclude spending that will be reimbursed from any health insurance cover, if you have any. 
They also exclude the government benefits SSS, GSIS and ECC.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: PRESENT THE RESPONDENT WITH THE FOUR CUPS
These cups represent four possible amounts of expenditure on medical and dental care, medicines and 
maintenance drugs your household might face over the next 12 months (1 year) including transportation costs 
to health facilities, but not including any expenses that will be covered by all health insurance
1. spend nothing at all 
2. spend between 1 and 4000 pesos
3. spend between 4001 and 8000 pesos
4. spend more than 8000 pesos
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: GIVE THE RESPONDENT THE 10 STICKS. 
I am interested in your beliefs about the chance that your household will incur the different levels of expenditure 
over the next 12 months (1 year). I would like you to distribute the 10 sticks over the cups to express what you 
think is the chance of each level of expenditure. One stick represents one chance out of 10. If you do not put 
any sticks in a cup, it means you think that you will NOT spend that amount. As you add sticks, it means that 
you think the chance of facing that level of expenditure increases. For example, if you put one or two sticks in 
a cup, it means you think it is unlikely that you will spend that amount but it is still possible. If you put 5 sticks 
in a cup, it means that there is an equal chance that you will spend that amount as it is that you will not (fifty-
fifty). If you put 6 sticks in a cup, it means that there is slightly more chance that you will spend that amount. 
If you put 10 sticks in a cup, it means you think that you will spend that amount, and there is no chance that 
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you will spend any of the other amounts. There is not a right or wrong answer, I just want to know what you 
think.
How would you distribute these 10 sticks now? Please remember that this concerns out-of-pocket expenditures 
for healthcare, medicines and maintenance drugs your entire household will face in the next 12 months (1 year), 
including transportation costs.
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Appendix 3.2 Protocol for eliciting past expenditures
TOTAL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES PAST 12 MONTHS
[SHOWCARD]
How much did your household spend out-of-pocket on medical and dental care, medicines and maintenance 
drugs including transportation costs to health facilities in the past 12 months (1 year)?
Out-of-pocket expenditures include spending from salary/income, loans, savings and donations or charity 
assistance, but exclude spending that will be reimbursed from any health insurance cover, if you have any. 
They also exclude the government benefits SSS, GSIS and ECC.
NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF THE RESPONDENT IS HAVING DIFFICULTY ESTIMATING THE 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES, ASSIST HIM/HER IN ADDING UP THE EXPENSES THAT HE/SHE 
RECALLS.
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: IN CASE NECESSARY, REPEAT THAT WE ARE ASKING FOR 
OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURE OF HEALTHCARE, MEDICINES AND MAINTENANCE 
DRUGS THE ENTIRE HOUSEHOLD FACED IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (1 YEAR)
Nothing at all
1
Between 0 – 4,000 pesos
2
Between 4,001 – 8,000 pesos
3
More than 8,000 pesos
4
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Appendix 3.3 Protocol for eliciting willingness to pay for full health insurance coverage 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR FULL HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: WE HAVE TWO QUESTIONS FOR AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY. 
QUESTION A WILL BE ASKED TO HALF OF THE RESPONDENTS. QUESTION B WILL BE 
ASKED TO THE OTHER HALF OF THE RESPONDENTS (RANDOMLY SELECTED)
FOLLOW TICKMARK
[   ] ASK QUESTION A
[   ] ASK QUESTION B
A. AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY
Think of the amount you are willing to pay per month for a membership in a health insurance programme 
which covers all costs your entire household will incur for medical and dental care, medicines and 
maintenance drugs including transportation costs to health facilities.
For a full membership in this health insurance programme, would you be willing to pay (MENTION 
AMOUNT)?
NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: PLEASE START BY ASKING FOR THE AMOUNT OF 500 PESOS 
(Q504A). THEN DEPENDING ON THEIR ANSWER ASK IN INCREMENTS AS PROVIDED BY 
THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE TABLE 
AMOUNT IN 
PESOS
WILLINGNESS FINAL 
ANSWER
WILLINGNESS 
TO PAY =YES NO
A
500
1 2
SKIP TO F CONTINUE TO B
B
400
1 2
STOP. RECORD FINAL 
ANSWER AS PHP400. 
SKIP TO Q506.
CONTINUE TO C
C 300
1 2
STOP. RECORD FINAL 
ANSWER AS PHP300. 
SKIP TO Q506.
CONTINUE TO D
D 200
1 2
STOP. RECORD FINAL 
ANSWER AS PHP200. 
SKIP TO Q506.
CONTINUE TO E
E 100
1 2
STOP. RECORD FINAL 
ANSWER AS PHP100. 
SKIP TO Q506.
STOP. RECORD FINAL 
ANSWER AS PHP0.
PROCEED TO Q505
F
600
1 2
CONTINUE TO G
STOP. RECORD FINAL 
ANSWER AS PHP500.
SKIP TO Q506.
1 2
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G 700
CONTINUE TO H
STOP. RECORD FINAL 
ANSWER AS PHP600.
SKIP TO Q506.
H
800
1 2
CONTINUE TO I
STOP. RECORD FINAL 
ANSWER AS PHP700.
SKIP TO Q506
I
900
1 2
CONTINUE TO J
STOP. RECORD FINAL
ANSWER AS PHP800.
SKIPTO Q506.
J HIGHER 
THAN 900?
1 2
ASK MAXIMUM 
AMOUNT AND RECORD 
AS FINAL ANSWER. 
STOP. RECORD FINAL 
ANSWER AS PHP900
SKIP TO Q506
NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: QUESTION B (WITH SHOWCARD) WILL BE ASKED TO SELECTED 
HOUSEHOLDS (HALF OF THE RESPONDENTS). 
B. AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY 
SHOWCARD
How much are you willing to pay per month for a membership in a health insurance programme which 
covers all costs your entire household will incur for medical and dental care, medicines, and maintenance 
drugs including transportation costs to health facilities?
PhP 0 1 ASK Q505
PhP 1-100 2
SKIP TO Q506
PhP 101-200 3
PhP 201-300 4
PhP 301-400 5
PhP 401-500 6
PhP 501-600 7
PhP 601-700 8
PhP 701-800 9
PhP 801-900 10
If more than PhP 900, specify: ____________ 11
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Appendix 3.4 Sensitivity to distributional assumption 
To construct a measure for the perceived fair price from the moments of the subjective 
probability distribution requires us to make a distributional assumption. We choose a 
lognormal distribution since this allows for a large tail without fixing the maximum. We 
explain the limitations of other distributional assumptions below.
We considered using a piecewise uniform distribution, however this distribution is 
relatively sensitive to the value at which the bound for the upper interval for the elicitation 
of medical expenditures is set. This value has the largest impact on the estimates for 
respondents that put all the sticks in the cup indicating expenditure of more than 8,000 pesos. 
This degree of sensitivity to a parameter about which we have little information is a major 
disadvantage of assuming a piecewise uniform distribution. The sensitivity carries over to 
estimates of the second moment. Even if we had elicited a bound on the last interval each 
household contemplated incurring, it would be implausible to assume that the density is flat 
in the region preceding that value. For these reasons, we did not choose to give consideration 
to estimates obtained under the assumption of a piecewise uniform distribution.
Another consideration was using the beta distribution. The sample mean of the 
estimates of the expectation is robust to assuming each household’s subjective probability 
distribution of expenditures has a beta form rather than being lognormal. The main 
difference between the sample distributions of estimates of expected medical expenditure 
derived from the assumptions of lognormality and beta is that the latter produces fewer low-
valued expectations. For example, the first quartile is 78 with lognormality and 568 with 
beta. The reason for choosing the lognormal over the beta distribution is because the latter 
does not allow for a tail and requires setting a maximum on the distribution. Table A3.4.1 
below further illustrates the sensitivity of our distributional assumption. 
Besides making a distributional assumption we need to assume an upper bound on 
the last interval for which we elicited likelihood of medical expenditures. The bottom panel 
of the table shows summaries of estimates of the first two moments of the subjective 
distributions under the assumption of lognormality with the upper bound of the last interval 
set at 20,000 pesos and 50,000 pesos. Comparing these with the estimates shown in the top 
panel using an upper bound of 12,000 pesos reveals that the sample means are somewhat 
sensitive to the value imposed. Actually, the distribution of estimates of the first moment
shifts little with the upper bound value up to the 75th percentile. But there are substantial 
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differences at the top of the sample distribution, which affect the mean. These are generated 
by respondents who place many sticks in the cup indicating spending in excess of 8,000 
pesos. The upper bound assumed for such spending obviously has a large impact on the 
expected value calculated. As would be expected, the distribution of estimates of the second 
moment is more sensitive to the upper bound value. The median obtained with a value of 
50,000 pesos is 1.9 times that derived using 12,000 pesos. In contrast, the median of the first 
moment essentially remains the same irrespective of the upper bound value imposed. 
Table A3.4.1 Estimates of first two moments of subjective probability distribution of 
household medical expenditure – sensitivity to distributional assumption and upper bound 
imposed
Mean Std. Dev. Percentiles
p25 p50 p75 p90
Upper bound 12000 pesos
)LUVWPRPHQWȝs)
Lognormal 3,341 3,291 78 3,217 5,670 8,171
Beta 3,379 3,140 603 2,979 5,514 8,189
Piecewise uniform 3,779 2,837 2,001 2,801 5,601 8,001
6HFRQGPRPHQWıs)
Lognormal 1,323 1,868 51 274 2,891 4,409
Beta 1,351 1,350 302 835 2,569 3,640
Piecewise uniform 1,885 1,089 1,154 1,291 2,921 3,517
Lognormal
First PRPHQWȝs)
Upper bound
20.000 pesos 3,742 3,962 78 3,277 5,661 9,294
50.000 pesos 4,634 5,883 80 3,461 5,738 14,462
6HFRQGPRPHQWıs)
Upper bounds
20.000 pesos 1,785 2,768 50 409 3,192 6,277
50.000 pesos 2,816 8,050 51 403 3,210 8,138
Sample size 1565
Notes: Columns give summary statistics of the sample distribution of household-specific estimates of the first 
two moments of the subjective distribution of healthcare expenditures. The square root of the second moment 
(standard deviation) is given. When fitting the Beta distribution we assume a uniform distribution for respondents that 
put all sticks in the last cup.
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Appendix 3.5 Balancing tests of attrition 
Table A3.5.1 Balancing tests of attrition on baseline characteristics
Followed up Not Followed up p-value
Informal sector/poor at baseline
Urban 0.424 0.617 0.000
Average per capita household expenditure 22351 29766 0.000
Head is working 0.876 0.844 0.079
Head has poor health 0.028 0.039 0.220
Head had at least college education 0.077 0.130 0.000
Has available health facility within 15 min 0.721 0.749 0.240
Has other insurance 0.026 0.043 0.065
Number of children under 21 1.851 1.517 0.000
Experienced adverse health outcome in the last year 0.264 0.268 0.864
National Capital Region 0.112 0.245 0.000
Rest of Luzon 0.440 0.483 0.103
Visayas 0.226 0.087 0.000
Mindanao 0.223 0.186 0.093
N 1513 462
Formal sector at baseline
Urban 0.652 0.523 0.000
Average per capita household expenditure 35592 57223 0.639
Head is working 0.891 0.912 0.314
Head has poor health 0.026 0.023 0.740
Head had at least college education 0.202 0.254 0.090
Has available health facility within 15 min 0.772 0.733 0.220
Has other insurance 0.127 0.093 0.118
Number of children under 21 1.843 1.952 0.355
Experienced adverse health outcome in the last year 0.255 0.270 0.635
National Capital Region 0.213 0.100 0.000
Rest of Luzon 0.554 0.436 0.001
Visayas 0.090 0.260 0.000
Mindanao 0.142 0.203 0.029
N 267 708
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Chapter 4
Long-term effects of temporary inducements: A 
nationwide randomized health insurance 
experiment in the Philippines
Joint work with Baillon, A., Capuno, J., O’Donnell, O., Quimbo, S. and R. Tan, C. 
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4.1 Introduction
The greatest challenge for countries striving to reach universal health coverage is the 
‘missing middle’: informal sector workers who do not benefit from employment-based 
mandatory insurance and who are not sufficiently poor to qualify for means-tested fully 
subsidized insurance (Bredenkamp et al. 2015; Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011; Wagstaff et 
al., 2016). Voluntary insurance enrollment of these workers and their families, which 
comprise a very large share of the population of most middle-income countries, is typically 
low (Acharya et al. 2013; Bredenkamp et al. 2015; Pettigrew and Mathauer 2016). This has 
prompted experimentation with inducements – premium subsidies, information on benefits 
and assistance with application – that are intended to encourage enrollment. Evidence on the 
effects on take-up at the time the inducements are offered is mixed (Asuming et al 2017; 
Capuno et al., 2016; Chemin 2018; Das and Leino 2011; Dercon et al 2015; Thornton et al 
2010; Wagstaff et al. 2016). But even when the effect is positive, it would be expected to 
dissipate once the inducement is withdrawn, unless the experience of being insured changes 
the valuation of it or the inducement helps the recipient overcome a fixed cost to enrollment 
that is not faced again at reenrollment. Knowing whether inducements have short- or long-
lived impacts on the demand for insurance is critical to determining their cost-effectiveness. 
And yet, as far as we know, the only evidence on the long-term (> 1 year) effects that exists 
comes from an experiment conducted in one rural district of northern Ghana (Asuming et al 
2017). 
This chapter adds to this meagre evidence base on the long-term effects of health 
insurance inducements by using a nationwide randomized experiment to estimate the impact 
four years later of two sets of interventions designed to encourage enrollment in the 
voluntary plan of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) of the Philippines (Capuno 
et al. 2016). The first intervention consisted of a one-off premium subsidy of up to 50%, plus 
information on the operation and benefits of the insurance program as well as SMS reminders 
to enroll over a period of eleven months. We will refer to this as the subsidy+info
intervention. Half of the treated households that did not respond to this intervention were 
randomly selected to receive a second that reduced the indirect costs of enrollment by 
providing one-time assistance with completion and submission of the insurance application. 
We will refer to this as the handholding intervention. Households offered the subsidy+info
intervention, but not the handholding intervention, were 4.8 percentage point (ppts) more 
likely than controls to be voluntarily enrolled in NHIP four years later (p<0.05). This is a 
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staggering four fifths of the short-term effect. Attenuation of the effect of the handholding
intervention, which had a much larger short-term impact, was much greater. In fact, it had 
no significant long-term effect on enrollment. The non-significant point estimate indicates 
that sample households randomly offered this inducement after failing to respond to the 
subsidy+info intervention were 3.0 ppts more likely to be voluntarily insured four years later 
than the sample households not offered handholding despite also failing to respond to the 
subsidy+info intervention. This is only 11% of the short-term impact of this intervention. 
The combined effect of the two interventions is to raise enrollment by 8.5 ppts (p<0.01) four 
years after the inducements were offered. This is 23% of their combined short-term impact. 
Our study adds to the scant and mixed evidence on the long-term effects of 
inducements for health insurance enrollment. The results contradict those of two 
experiments that find the immediate impact of a premium subsidy on health insurance 
enrollment already dissipates after one year (Chemin 2018; Thornton 2010), but they are 
partially consistent with a third experiment that finds the effect of a premium subsidy is 
sustained to some degree three years after it was offered (Asuming et al 2017). Thornton et 
al. (2010) report that a substantial premium subsidy offered to informal workers in three 
markets in Managua (Nicaragua) initially raised enrollment by about 30 ppts, but this 
diminished after 1 year, with less than 10% of those who enrolled during the experiment still 
remaining in the program. Similarly, Chemin (2018) finds that a full premium subsidy in 
combination with information and assistance with application initially raised enrollment by 
45 ppts in a rural community in the Central Province of Kenya, but this effect completely 
vanished after a year when the subsidy was withdrawn. However, the same study finds that 
another intervention designed to build trust in the insurance product by having a respected 
community member present it during a regular meeting of an existing informal group 
increased take-up by 12 ppts, and almost three fifths of this was maintained after one year. 
This suggests that changing the way in which people who are unfamiliar with the concept of 
insurance perceive it can be important to achieving permanent changes in demand. But this 
may not hold universally. In a rural district of Northern Ghana Asuming et al (2017) find 
that a subsidy of 33-100% raised enrollment by 40 ppts initially and by 15 ppts after three 
years. But a 17 ppts initial impact of information on enrollment was not sustained at all three 
years later. Rather strangely, a handholding intervention had no immediate impact but is 
96
estimated to have raised enrollment by 20 ppts after three years37. The long-term combined 
effect of all three interventions is an incredible 86% of their combined short-term effect. 
This study shows that it is possible for temporary inducements to have a lasting impact on 
health insurance enrollment. But given the location of the experiment in one rural district of 
one province in Ghana, one may wonder about the extent to which the results generalize. 
The present chapter provides evidence from an experiment conducted nationwide in 
the Philippines in both rural and urban areas. Our results confirm that temporary 
inducements for voluntary health insurance can indeed have a long-term, sustained impact 
on enrollment. In addition, we show that the ranking of the effectiveness of the different 
inducements switches as the follow-up period is stretched. This demonstrates that short-term 
results may be a poor guide of the long-term relative cost-effectiveness of programs. 
One-time interventions, such as a subsidy, could heighten or dampen demand for 
insurance, health services or, indeed, other products in the long run (Dupas 2014). The effect 
may be positive if the consumer previously had little or no experience of the product and 
found it difficult to assess its value. In that case, a temporary inducement may permanently 
shift preferences by making the consumer aware of what they were previously missing. In 
the context of insurance, this is most likely to occur for those who make a claim during the 
initial period of cover. However, given a right-skewed distribution of medical expenses, for 
insurance to be viable without continued, substantial subsidies, a minority must claim in any 
period. The experience of purchasing insurance, even at a subsidized price, may disillusion 
the majority that do not make a claim. Unless this is compensated by the peace of mind from 
knowing that they would be covered if expenses were incurred, then a temporary period of 
insurance may discourage many from renewing their cover when the subsidy is withdrawn. 
A negative learning effect could also arise if those responding to the subsidy are disappointed 
by the benefits offered when they do make a claim. In the Philippines, providers are 
permitted to charge prices that exceed the reimbursement ceiling covered by NHIP. Most 
take advantage of this. Acquiring insurance cover can therefore result in being charged a 
higher price for the same treatment. The insured may then enjoy little benefit in terms of 
reduced exposure to medical expenditure risk. Of course, in this case the low demand for 
insurance should be of less concern since it offers little effective protection.
37The authors do not have a clear explanation for this finding. They suggest that those treated in the 
village may have created a personal relationship over time with the government field officers which increased 
the pressure to enroll in the long run but not in the short run.
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Development practitioners and economists are alert to the potential for one-off 
subsidies for health and other products to impact negatively on demand in the long run, 
although there is only limited evidence on the extent to which such fears are well founded 
(Dupas 2014). Demand inducement through a price subsidy runs the risk that the recipients 
may anchor their willingness to pay (WTP) on the discounted price (Dupas 2014). The one-
time subsidy may then reduce take-up in the long run as it reduces the consumer’s reservation 
price below the unsubsidized price (Simonson and Tversky 1992, Koszegi and Rabin 2006, 
Simonsohn and Loewenstein 2006, Dupas 2014). In addition to the impact of the 
interventions on insurance enrollment, we also estimate effects on WTP for insurance in the 
long term. This makes it possible to assess the plausibility of some mechanisms through 
which the long-term effect on enrollment may operate. We do not find any significant effect 
of the subsidy+info intervention, the handholding intervention or the combination of the two 
on WTP four years later. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides background of 
the health insurance setting in the Philippines. Section 4.3 presents the research design and 
methods, and section 4.4 presents the empirical strategy. The results are summarized in 
Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Study setting
The NHIP, which is administered by and is commonly referred to as PhilHealth, initially 
(1995) provided mandatory cover for civil servants and formal sector salaried employees 
only (Bredenkamp and Buisman, 2016; Capuno et al., 2016). It was extended first to provide 
fully subsidized insurance for the poor and later to make voluntary insurance available to 
informal sector workers and the self-employed through the Individually Paying Program 
(IPP). By 2010, the year before our experiment, PhilHealth claimed to cover 75% of the 
population and have 70 million beneficiaries. Of these, only 16% were enrolled through the 
IPP program and they accounted for only 33% of those eligible for this program (Manasan 
2011; Capuno et al. 2016). Two thirds of those who could enroll chose not to. 
All PhilHealth programs extend coverage to the spouse, children (<21 years) and 
parents ( 65 years) of the enrolled member. At the time of the experiment, the annual 
premium for the IPP was 1,200 pesos (just under $30) for those with an average monthly 
individual income of no more than 25,000 pesos. It was 2,400 pesos for those with higher 
incomes.
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Between 2011/12 when the experiment took place and the long-term follow-up in 
2015, PhilHealth implemented various changes. In 2014, fully subsidized cover was 
extended to the near poor (2013 Amendment to the National Health insurance Act of 1995 
(RA 10606)). About half of the households benefitting this extension of free health insurance 
were not previously covered by any PhilHealth program, while the other half did have 
insurance, including some who were enrolled in the IPP program (Bredenkamp et al. 2017). 
At the start of 2015, a law mandating government-sponsored health insurance for all senior 
citizens ( 60 years) came into effect (PHIC 2014). According to the PhilHealth database, 
between the end of 2011 and mid 2015 coverage increased from 27.9 million families (78.4 
million individuals) to 38.5 million families (89.4 million individuals) (Bredenkamp et al 
2017). However, survey data consistently show coverage rates that are lower by about 20 
ppts (Bredenkamp and Buisman 2016; Bredenkamp et al 2017)38. In any case, coverage 
undoubtedly did increase markedly in the period from our interventions to the long-term 
follow-up. This does not invalidate our design provided that the coverage extensions 
benefited the treatment and control groups equally, which should hold given random 
allocation of the initial inducements.   
By 2015 those with an average monthly individual income of no more than 25,000 
pesos ($540), paid a premium of 2,400 pesos per year ($50) to enroll voluntarily in the IPP. 
At earnings above 25,000 pesos, the premium was 3,600 pesos per year.
The benefit package includes a wide range of inpatient services at accredited 
Philhealth providers in both the public and private sector. In also includes some specific 
outpatient interventions and there is a limited primary care benefit package (Bredenkamp 
and Buisman 2016). There is, however, evidence that PhilHealth coverage provides only 
limited financial protection (Bredenkamp and Buisman 2016). This most likely results from 
the fact that providers are allowed to set their own prices while PhilHealth does not cover 
expenses beyond reimbursement ceilings, leaving patients to pay the excess out-of-pocket. 
The insured face a high degree of uncertainty over both the amount the provider will charge 
and the amount PhilHealth will reimburse.
38 This most likely results from the fact that subsidized members such as the poor and senior citizens 
are automatically enrolled in PhilHealth by virtue of their status as opposed to having to actively enrol 
themselves and might therefore not be aware of their insurance status. 
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4.3 Research design
The sampling strategy, interventions, randomization and data collection are described in
Capuno et al. (2016), which presents estimates of the short-term effects of the interventions.
4.3.1 Sampling 
A multi-stage cluster randomized design was used to select 2950 households from 243 
municipalities that are representative at the national level, excluding the conflict area of 
Autonomous Region Muslim Mindanao. First, there was stratification by broad regions 
(National Capital Region, North-Central Luzon, South Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao) 
within which provinces were selected using proportionate to population sampling (PPS). 
Within each sampled province, first municipalities/cities, and then barangays 
(community/neighborhood), were selected again using PPS. From each barangay, five 
households were drawn using simple random sampling (Capuno et al. 2016). The baseline 
survey was fielded February-April 2011.
Randomization of the insurance inducements was done at the municipality level 
rather than the barangay or household levels to reduce the scope for contamination between 
treatment and control groups, and to avoid non-compliance that could occur if control 
households were to see their neighbor benefiting from a subsidy they were denied. Out of 
243 municipalities selected by the sampling procedure described in the previous paragraph, 
179 were randomly assigned to be intervention sites and the remaining 64 designated as 
control sites. In the 179 intervention sites, 2200 households were selected for interview to 
establish eligibility for the IPP. Those found to be eligible (1,037 households) were offered 
the insurance inducements described in the next sub-section. A household was considered 
eligible if the survey respondent reported: a) that either the household head or the spouse 
was not covered by any PhilHealth program; b) being unsure whether the head/spouse were 
covered by any program; or, c) that they had not paid the IPP premium in the preceding six 
months (Capuno et al 2016). Hence, households in which both the head and the spouse were 
paid-up members of the IPP program, or any other PhilHealth program, were not eligible for 
the interventions. In the 64 control municipalities, 780 households were interviewed and 
none was offered any inducement.
Figure 4.1 shows the study design and participant flow.
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Figure 4.1 Participant flow
4.3.2 Interventions
Households located in the treatment sites that were eligible for the IPP program were offered 
the subsidy+info intervention at the end of the baseline interview that was conducted at some 
time from February to April 2011. This consisted of a voucher giving entitlement to enroll 
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in the IPP at a reduced premium, an information kit and a series of SMS messages sent 
intermittently reminding the respondent to use the voucher to enroll. The voucher was 
initially valid until the end of 2011 (9-11 months depending on the date of interview) and 
was worth a 600 pesos ($13.66) discount on the annual premium for IPP membership. The 
amount was equivalent to a 50% reduction in the price for a low income individual (25,000
pesos monthly income) and a 25% discount for a higher income individual. The recipient 
could use the voucher at their nearest PhilHealth service office, where they would have to 
submit the requisite application forms and pay the part of the annual premium not covered 
by the voucher. The voucher was not transferable. The information kit consisted of leaflets 
covering enrollment, claims procedure and frequently asked questions, as well as the 
application form. Until the end of period for which the voucher was valid, a recipient who 
had not yet redeemed their voucher was sent SMS messages reminding them to use it and 
how to do so. Those in the control sites eligible for the IPP program were not offered 
anything, neither were those not eligible in both types of site.
In January 2012, households in the treatment sites who had been issued with a 
voucher but who had not yet enrolled in the IPP and were still eligible to do so were randomly 
allocated to one of two groups, with randomization in this case being done at the household 
level39. One half of these households were sent (by mail) a letter containing the same 
information kit they had been issued with earlier and with notification that the validity of the 
voucher had been extended up to the end of February 2012. They were also sent SMS 
messages with the same information. The other half of these non-responding but eligible 
households were also sent a letter that, in addition to including the same information kit, 
informed them that the voucher would remain valid until they were visited by a survey 
enumerator (March-May 2012) who would offer assistance with completion of the 
application form, deliver it to the PhilHealth office on their behalf and ensure that the 
PhilHealth ID card was mailed back to them. Essentially, this eliminated the indirect cost of 
enrollment, which in some cases could be substantial when transport connections, e.g. by 
boat, were poor. This is what we refer to as the handholding intervention. 
39 In January 2012, PhilHealth gave the study team a list of households who had used their voucher to 
purchase IPP cover. Households that had received the voucher but were not on this list became the target group 
for the sub-experiment. Their IPP eligibility was double checked in the end line survey conducted March-May 
2015 (Capuno et al 2016).
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Of the 918 households in the treatment sites that had been offered the voucher for 
IPP enrollment but had not taken it up by the end of 2011, 787 were still eligible for the 
program at that time. From these households, 392 were randomly assigned to receive the 
two-month extension to the subsidy+info intervention. The other 395 were given the 
handholding intervention. The remaining 131 non-responding households were no longer 
eligible for the IPP program. These households received no further inducement. 
4.3.3 Statistical power
The experiment was powered to estimate the short-term (approximately one year) effect on 
IPP enrollment of the subsidy+info intervention. No separate power calculations were made 
for the handholding intervention. The sample size was set to detect a short-term increase in 
the enrollment rate of 7.5 percentage points among IPP eligible households not yet enrolled 
with power fixed at 0.8 and the significance level set at 0.05. The PhilHealth overall coverage 
rate was assumed to be 53%, the IPP coverage rate was assumed to be 33% of those eligible 
for that program, the IPP enrollment rate in the control group at short-term follow-up was 
assumed to be 10% and the intra-cluster correlation coefficient was assumed to be 0.16. 
Clustering was at the municipality level, which was the unit of randomization.  
4.3.4 Follow-up sample
The long-term effects of the interventions are estimated using a follow-up survey conducted 
in July-August 2015. The intention was to interview all 1420 households that were IPP-
eligible at baseline. It proved possible to trace and interview 1000 of these households. The 
households that attrited differ from those that were followed up in some baseline 
characteristics. They are more likely to be urban (/capital city) dwellers, they are better 
educated, have higher incomes, have fewer children and are willing to pay more for 
insurance through PhilHealth. (Appendix Table A4.1). We explain in section 4.4 how we 
reweight the sample to deal with these differences.
The bottom of Figure 4.1 shows how the 1000 households who were followed up are 
split across the various treatment and control groups.  
4.3.5 Outcomes 
The main outcome of interest is whether a household that was IPP eligible in 2011 was 
enrolled in this program in 2015. If either the household head or spouse is reported to be 
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enrolled as an IPP member and was not enrolled in 2011, then we consider that the household 
is insured through this program given coverage extends to the family of the IPP member. 
We do not consider insurance through any other program because individuals qualify for 
these schemes through formal sector employment, poverty or by belonging to a defined 
population group. They do not voluntarily pay a premium to join these programs.
In addition to evaluating the long-term impact on enrollment, we estimate the impact 
on the willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance through a PhilHealth program in 2015. WTP 
was elicited in two ways that were randomized between respondents. The first method was 
the iterative bidding approach. This started by asking the respondent whether they would 
pay 100 pesos per month for PhilHealth membership. Depending on whether or not they said 
they would, the amount was subsequently raised or lowered and the bidding continued until 
the respondent changed their response. If the respondent claimed to be willing to pay more 
than 300 pesos, they were asked to state the amount they would pay. The other method 
involved listing WTP intervals, each with a range of 50 pesos, and asking the respondent to 
pick the one closest to their WTP. The intervals were given for amounts up to 300 pesos, 
with a final option to indicate their WTP amount if it exceeded this. Since the elicitation 
method was randomized, it is orthogonal to the randomly allocated interventions. But to 
increase power we control for an indicator of the method of elicitation.
4.4 Empirical strategy 
Randomized allocation of both interventions is the basic strategy used to identify their long-
term effects on enrollment in the IPP program and WTP but there are two potentially 
confounding factors that need to be dealt with: attrition and eligibility for the handholding
intervention being partly behaviorally determined. To identify the long-term effect of the 
subsidy+info intervention, households that were also exposed to the handholding
intervention must be excluded from the treatment group. That leaves three groups that were 
exposed only to subsidy+info: i) those who responded to this inducement by enrolling in the 
IPP by the end of 2011 (Group 1) (see Figure 4.1); ii) those who did not enroll in IPP and 
were still eligible for it at the end of 2011, and who were randomly assigned not to receive 
the handholding intervention (Group 3); and, iii) those who did not enroll in IPP and were 
no longer eligible for it at the end of 2011 (Group 4). Comparing the mean outcome across 
these three groups in 2015 with the mean outcome of the control group that did not received 
any intervention (Group 5) does not provide an unbiased estimate of the average treatment 
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effect of subsidy+info because exclusion of households that were exposed to this 
intervention, did not respond to it by the end of 2011 and were subsequently randomly 
allocated to receive the handholding intervention (Group 2) renders the treatment group
potentially compositionally different, in unobservables as well as observables, from the 
control group. If the insurance demand without inducement of households that did not 
respond to the subsidy+info intervention differs from that of the average household initially 
eligible for the experiment, then comparing outcomes in a treatment group consisting of 
Group 1 + Group 3 + Group 4 with outcomes in Group 5 will give a biased estimate of the 
effect. Let ܻ଴ be the potential outcome in the absence of any intervention. The problem is 
that, in general,
ܧ[ܻ଴|ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ 1 ׫ ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ 3 ׫ ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ 4] ് ܧ[ܻ଴|ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ 5], while, due to randomization, 
ܧ[ܻ଴|ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ 1 ׫ ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ 2 ׫ ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ 3 ׫ ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ 4] = ܧ[ܻ଴|ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ 5].
We deal with this problem by reweighting the treatment group used to estimate the 
effect of subsidy+info such that the weighted proportion of households that responded to this 
intervention by the end of 2011 in this treatment group is equal to its unweighted proportion 
of all households initially exposed to the intervention. Define group membership indicators
ܦ௝௜ = 1(݅ א ܩݎ݋ݑ݌ ݆ ), where 1() is the indicator function. Then the group sizes are 
௝ܰ = σ ܦ௝௜௜א ீ௥௢௨௣ ௝ . Define weights,
ݓ௜ = {ଵ                      ௢௧௛௘௥௪௜௦௘
ಿయశಿర
ಿమశಿయశಿర  ௜௙  ௜ א ீ௥௢௨௣ ଵ, (4.1)
such that, 
σ ௪೔೔א ಸೝ೚ೠ೛ భ
σ σ ௪೔೔א ಸೝ೚ೠ೛ ೕరೕసభ,య
=
ேభ
ேభାேమାேయାேర. Application of these weights to a treatment 
group consisting of Group 1 + Group 3 + Group 4 ensures that households of the type that 
initially respond to the subsidy+info intervention have the same influence on the 
composition of this group as these types of households have in the full treatment group, 
which, due to random assignment, is not expected to differ compositionally from the control 
group. Hence, if there were no attrition, then the average long-term effect of subsidy+info
could be estimated without bias from the weighted mean outcome across Groups 1, 3 and 4
less the mean outcome of the control Group 5.
We further reweight the sample to correct for the observable baseline differences 
between the treatment and control groups that arise from attrition (Rosenbaum 1987; Imbens 
2004). Inverse probability weights (IPW) are derived from the estimated propensity scores 
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of receiving the subsidy+info intervention in a sample consisting of Groups 1, 3, 4 and 5.
The propensity scores are estimated from a probit model of the treatment indicator on the 
baseline characteristics  iX that are identified in Appendix Table A4.1. These include the 
baseline values of one of the outcomes - WTP.40 The other outcome – enrollment in IPP – is 
equal to zero for all observations at baseline. The weights defined above are applied in this 
probit. Let the estimated propensity score for an individual in the control Group 5 be  ˆi) X Ȗ
, where  ) is the standard normal cumulative density function. Then, that observation is 
given a weight equal to iiw
Q Q , where 
   
ˆ
ˆ1
i
i
i
Q ) )
X Ȗ
X Ȗ , 5
5
1
i i
i
D
N
Q Q ¦ . Weights for the 
treated households continue to be defined as in (1). After reweighting the estimation sample, 
there are no differences in the means of any of the baseline characteristics between the 
treatment groups (1, 3 and 4) and the control group (5) (see Appendix Table A4.2).
The average long-term effect of subsidy+info is estimated by,
5
1,3,4 5
1,3,4
1 1
1,3& 4 5 ji i i i i i
j i iji i i i
j i i
y Groups y Group D w y D w y
D w D w 
 
ª º  ª º  ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ ¦ ¦ ¦¦ ¦ ¦ (4.2)
where the expressions on the left hand side represent weighted sample means over the 
respective groups of the outcome (y) in 2015 and these means are written explicitly on the 
right hand side. We obtain this estimate from a weighted least squares regression of the 
outcome (enrollment or WTP) on an indicator of being in Groups 1, 3 or 4 as opposed to 
Group 5. We also present doubly robust estimates obtained by applying the IPW and also 
conditioning on the baseline covariates listed in Appendix Table A4.1. This estimator is 
consistent if either the propensity score or the regression, but not necessarily both, is 
correctly specified (Robins and Rotnitzky 1995). For the enrollment outcome, we present 
probit in addition to the least squares estimates of this doubly robust estimator.
We estimate the long-term effect of the handholding intervention by restricting the 
estimation sample to the households that had not to enrolled in the IPP by the end of 2011 
but that were still eligible at that time and comparing outcomes of those randomly allocated 
to be offered the handholding inducement (Group 2) with those who were not (Group 3). 
Reweighting is necessary in this case only to correct for differences in observable baseline 
40 For observations that are missing on WTP at baseline, the mean WTP at baseline is entered and an
indicator of being missing on WTP is included. The effects on enrollment are robust to excluding baseline 
WTP in the estimation of the propensity score. 
106
characteristics that result from attrition. Following the general procedure described above, 
we estimate a probit model for the probability of being in Group 2 as opposed to Group 3,
use the estimated propensity score to construct weights for the control group (3) and then 
take the weighted mean difference in outcomes between the two groups.
Last we define a combined treatment consisting of being offered subsidy+info
followed, if necessary, by handholding if there is no initial response to the first inducement. 
To estimate the effect of this treatment combination, we compare the outcomes of a treatment 
group consisting of those households that had enrolled by the end of 2011 (Group 1) plus 
those that did not and were subsequently randomly assigned to receive handholding (Group 
2) with the control group that did not receive any intervention (Group 5). For the reasons 
described in relation to estimation of the effect of subsidy+info, this also requires 
reweighting the treatment group to make it representative of the whole initial treatment group 
and so comparable with the control group. In this case, the appropriate weights are,
ݓ௜ = {ଵ                      ௢௧௛௘௥௪௜௦௘
ಿమ
ಿమశಿయశಿర  ௜௙  ௜ א ீ௥௢௨௣ ଵ,
(4.3)
such that, 
σ ௪೔೔א ಸೝ೚ೠ೛ భ
σ σ ௪೔೔א ಸೝ೚ೠ೛ ೕమೕసభ
=
ேభ
ேభାேమାேయାேర. Differences between the treatment group and 
control group in baseline characteristics due to attrition are corrected by application of IPW 
constructed from propensity scores analogous to those described above. The difference in 
the weighted means is obtained from a bivariate regression in the case of the IPW estimator 
and from a multivariate regression for the doubly robust estimator, as described before. 
All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the municipality level, which was 
the level of randomization to the subsidy+info intervention41.
In addition to estimating the long-term effect approximately four years after the offer 
of the insurance inducements, we also estimate short-term effects. To facilitate comparison, 
we do this using the same sample used to obtain the long-term effects. That is, those attriting 
by 2015 are not used even if they did participate in the 2012 follow-up. Consequently, all 
the identification issues discussed above also arise for estimation of the short-term effects in
41 To be conservative we also used clustered standard errors at this level when estimating the effect 
of handholding although randomization of this treatment was done at the household level. 
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this sample and we use exactly the same estimation methods. All that changes is that 
outcomes are measured from the 2012 follow-up rather than the 2015 follow-up.42
4.5 Results
After application of the IPW obtained from the estimated propensity scores, the control 
group and treatment group are balanced on baseline line characteristics for each of the three 
treatment groups used for the subsidy+info, handholding and combined interventions. The 
corresponding tables are given in Appendix A4.2.
4.5.1 Short-term effects 
Before examining the long-term effects, we present the short-term effects in Table 4.1. The 
subsidy + info intervention that provided a premium subsidy, information and SMS 
reminders is estimated to have raised enrollment in the IPP program by 6 percentage points 
(ppts) (p<0.01) according to the IPW estimator approximately one year after the inducements 
were first offered and before any household was required to renew their insurance without 
the subsidy. The doubly robust estimator implemented using least squares gives essentially 
the same estimate. Using probit to condition on the covariates (in addition to applying the 
IPW) raises the estimate to 6.8 ppts. In the control group, 6.3 percent of eligible households 
had enrolled after one year. So, the intervention is estimated to have approximately doubled 
the rate of enrollment.
Our estimates of the short-term effect of subsidy+info are approximately twice as 
large as those obtained by Capuno et al (2016). The reason is that we estimate the effect of 
these inducements being offered initially for a period of around 9 months plus an extension 
for a further 3 months. Capuno et al. (2016) estimate the effect of the original offer only. 
They measure enrollment in January 2012. We measure enrollment in March-May 2012. 
The handholding intervention is estimated to have raised enrollment by 29 ppts 
(p<0.01) after about one year using either the IPW or doubly robust (least squares) 
estimators. Using probit in the second step of the doubly robust estimator reduces the 
42 Capuno et al. (2016) estimate the short-term effect of the subsidy+info intervention by comparing 
the enrollment rate in January 2012 (before implementation of the handholding intervention) of the full 
treatment group with that of the full control group. The estimate the effect of the handholding intervention by 
comparing enrollment in May 2012 of those offered this with that of those not offered it within the treatment 
group households that had not enrolled by January 2012. 
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estimate only on 1 ppt. This compares to an enrollment rate of 3.1% amongst those who only 
received the premium subsidy, information and reminders and who had not enrolled by 
January 2012. Clearly, the offer to provide assistance with completion and submission of the 
application form had a very large impact on enrollment in a group that had not been 
responsive to the premium subsidy. Our estimates are extremely close to those of Capuno et 
al (2016), which are obtained from enrollment measured, like our short-term effects, in 
March-May 2012.
Table 4.1 Short-term effects on health insurance enrollment
Effect Standard error z-Stat N
subsidy+info
Inverse probability weights 0.0608*** 0.0208 2.92 740
Doubly robust
Least squares 0.0593*** 0.0199 2.99 740
Probit 0.0679*** 0.0229 2.97 740
handholding
Inverse probability weights 0.2877*** 0.0311 9.26 548
Doubly robust
Least squares 0.2870*** 0.0307 9.35 548
Probit 0.2787*** 0.0283 9.84 548
Combined 
Inverse probability weights 0.3604*** 0.0319 11.29 613
Doubly robust
Least squares 0.3634*** 0.0312 11.64 613
Probit 0.3601*** 0.0290 12.43 613
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. *** p<0.01
The combined intervention of initially providing the subsidy, information and 
reminders and subsequently providing the handholding intervention to those who opted not 
to enroll after being offered the subsidy+info inducements is estimated to have increased 
enrollment by 36 ppts (p<0.01) after approximately one year. This is a six-fold increase on 
the enrollment rate of the control group.
4.5.2 Long-term effects
Estimates of the long-term effects of the three sets of interventions after four years are 
reported in Table 4.2. The subsidy + info intervention is estimated to have raised enrollment 
by 4.5-4.8 ppts (p<0.05) four years after the inducements were first offered and three years 
after they had been withdrawn. Compared to an enrollment of the control group of 5.5 
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percent, this represents an increase of at least 82%. It is also around three quarters of the 
short-term effect. This represents a remarkable maintenance of the treatment effect after 
expiry of the treatment. Apparently, the majority of those induced by the subsidy to enroll 
continued to do so even when the subsidy was no longer offered. 
The point estimates of the long-term effect of the handholding intervention on 
enrollment are around 3 ppts but are not significant. The non-significance likely reflects 
insufficient power since the experiment was powered to detect an effect of7.5 ppts in the full 
sample. The point estimate of 3 ppt is reasonably large compared with an enrollment rate of 
the respective control group of 8.3 percent. However, it is a small fraction of the 28 ppt short-
term effect. The effect of the handholding inducement appears to have been sustained to a 
much lesser extent than the subsidy+info intervention, although in making this comparison 
one must bear in mind that the two effects are estimated for different samples. 
The estimates of the long-term effect of the combined interventions are 
approximately equal to the sum of the separate effects of the two interventions. Offering the 
subsidy+info followed up with handholding for those who do not initially respond is 
estimated to have raised enrollment after four years by a significant 8.5-9.1 ppts (p<0.05) 
compared to not offering any intervention whatsoever. This is about a quarter of the 
respective short-term effect.
Table 4.2 Long-term effects on health insurance enrollment
Effect Standard error z-Stat N
subsidy+info
Inverse probability weights 0.0476** 0.0232 2.05 740
Doubly robust
Least squares 0.0448** 0.0217 2.07 740
Probit 0.0462* 0.0245 1.89 740
handholding
Inverse probability weights 0.0303 0.0273 1.11 548
Doubly robust
Least squares 0.0307 0.0268 1.15 548
Probit 0.0360 0.0254 1.42 548
Combined 
Inverse probability weights 0.0848*** 0.0266 3.18 613
Doubly robust
Least squares 0.0846*** 0.0258 3.28 613
Probit 0.0911*** 0.0288 3.17 598
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.3. reports estimates of the long term effects on WTP for insurance through a 
PhilHealth program. None of the interventions has a statistically significant impact on WTP. 
The point estimate of subsidy+info is positive, which further supports that there is no 
evidence of recipients of the inducement anchoring their willingness to pay on the subsidized 
price. 
Table 4.3 Long term effects of interventions on willingness to pay for health insurance
  Effect Std error z-Stat N
subsidy+info
Doubly robust
Least squares 5.621 7.87 0.71 640
Probit 3.449 6.88 0.50 640
handholding
Doubly robust
Least squares -12.759 10.04 -1.27 475
Probit -11.368 9.95 -1.14 475
Combined
Doubly robust
Least squares -1.974 8.62 -0.23 534
Probit -5.787 7.27 -0.80 534
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined the long-term effects of health insurance demand inducements using 
a nationwide randomized experiment of two sets of interventions designed to encourage 
enrollment in the voluntary plan of the Philippines’ National Health Insurance Program. The 
first subsidy+info intervention consisted of a one-off premium subsidy of up to 50%, plus 
information on the operation and benefits of the insurance program as well as SMS 
reminders. The handholding intervention reduced the indirect costs of enrollment by 
providing one-time assistance with completion and submission of the insurance application 
to a random sample of households that opted not to enroll even after being offered the 
premium subsidy. Only the subsidy+info intervention has a significant impact on enrollment 
four years after the inducements were offered and three years after they had been withdrawn. 
The long-term effect of this intervention is relatively large in two respects. First, it represents 
an increase in enrollment relative to the counterfactual of more than 80%. Second, it is 
around three quarters of the short-term effect. This large, sustained impact suggests that 
those who were induced to enroll by the offer of the subsidy were already on the margin of 
enrolling and the experience of holding insurance was positive. After the subsidy was 
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withdrawn, a large proportion of these compliers were sufficiently pleased with the cover to 
continue paying for it even at the full price. 
Although the handholding intervention had a strong impact in the short term, this 
was not maintained in the long run. The long-term effect of this intervention is only 11% of 
its short-term effect and is not statistically significant. Most likely the decision to enroll 
when offered a subsidy of up to 50% and the elimination of all indirect costs of application 
deviates so far from the decision to insure without these inducements that once they are 
withdrawn most households that had responded to them are not sufficiently interested in 
insurance to continue with enrollment when the direct and indirect costs rise substantially. 
Since a reduction in time costs of enrollment, combined with the premium subsidy, nudged 
these households into buying the insurance, it is not unlikely that they discount the future 
heavily or procrastinate paying continued payment of the premium. 
While the nationwide nature of the experiment we have studied makes the findings 
more generalizable than much of the existing evidence on short- and long-term effects of 
health insurance inducements, obviously one must be careful about inferring effects in quite 
different contexts. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that temporary inducements, particularly a 
substantial price subsidy, for voluntary health insurance can have a sustained long-term 
impact on enrollment. Importantly, our study shows that short-term effects of interventions 
may not be predictive of their long-term impacts. One intervention may have a strong, short-
term impact and yet its long-term effect can be smaller than that of another that initially is 
less effective. In order to determine the relative cost-effectiveness of temporary 
interventions, it is critical to know their long-lived impacts and these might not be consistent 
with their ranking in terms of short-run effects. 
.
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Appendices Chapter 4
Appendix 4.1 
Table A4.1. Means of characteristics at baseline by whether household participated in 4-
year follow-up survey
Interviewed at 4-year follow-
up
Yes
(1)
No
(2) 
(1)=(2)
p-value
Urban 0.468 0.648 0.000
Average per capita household expenditure 22101 29743 0.000
Head is working 0.876 0.852 0.229
Head has poor health 0.021 0.033 0.172
Head had at least college education 0.074 0.145 0.000
Has available health facility within 15 min 0.699 0.783 0.001
Has other insurance 0.023 0.036 0.176
Number of children under 21 1.868 1.574 0.004
Experienced adverse health outcome in the last year 0.268 0.264 0.885
National Capital Region 0.153 0.267 0.000
Rest of Luzon 0.465 0.433 0.274
Visayas 0.226 0.136 0.000
Mindanao 0.156 0.164 0.697
WTP for health insurance (Philhealth) 97.76 111.71 0.000
N 1000 420
Notes: The baseline survey was conducted February-April 2011. The ‘4-year’ follow-up was July-August 2015. 
There are 871 observations for WTP for PhilHealth amongst those interviewed at 4-year follow-up and 363 for 
those not followed up. This is due to missing observations for those not aware of PhilHealth. 
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Appendix 4.2 
Table A4.2 Comparison of households in treatment and control groups on baseline 
characteristics and WTP for Philhealth
(1) Control (2) Treatment p-value (1)-(2)
subsidy+info
Urban 0.480 0.483 0.941
Average per capita household expenditure 19975 20530 0.657
Head is working 0.885 0.890 0.836
Head has poor health 0.022 0.019 0.739
Head had at least college education 0.071 0.073 0.917
Has available health facility within 15 min 0.685 0.701 0.676
Has other insurance 0.024 0.022 0.922
Number of children under 21 1.953 1.966 0.930
Experienced adverse health outcome in the last year 0.265 0.270 0.887
National Capital Region 0.127 0.136 0.757
Rest of Luzon 0.451 0.458 0.844
Visayas 0.245 0.235 0.780
Mindanao 0.177 0.171 0.820
WTP for health insurance (Philhealth) 95.31 97.07 0.577
N 271 469
handholding
Urban 0.531 0.519 0.802
Average per capita household expenditure 24067 25421 0.502
Head is working 0.881 0.865 0.632
Head has poor health 0.013 0.015 0.844
Head had at least college education 0.063 0.065 0.916
Has available health facility within 15 min 0.716 0.719 0.936
Has other insurance 0.018 0.015 0.835
Number of children under 21 1.746 1.738 0.961
Experienced adverse health outcome in the last year 0.270 0.277 0.862
National Capital Region 0.248 0.235 0.762
Rest of Luzon 0.406 0.423 0.705
Visayas 0.230 0.227 0.924
Mindanao 0.116 0.115 0.995
WTP for Philhealth 106.43 103.94 0.627
N 288 260
Combined
Urban 0.521 0.531 0.834
Average per capita household expenditure 28611 25683 0.510
Head is working 0.859 0.874 0.631
Head has poor health 0.015 0.016 0.877
Head had at least college education 0.072 0.072 0.994
Has available health facility within 15 min 0.723 0.722 0.975
Has other insurance 0.019 0.018 0.911
Number of children under 21 1.750 1.740 0.949
Experienced adverse health outcome in the last year 0.309 0.284 0.614
National Capital Region 0.232 0.232 1.000
Rest of Luzon 0.428 0.430 0.955
Visayas 0.217 0.216 0.997
Mindanao 0.124 0.122 0.927
WTP for Philhealth 103.60 104.79 0.784
N 271 342
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Chapter 5
Debiasing expectations
Joint work with Baillon, A. and O’Donnell, O.
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5.1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, economists have recognized the value of measuring subjective 
expectations alongside economic outcomes in surveys. Doing so allows the analyst to relax 
the assumption of rational expectations, separate expectations from preferences in the 
explanation of behavior and measure uncertainty at the individual level (Manski, 2004). 
Subjective probabilities have been elicited in many household surveys, such as the US 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), and the responses obtained have proved useful in 
understanding the formation of expectations (Smith et al 2001) and in explaining a variety 
of economic behaviors (Hurd, 2009). For example, subjective probabilities of stock market 
returns suggest expectations are considerably below historical market averages and this has 
been proposed as an explanation for overly low rates of stock holding (Dominitz and Manski, 
2007; Hurd, 2009; Hurd et al., 2011). 
While measurement of beliefs undoubtedly holds much potential for understanding 
behavior, the reporting of probabilities is not a task that is familiar to most survey 
respondents. This can lead to biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Unpacking an event 
into subevents and then summing the reported probabilities assigned to these subevents tends 
to give a higher estimate of the probability of the event than that obtained by directly asking 
about the event likelihood (Fischhoff et al. 1978; Tversky and Kahneman 1983; Johnson et 
al. 1993; Tversky and Koehler 1994; Tversky and Fox 1995). This is the property of 
subadditivity. It implies that the probability of an unlikely event tends to be overestimated 
and that of a likely event to be underestimated.
Subadditivity of reported probabilities can be explained by the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). When someone is asked to report the 
probability of an event, there is a tendency to start from an anchor, such as 50%, and then 
adjust the estimate using knowledge (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Yet, the adjustment is 
typically insufficient. The response is then ‘contaminated’ by the anchor and may reflect the 
ability of the respondent to report probabilities as much as his actual knowledge of the event 
likelihood. This contamination is generally found to be present in the subjective probability 
data used by economists to model behavior (Hurd, 2009). 
Subadditivity of reported probabilities causes three main problems. First, it distorts 
the measured expectations. Second, because not everyone exhibits the same degree of 
subadditivity, correlations between expectations and behavior can also be biased. Third, 
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subadditivity and noise can together create violations of monotonicity (i.e., reporting a lower 
probability for an event than for one of its subevents). Typically, 20-40 percent of 
respondents violate some consistency rules and are excluded by studies that use subjective 
probabilities to model beliefs and predict behavior (Delavande and Rohwedder, 2008; Hurd 
et al., 2011; van Santen et al., 2012). Dropping around a third of the sample is regrettable, to 
say the least. Not only does it substantially reduce power, but it also risks the introduction 
of biases due to endogenous selection. Less educated and less wealthy respondents are more 
likely to report probabilities that violate consistency (Delavande and Rohwedder, 2008) and 
respondents with lower education and cognitive functioning are more likely to give a focal 
response of 50% probability (Kleinjans and Van Soest, 2014; Bago d’Uva et al, 2015). 
Excluding these responses leaves a sample that is no longer representative of the population 
and underrepresents the most vulnerable groups that may be the intended beneficiaries of a 
policy (Delavande and Rohwedder, 2008).
This chapter introduces an approach to measuring subjective probability that takes 
account of inconsistencies and produces a measure of beliefs purged of subadditivity bias 
that is potentially better in explaining behavior. We achieve this by drawing on literature in 
psychology and decision analysis, which has studied biases in subjective probability 
elicitations for decades (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Our approach is based on a simple 
model of subadditive reported probabilities, which is in line with psychological models 
proposed by Fox and Rottenstreich (2003) and Clemen and Ulu (2008).43 From this model, 
we obtain a method to debias reported probabilities and correct them for the attraction 
towards 50%. We apply our method to probabilities of stock market returns elicited from a 
sample of alumni of an Economics faculty in the Netherlands. We use typical questions on 
subjective probabilities of the sort suggested by Dominitz and Manski (1997) and Manski 
(2004) that are used in surveys such as the HRS. Reported chances of gains and losses above 
a series of thresholds provide points on the subjective cumulative distribution function. We 
add two questions (one in each domain of gains and of losses) to identify and quantify 
subadditivity.
The results confirm that most respondents give subadditive responses. Pooling over 
individuals, the correction for subadditivity gives a better Akaike information criterion. At 
the individual level, we model beliefs with and without correcting for subadditivity and in 
43 See Tversky and Koehler (1994) and Bearden et al. (2007) for alternative models.
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each case obtain estimates of the mean and variance of the subjective probability distribution 
of forecast stock market returns. Correcting beliefs reduces both the mean and the variance 
of the individual-specific subjective probability distribution for most of the sample. The 
corrected estimates of the mean are more closely associated with the ownership of risky 
assets. Not only do we obtain measures of beliefs that are more informative of behavior, but 
we also keep a large fraction of the sample that would otherwise be excluded.
Section 5.2 introduces our model of reported probabilities. Section 5.3 first describes 
the methodology used to elicit subjective probabilities and the characteristics of our sample. 
It then explains how we model beliefs both with and without correction for subadditivity. 
Section 5.4 commences by assessing the extent to which respondents display subadditivity 
in their reported probabilities and violate other consistency requirements. It then investigates 
whether the model with correction for subadditivity improves the fit of the data, before 
comparing the distributions of estimated beliefs obtained from the two models. Finally, we 
show that correcting for subadditivity increases the extent to which estimated beliefs predict 
behavior. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 A simple model of reported probabilities
Let ܵ be a state space and events are subsets of ܵ. Respondents are asked to report 
probabilities of events and ݎ(ܧ) represents the reported probability for event ܧ. Researchers 
analyzing reported probabilities start by assuming a belief model; traditionally, a (additive) 
probability measure ܲ. Often, a specific family of probability distributions is assumed; for 
instance, normal distributions (e.g. Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Hurd et al., 2011). Then, ܲ
is either equated with ݎ or estimated from it. Estimation produces residuals that capture noise 
in the reporting process. 
We propose a method to correct reported probabilities for subadditivity, which is a 
bias: a systematic error pattern that does not cancel out at the aggregate level, unlike noise. 
Our method is based on a simple, tractable model adapted from Fox and Rottenstreich (2003) 
and Clemen and Ulu (2008).44 In line with these papers, it is assumed that reported
44 Fox and Rottenstreich (2003) formulates a model in terms of odds and uses the belief model of 
Tversky and Koehler (1994). Clemen and Ulu’s (2008) model is defined for settings in which an analyst 
interviews an expert using a partition of a state space while the expert has another partition in mind. Our model 
corresponds to the special case in which partitions are aligned and questions deal with one event at a time.
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probabilities are biased towards 50%:
ݎ(ܧ) =  ܽ ଵ ଶ + (1െ ܽ)ܲ(ܧ), (5.1)
for 0 < ܲ(ܧ) < 1, where 0 ൑ ܽ ൑ 1 is the subadditivity factor. If ܲ(ܧ) = 1, then 
ݎ(ܧ) = 1 and if ܲ(ܧ) = 0, then ݎ(ܧ) = 0. No bias (ܽ =  0) results in ݎ(ܧ)  =  ܲ(ܧ) and 
extreme bias (ܽ =  1) results in ݎ(ܧ)  =  0.5 for all events ܧ with 0 < ܲ(ܧ) < 1. The 
subadditivity factor can be interpreted as the degree of attraction towards the 50-50 anchor.
The model preserves binary complementarity, i.e. additivity for complementary 
events: ݎ(ܧ) + ݎ(ܵ െ ܧ)=1. At the individual level, respondents may violate binary 
complementarity but no systematic pattern (i.e. no bias) has been found (Wright and 
Whalley, 1983; Tversky and Koehler, 1994 and Fox and Tversky, 1998). Hence, violations 
of complementarity can be attributed to noise.45
For a minority of respondents, there may be violations of monotonicity (or set 
inclusion) due to a subevent being judged more likely than the event it is part of. Such cases 
are often excluded from empirical analyses on the basis that they are due to misunderstanding 
of the survey task or imply implausibly large noise (e.g. Delavande and Rohwedder 2008; 
Hurd et al. 2011; van Santen et al. 2012). Yet, when the subadditivity factor ܽ is large, 
relatively little noise suffices to generate violations of monotonicity. We use a model that 
allows for subadditivity plus noise in order to preserve as many observations as possible for 
data analysis.
To identify ܽ, one can simply ask respondents to report the probability of an event 
E, a disjoint event F and that of their union ܧ ׫ ܨ. Making use of the additivity of ܲ:
ݎ(ܧ) +  ݎ(ܨ)–  ݎ(ܧ ׫ ܨ)  =   ௔ ଶ . (5.2)
After deriving ܽ, the probabilities ܲ(ܧ), ܲ(ܨ) and ܲ (ܧ ׫ ܨ) can be recovered. The 
empirical approach we adopt involves eliciting ݎ(ܧ), ݎ(ܨ), and ݎ(ܧ ׫ ܨ) to ensure that ܽ is 
identifiable but it also allows for an error term representing noise. The subadditivity factor 
ܽ captures the non-additive part of the report due to systematic unidirectional errors.
The easy identification of ܽ using Eq. 5.2 is a major practical advantage of our model 
because it means the additional data requirements are minimal. This is important in survey 
45 The model also preserves a form of additivity called interior additivity by Wu and Gonzalez (1999). 
If ܲ(ܧ) > 0, ܲ(ܨ) > 0, and ܲ(ܩ) > 0, then ݎ(ܧ ׫ ܨ)െ ݎ(ܨ) = ݎ(ܧ ׫ ܩ) െ ݎ(ܩ).  Evidence of Wu and 
Gonzalez (1999) and Clemen and Ulu (2008) supported interior additivity.
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research, where adding questions can be very costly. If the survey budget constraint is not 
binding, then researchers may want to use a richer model that allows for nonlinearity or 
anchors that differ across respondents. But identification of the additional parameters would 
require asking more questions and raise survey costs. In this chapter, we demonstrate the 
added value of the most parsimonious approach we could think of.
We interpret subadditivity as a bias induced by the process of reporting a 
probabilistic judgment, and not as a part of a respondent’s actual belief. If this is the case, 
then a measure of belief, ܲ, that is purged of the bias should correlate with behavior more 
closely than the reported probability, ݎ. We test this prediction in Section 5.4 and discuss the 
interpretation of subadditivity from which it derives in Section 5.5.
5.3 Method
5.3.1 Elicitation of probabilities
To test our approach, we elicited subjective probabilities of stock market returns from a 
sample of alumni of a Dutch university. Several papers investigate stock market expectations 
using survey data (Hurd, 2009; Dominitz and Manski, 2011; Hudomiet et al., 2011; Hurd et 
al., 2011). A major motivation is to understand why so few households own stocks given 
rates of return are high relative to those on other stores of wealth (Hurd, 2009). An 
implausibly high level of risk aversion would be required to explain the lack of stock 
holdings by agents with rational expectations. Low expectations offer an alternative 
explanation (Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Hurd et al., 2011). Hurd et al. (2011), for example, 
found stock market expectations to be lower than historical average returns in aggregate and 
correlated with stock ownership in a survey of several thousand households in the 
Netherlands. However, these findings were obtained after dropping about one third of 
respondents that violated certain consistency requirements from the initially representative 
sample.
We used questions originating from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and 
included in the De Nederlandsche Bank Household Survey (DHS) used by Hurd et al. (2011). 
A short introduction asked the respondent to imagine that he had a rich relative who 
unexpectedly left him 10,000 Euro and that he was thinking of putting the money into a 
mutual fund invested in “blue chip” stocks (like those in the Amsterdam AEX stock market 
index, the Eurostocks index or the Dow Jones Industrial Average index).
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The first question of the (gain) sequence was as follows: 
Suppose you put the 10,000 Euro in the stock mutual fund and left it in for one year. What is 
the chance that you would make money where 0 means absolutely no chance and 100 means 
absolutely certain; that is, what is the chance that in a year your investment would be worth 
more than 10,000 Euro?
Similar questions asked for the chances that an investment in the mutual fund would 
generate gains of more than 10%, 20%, and 30% over a one-year horizon. These questions 
are represented by the arrows pointing to the right in Figure 5.1. Analogous questions asked 
about the chances of incurring losses of more than 0%, 10%, 20%, and 30% (arrows to left 
in Figure 5.1). The four questions within each sequence (gains and losses) were always 
presented in order of increasing absolute returns, but the order of the two sequences was 
randomized.
Figure 5.1 Ten events (range of returns) for which probabilities are reported 
To identify the subadditivity factor a, we needed to elicit the subjective probability 
of two disjoint events and that of their union. We achieved this by asking respondents to 
report the chance that an investment in the mutual fund would generate a gain between 0% 
and 10%. Specifically: 
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What is the chance that the 10,000 Euro in your stock mutual fund would have gone up but 
by less than 10 percent; that is, it would be worth an amount between 10,000 and 11,000 
Euro a year from now?
The range of returns for this question is indicated by the broken line to the right of 0 
in Figure 5.1. We did the same for losses and thus elicited subjective probabilities of ten 
events in total.
In addition, we obtained information on ownership of risky assets, as well as gender, 
age, marital status, income (7 categories), employment (ever) in the financial sector and 
personal traits (trust, risk aversion and optimism) that may affect investment decisions.46
5.3.2 Sample
Data were collected between January 30 and February 26, 2015. A link to the anonymized 
questionnaire was distributed by the alumni office of Erasmus School of Economics through 
media such as LinkedIn® and a newsletter. Once on the website, respondents were given the 
choice to complete the questionnaire in Dutch or English. A total of 269 alumni completed 
the questionnaire in full. The item non-response on the questions eliciting subjective 
probabilities was low – no more than 2% per question, resulting in the exclusion of 13 
respondents.
Table 5.1 reports the means of covariates. The vast majority of sample respondents 
are male (86%) and three-quarters live with a partner. About half of the sample is younger 
than 44 and a slight majority earns more than 60,000 euro a year. More than three fifths hold 
investments in stocks, bonds or mutual funds. A relatively large fraction (about 38%) of 
respondents work or have worked in the financial sector, which reflects sampling from the 
alumni of an economics faculty. One might expect this sophisticated sample to be less prone 
to report subadditive probabilities than would be the case for a random sample of the 
population.
46 The precise wording of all questions was obtained from the DHS and a supplement added by Hurd 
et al (2011) to elicit information on stock market expectations and trading behavior not already included in the 
DHS.
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Table 5.1 Definitions and means of covariates and outcomes
Variable label Variable takes value of 1 (0 otherwise) if: Mean N
Female Female 0.138 269
Has partner Married or cohabiting 0.747 269
Female * Has partner Female and either married or cohabiting 0.086 269
Age: young Aged 44 or younger 0.509 269
Age: old Aged 65 or older 0.115 269
Income >= €60,000 Total gross income not less than €60,000 in 2014 0.550 269
Financial sector Works or worked in the Banking or Financial sector 0.383 269
Trust Agrees with ‘most people can be trusted’ 0.584 269
Risk averse Prefers current income to a 50:50 gamble of doubling it or 
losing a third of it
0.517 269
Optimistic (Strongly) agrees with ‘overall, I expect more good things to 
happen to me than bad things’
0.792 269
Owns risky assets Holds stocks, bonds and/or mutual funds 0.632 269
5.3.3 Analysis
We assess the internal and external validity of the reported probabilities using an empirical 
model of beliefs from the literature and a corrected version that incorporates the 
subadditivity factor.
Belief model
We adopt the belief model derived by Hurd et al. (2011), which generalizes the approach of 
Dominitz and Manski (2007). The stock market index ݏ௧ is modelled as a random walk with 
drift (Ɋ),  
ln ቀ௦೟శభ௦೟ ቁ =  Ɋ+  ݒ௧ (5.3)
where ݒ௧ are i.i.d. N(0, ߪଶ).47 Hence, the expectation of the return in the next period 
is Ɋ with volatility ߪଶ. The probability that the stock market return is within the range [߬, ߬’]
over the next year is 
ܲ ቀ 1 + ߬ < ௦೟శభ௦೟ < 1 + ߬
ᇱቁ = ܲ ቀln(1 + ߬) < ln ௦೟శభ௦೟ < ln(1 + ߬
ᇱ)ቁ
= ߔ ቀ୪୬൫ଵାఛᇲ൯ିఓఙ ቁ െ ߔ ቀ
 ୪୬(ଵାఛ)ିஜ
ఙ ቁ
(5.4)
47Hurd et al. (2011) show that normally distributed returns is not an overly unreasonable 
approximation to the behavior of the Amsterdam AEX index over the period 1983-2006.
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where ߔ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Following the 
literature (Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Hurd et al., 2011), we assume that respondents’ 
beliefs can be modelled as in Eq. 5.4, with respondent-specific expected returns and 
volatility.
From beliefs to reported probabilities
We obtain reported probabilities for 10 intervals that we generically denote [ ௝߬ , ௝߬ᇱ]
for ݆ א {1, … ,10}. If reported probabilities correspond to beliefs plus noise, then from Eq. 
5.4 we can retrieve the respondent’s subjective expected return ߤ௜ and volatility ߪ௜ଶ using:
ݎ௜௝ = ߔ ቆ
୪୬ቀଵାఛೕᇲቁିఓ೔
ఙ೔ ቇ െ ߔ ቀ
 ୪୬൫ଵାఛೕ൯ିஜ೔
ఙ೔ ቁ+  ߝ௜௝, (5.5)
with ݎ௜௝ the reported probability of respondent ݅ for interval ݆ and with ߝ௜௝ an error
term. We call Eq.5.5 the uncorrected model. It assumes that only noise can explain why 
probabilities are not additive or may be inconsistent. Inconsistencies cannot systematically 
lie in one direction. The corresponding estimates of ߤ௜ and ߪ௜ are also called uncorrected.
To allow for the systematic biases discussed in section 5.2, we combine the belief model 
(Eq. 5.4) with the model of reported probabilities (Eq. 5.1) plus an error term (ߝ௜௝) to obtain:
ݎ௜௝ = ܽ௜ ଵଶ+ (1െ ܽ௜) ቈߔ ቆ
୪୬ቀଵାఛೕᇲቁିఓ೔
ఙ೔ ቇ െ ߔ ቀ
 ୪୬൫ଵାఛೕ൯ିஜ೔
ఙ೔ ቁ቉+  ߝ௜௝. (5.6)
Eq. 5.6 will be referred to as the corrected model, and the estimates derived from it 
will be called corrected.
Fitting data
To assess internal validity of the corrected model, we compare its performance to 
that of the uncorrected model in fitting the data. We pool data across all individuals and 
estimate the population averages of the parameters by nonlinear least squares. We allow the 
parameters to vary with covariates to capture observed heterogeneity between respondents. 
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level to allow for violation of independence 
due to heterogeneity that remains unobserved. We use the Akaike information criterion
(AIC) to choose between the models on the basis of parsimony and best approximation to 
the information in the data.
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Predicting behavior
To assess whether correcting for subadditivity affects the extent to which the estimated 
beliefs predict behavior, we follow the procedure of Hurd et al. (2011), first using non-linear 
least squares to estimate ߤ௜ and ߪ௜ from the uncorrected model for each individual 
independently, and then running a probit regression of ownership of risky assets on these 
estimates and covariates. We then follow the same procedure but using the corrected model 
in the first stage. Bootstrap standard errors are used to allow for the generated regressors 
problem (Pagan, 1984) arising from the inclusion of estimates in the probit regressions.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Raw data 
On average, respondents report a 59.6% chance of a stock market gain and a 37.8% chance 
of a stock market loss (Table 5.2).  The mean reported probability of a gain (loss) falls 
monotonically as the magnitude of the gain (loss) increases. 
Table 5.2 Summary of answers to stock market expectation questions
Percentiles
N Mean 5 25 50 75 95
Gain > 0% 269 59.64 24 50 60 75 88
Gain > 10% 269 31.70 5 15 25 50 75
Gain > 20% 269 16.30 0 4 11 24 51
Gain > 30% 269 9.43 0 1 5 10 40
Gain 0-10% 269 50.79 7 33 50 75 90
Loss > 0% 269 37.75 10 25 40 50 75
Loss > 10% 269 24.32 2 10 20 30 65
Loss > 20% 269 14.74 0 5 10 19 51
Loss > 30% 269 9.77 0 2 5 10 45
Loss 0-10% 269 35.04 5 19 30 50 77
Notes: Cell entries give reported probabilities in %
Figure 5.2 depicts the mean reported probability to gain money alongside the mean 
of the sum of the reported probabilities to gain up to 10% and to gain more than 10%. The 
right-hand columns show the equivalent means in the domain of losses. In both cases there 
is clear evidence of subadditive beliefs, i.e., the sum of the probability of two disjoint events 
exceeds the probability of their union.
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Figure 5.2 Mean and 95% confidence interval for the reported probability to gain (lose) 
money and for the sum of the reported probabilities to gain (lose) up to 10% and to gain 
(lose) more than 10%.
Figure 5.3a depicts the distribution of the difference between a) the sum of the 
reported probabilities to gain (lose) up to 10% and to gain (lose) more than 10%, and b) the 
reported probability of any gain (loss). A systematic error pattern (bias) is apparent, with the 
sum of the two disjoint events being greater than the probability of their union for most 
respondents.48 We then separate respondents who violate monotonicity from those who do 
not. Violation of monotonicity is identified by reported probabilities that are not weakly 
decreasing as the threshold is increased from 0% to 10% to 20% to 30% in either the domain 
of gains or losses.49
As expected, respondents who violate monotonicity (figure 5.3b) are more prone to 
subadditivity than respondents who do not (figure 5.3c). This is evident in both domains. In 
gains, the mode of the distribution lies far above zero for respondents who violate 
monotonicity, and is slightly below zero for those who do not.
48 The means of all distributions differ from 0 (p =0.000).
49 If, in addition, we require that the reported probability of a gain (loss) is not smaller than the reported 
probability of a gain (loss) between 0-10%, the number of respondents with any violation of monotonicity rises 
from 66 to 150. Each additional question concerns an event with likelihood close to that of the event of which 
it is a subset. Hence, little noise is enough to lead to violations of monotonicity. This explains the rise of the 
number of respondents identified as violating monotonicity. The pattern of the distributions in Figure 5.3 is 
similar if we identify non-monotonicity in this way.
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Figure 5.3 Subadditivity: distribution of the difference between a) the sum of reported 
probabilities to gain (lose) up to 10% and to gain (lose) more than 10%, and b) the reported 
probability of any gain (loss)
5.3a All respondents (N=269)
5.3b Respondents who violate monotonicity (N=66)
5.3c Respondents who do not violate monotonicity (N=203) 
128
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates a difference between the distributions for the two 
groups of respondents in both the gain (p=0.004) and loss (p=0.000) domains. 
While there is clear evidence of subadditivity, there is little systematic error pattern 
that indicates violation of binary complementarity (Figure 5.4). Almost half of respondents 
report probabilities of a gain and a loss that add up to 100 percent.50 The mean of this sum 
is 97.4% (H0: mean=100%, p=0.014). The slight shortfall, on average, may result from the 
fact that respondents were not asked for the probability of a zero annual return. The 
violations of binary complementarity are roughly symmetrically distributed, suggesting that 
they are best explained by noise.
Figure 5.4 Binary additivity: the sum of the reported probabilities of a gain and a loss
50 In the literature (e.g. Hurd et al 2011), respondents for whom the reported probabilities of a gain 
and loss add up to more than 100 are often also excluded on the grounds that this violates consistency. In our 
sample, 27% violate this condition. Excluding these respondents would result in the loss of another 19% of the 
sample in addition to those who dropped because of violation of monotonicity resulting in the removal of 44% 
in total. 
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5.4.2 Fitting data
Table 5.3 presents the pooled data estimates of the uncorrected model and of the corrected 
model for the reported probabilities of experiencing gains/losses. Comparison of the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) provides decisive evidence in favor of the model with the 
subadditivity correction.51 Consistent with what is evident in the raw data, the estimate of 
the subadditivity factor is positive. The point estimate of 0.100 suggests that the average 
reference individual (single male aged 45-64 earning €0-€60,000 with no financial sector 
work experience) reports probabilities that are biased towards the 50-50 anchor by 10% (see 
Eq. 5.1). Rather surprisingly, respondents with financial sector experience appear to display 
greater subadditivity, although the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level and the 
corresponding coefficient in a median regression of individual-specific estimates of the 
subadditivity factor is not at all significant (see next sub-section and Appendix Table A5.1). 
Allowing for subaddivity makes a difference to the estimates of the population 
averaged subjective distribution of returns. The corrected model gives an estimate of 1.3% 
for the reference respondent’s expected return, which is about two fifths of that obtained 
from the uncorrected model and is no longer significant. Failing to correct for subadditivity 
results in overestimation of expected returns, which may lead to false rejection of the 
hypothesis that low expectations explain low stockholding. The corrected model gives a 
point estimate of the reference respondent’s perceived standard deviation of returns that is 
less than three quarters of the uncorrected estimate. This suggests that without allowing for 
subadditivity there is a risk of overly attributing low stockholding to the perceived volatility 
of returns. There is also less evidence of heterogeneity (by marital/cohabitation status and 
financial sector experience) in the perceived risk of investing in a stock mutual fund once 
the bias correction is introduced. 
51 This model has an Akaike weight (Burnham and Anderson, 2002) extremely close to 1, indicating 
that there is little or no doubt that it provides the better approximation to the information in the data while 
respecting the principle of parsimony.
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Table 5.3 Pooled data estimates of reported probability models
Uncorrected model Corrected model
([SHFWHGUHWXUQȝ>5HIHUHQFH@ 0.031*** (0.010) 0.013 (0.009)
Shift in expected return:
Female 0.024 (0.020) 0.005 (0.015)
Has partner -0.002 (0.009) 0.005 (0.008)
Female * Has partner -0.039* (0.021) -0.014 (0.016)
Age: young 0.003 (0.006) 0.002 (0.006)
Age: old 0.027** (0.011) 0.023** (0.011)
Income>=60000 -0.003 (0.006) -0.001 (0.005)
Financial sector -0.006 (0.006) -0.010* (0.006)
6WDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQRIUHWXUQı>5HIHUHQFH@ 0.124*** (0.012) 0.089*** (0.010)
Shift in standard deviation:
Female 0.030 (0.025) -0.019 (0.013)
Has partner -0.019* (0.010) -0.003 (0.008)
Female * Has partner -0.071*** (0.027) -0.011 (0.016)
Age: young 0.011 (0.008) 0.003 (0.007)
Age: old 0.012 (0.011) 0.014 (0.011)
Income>=60000 -0.007 (0.007) -0.005 (0.007)
Financial sector 0.020*** (0.007) 0.006 (0.006)
Subadditivity factor (a)               [Reference] 0.100*** (0.026)
Shift in subadditivity factor:
Female 0.072 (0.048)
Has partner -0.028 (0.023)
Female * Has partner -0.091* (0.052)
Age: young 0.009 (0.015)
Age: old -0.009 (0.024)
Income>=60000 0.002 (0.015)
Financial sector 0.028* (0.015)
N 2690 2690
AIC -717.2 -1015.3
Notes: Nonlinear least squares estimates. Standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. There are 
10 observations per individual. *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
5.4.3 Individual-specific estimates of subadditvity and beliefs
Figure 5.5 shows the sample distribution of the estimates of the subadditivity factor (a)
obtained from nonlinear least squares estimation of the corrected model for each individual. 
Consistent with Figure 5.3a, it confirms that the vast majority of respondents report 
subadditive probabilities.52 The reference respondent identified above, who is estimated to 
52 The same conclusion arises from nonparametric estimates of the subadditivity factor obtained 
directly from Eq. 5.2 without allowing for noise. The nonlinear least squares estimates, which rest on the 
assumption of log-normal returns, are highly correlated with the nonparametric estimates. The correlation 
coefficient is 0.721 using the mean of the nonparametric estimates obtained from reported probabilities in the 
domain of gains and losses. The distributions of the estimates do differ, however. The median of the 
nonparametric estimates obtained from the reported probabilities in the domain of gains (losses) is 0.3 (0.26). 
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have a subadditivity factor of 0.100, is located around the third quartile of the distribution. 
The median (0.044) corresponds to a lesser degree of attraction towards the 50-50 anchor. 
At the 95th percentile, the degree of attraction towards the anchor is 25%. One fifth of 
respondents report probabilities consistent with a negative subadditivity factor. Such 
respondents may use anchors of 0% (for unlikely events) and 100% (for very likely events) 
instead of 50% for all events.  Median regressions of the estimated subadditivity factor on 
covariates reveal that the only strongly significant heterogeneities in the degree of 
subadditivity are with respect to gender and marital/cohabitation status, with single females 
displaying most bias (see Appendix Table A5.1).
Figure 5.5 Distribution of subadditivity factor (a) (N=229) 53
Figure 5.6a shows cumulative distributions of individual-specific nonlinear least 
squares estimates of the mean (ߤ௜) of the subjective probability distribution of returns. The 
dashed curve is drawn using the estimates from the uncorrected model. The solid curve is 
from the corrected model.54 The mean and the median uncorrected estimates are both higher 
than the respective corrected estimates. This suggests that, at least on average, failing to 
purge the bias may result in overestimation of the expected return. However, the distributions 
of estimates are close where there is greatest density and the distribution without the 
We concentrate on the parametric estimates since they are obtained along with the estimates of the subjective 
probability distribution moments, and they allow for noise.
53 For 40 respondents, nonlinear least squares (computed using Stata®) failed to produce an estimate, 
most likely due to peculiar configurations of the 10 probabilities reported by those individuals.
54 To maximise comparability, the estimates of the uncorrected model are obtained using all 10 
probability responses that are used to identify the subadditivity factor in the corrected model. Figure A5.2 in 
the Appendix reveals that the distribution of estimates from the uncorrected model differs somewhat if 8 (as in 
Hurd et al, 2011) rather than 10 responses are used. However, the difference is much less marked than that due 
to changing the model and keeping the number of observations constant (Figure 5.6a).
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correction does not first order stochastically dominate the distribution with the correction.55
So, the correction does not reduce the estimate of the expected return at all points in the 
distribution, and there is no theoretical reason that it should.
Figure 5.6 Cumulative distributions of individual-specific nonlinear least squares estimates 
of moments of subjective probability distribution of returns
5.6a Mean (ߤ௜)                     5.6b Standard deviation (ߪ௜)
Figure 5.6b presents the respective empirical cumulative distributions of estimates 
of the standard deviation (ߪ௜) of returns from the two models. In this case, the distribution of 
estimates obtained without the bias correction stochastically dominates. Correcting 
subadditivity unambiguously results in lower estimates of the volatility of the subjective 
distribution of returns. Presumably, this is because subadditivity leads to higher reported 
probabilities of extreme events. Not correcting for it gives estimates of volatility that are 
biased upwards.
Median regressions of the estimates of the subjective expectation and standard 
deviation of returns on covariates reveals little evidence of heterogeneity in beliefs 
irrespective of whether any adjustment is made for subadditivity (see Appendix Tables A5.3 
and A5.4). Older individuals have higher expected returns.
55 Dominance is tested using a two-stage procedure (Bennett, 2013) that first tests the null of equality 
against the alternative of inequality using a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. If the null is rejected, 
then the minimum of the one-sided KS test statistics is used to distinguish between dominance in each direction 
and crossing of the distributions. We adopt a conservative approach (with respect to concluding dominance) 
of using a 1% level of significance at the first stage and a 10% level at the second stage. We adopt the critical 
values derived by Bennett (2013) for his asymptotic test.
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5.4.4 Predicting behavior
We have demonstrated that correcting for subadditivity affects estimates of beliefs. The 
regressions of ownership of risky assets presented in Table 5.4 show that the correction also 
affects the extent to which the estimated beliefs predict behavior. The probability of owning 
risky assets is more strongly associated with the mean and variance of the subjective 
distribution of returns that are estimated from the corrected model than it is with the mean 
and variance obtained from the uncorrected model. Without correcting estimated beliefs for 
subadditivity, an increase of 0.1 in the expected annual return (i.e. an additional 10% gain) 
is associated (insignificantly) with an increase of 0.052 in the probability of holding risky 
assets.56, 57 This is very close to one of the two estimates produced by Hurd et al (2011) from 
a larger, representative sample of the Dutch population.58 With correction, the marginal 
effect of the expected return doubles in magnitude and obtains significance.   
Correcting for subadditivity also has an impact on the association between owning 
risky assets and the estimated standard deviation of the subjective distribution of returns. 
Without the correction, there is no significant relationship. Correcting the bias produces an 
increase in magnitude and significance, such that higher perceived variance of returns is 
estimated to be associated with greater propensity to own risky assets (albeit only at a 10% 
significance level).59 This is counter intuitive and may be attributable to reverse causality: 
holding risky assets may make investors more aware of the volatility of the stock market. 
56 A 0.1 increase in the mean return corresponds to a shift from the median to the 95th (99th) percentile
of the distribution of estimated expected returns obtained using the uncorrected model (Eq. 5.5) (Corrected 
model (Eq. 5.6)). The sample probability of holding risky assets is 0.63 (Table 5.1).
57 There is no significant relationship between stock ownership and the estimates of ȝ obtained from 
the uncorrected model (Eq. 5.5) using 8 (as opposed to 10) subjective probability responses (marginal effect = 
-0.004, SE = 0.283). The association with estimates of ı also declines when only 8 responses are used (marginal 
effect = 0.009, SE = 0.125). One reason for these decreases in magnitudes and significance is that there is less 
information in fewer responses and so there is greater measurement error in the estimates of beliefs. Another 
likely explanation is that a consequence of restricting analysis to 8 responses and not using the probabilities of 
a gain and a loss of 0-10% is that more weight is placed on the reported probabilities of more extreme events 
that are more vulnerable to subadditivity bias. Consistent with this, if we drop respondents who violate (weak) 
monotonicity (associated with subadditivity) and/or report probabilities of a gain and of a loss that sum to more 
than 100 percent and use 8 responses, then the marginal effect of a 0.1 rise in ȝ increases to 0.0705 (SE=0.932). 
This is quite close to one of the estimates of Hurd et al (2011) who impose these exclusions and use 8 responses 
(see next footnote).
58 Using data from a 2006 survey, they get an estimate of 0.049 (SE=0.0193). With data from 2004, 
they get an estimate of 0.0291 (0.0123).
59 The regressions presented in Table 5.4 are estimated using the respondents for whom we obtain 
estimates of ȝ and ı from both the uncorrected model (Eq. 5.5) and the corrected model (Eq. 5.6). The results 
are robust to allowing the number of observations to differ by using respondents for whom we obtain estimates 
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Consistent with Hurd et al (2001), we find that ownership of risky assets is lower 
among the young and higher among the better-off. There is also evidence that those who 
work, or have worked, in finance are more likely to own risky assets. Conditional on beliefs 
about the distribution of returns, stock ownership is not associated with personal traits (trust, 
risk aversion and optimism). This is also consistent with Hurd et al (2011).60
Table 5.4 Probit estimates of marginal effects on probability of owning risky assets
Uncorrected Corrected
model model
0HDQȝRIWKHILWWHGVXEMHFWLYHSUREDELOLW\GLVWULEXWLRQ 0.520 1.051**
(0.473) (0.495)
6WDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQıRIWKHILWWHGVXEMHFWLYHSUREDELOLW\GLVWULEXWLRQ 0.136
(0.266)
0.852*
(0.444)
Female -0.178 -0.175
(0.267) (0.321)
Has partner -0.006 -0.007
(0.079) (0.074)
Female * Has partner 0.037 0.044
(0.290) (0.344)
Age: young -0.368*** -0.352***
(0.057) (0.057)
Age: old -0.119 -0.150
(0.106) (0.109)
Income >= 60,000 0.147** 0.158***
(0.059) (0.056)
Financial sector 0.102* 0.129**
(0.062) (0.057)
Trust -0.014 -0.019
(0.058) (0.057)
Risk averse -0.055 -0.048
(0.060) (0.058)
Optimistic 0.006 0.013
(0.074) (0.073)
Observations 224 224
1RWHV0HDQȝDQGVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQıRIVXEMHFWLYHSUREDELOLW\GLVWULEXWLRQREWDLQHGIURPLQGLYLGXDO-
specific nonlinear least squares estimates of the uncorrected model (Eq. 5.5) (left column) and the corrected 
model (Eq. 5.ULJKWFROXPQ6DPSOHUHVWULFWHGWRUHVSRQGHQWVIRUZKRPHVWLPDWHVRIȝDQGıDUHREWDLQHG
from both models. Estimates are marginal effects averaged over the sample. Bootstrapped standard errors with 
500 replications in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Following the usual practice of dropping respondents who violate weak monotonicity 
and/or report probabilities of a gain and of a loss that sum to more than 100 percent would 
of ȝ and ı from the uncorrected model (Eq. 5.5) in the left-hand regression and those for whom estimates are 
obtained from the corrected model (Eq. 5.6) in the right-hand regression (see Appendix Table A5.4).
60 In data from one of the two years used, Hurd et al (2011) find a rather surprising negative association 
of stock ownership with optimism.
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reduce the sample by 40%.61 If we impose these exclusions, then the effect sizes of the 
associations of stock ownership with the mean and standard deviation of the subjective 
distribution of returns estimated from the corrected model change little from those given in 
the right column of Table 5.4 (see Appendix Table A5.5). Significance is lost, which is 
understandable given the reduced power of a sample that now consists of only 135 
observations. The uncorrected estimates are less robust. Excluding respondents that do not 
satisfy the two consistency requirements doubles the marginal effect of the expected return, 
such that it becomes very close to the estimate obtained from the corrected model (see 
Appendix Table A5.5, middle column). This is consistent with the earlier observation that 
respondents who violate monotonicity have stronger subadditivity bias. Dropping 
respondents who report inconsistent subjective probabilities and correcting subadditivity 
bias appear, at least in this application, to have similar effects in terms of producing more 
informative estimates of beliefs that are correlated with behavior. The bias correction has 
the important advantage of preserving the power and representativeness of the sample. 
5.5 Conclusion
We have introduced a simple method of correcting estimates of subjective probability 
distributions for subadditivity bias that does not require exclusion of (a large fraction of) 
sample respondents who violate consistency requirements. In an application to forecast stock 
market returns, we demonstrated that a model correcting for subadditivity provides a better 
approximation to the information in the data than a model than does not take account of this 
bias. Estimates of beliefs obtained from the corrected model differ from those derived from 
the alternative model. On average across the sample, both the estimated means and variances 
of the subjective probability distributions are reduced by correcting for the bias. In fact, the 
variance falls across the whole distribution of estimates, which is consistent with subaddivity 
increasing the reported probability of extreme events. The corrected estimates are more 
closely associated with behavior. 
Alternative approaches have been explored. Rather than adopt a different model as 
we do, one might try to deal with inconsistent reporting behavior by changing the method of 
eliciting subjective probabilities. For example, Delavande and Rohwedder (2008) introduce 
a visual format that forces additivity by asking respondents to simultaneously report 
61 Hurd et al (2011) lose about the same proportion by imposing these exclusions.
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probabilities of all elements of a partition. While this avoids one bias, it creates other anchors 
and the reported probabilities become partition dependent (Fox and Clemen, 2005). Forcing 
additivity prevents certain violations of consistency, such as non-monotonicity, but the 
reported probabilities are still distorted by anchors. Hudomiet and Willis (2013) propose a 
method to correct for the tendency to report focal responses, such as 50%. Yet, as shown by 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), even people who 
do not report precisely 50% can be biased. Our method handles such cases.
We have interpreted subadditivity as a bias affecting reports that should be corrected. 
Our finding that corrected reported probabilities explain behavior better than the uncorrected 
ones is in line with this interpretation. An alternative interpretation could be that beliefs 
themselves are subadditive. There is evidence that subadditivity in judgments is linked to 
subadditivity in decision weights (Fox and Tversky 1998). If this is the case, then neglecting 
subadditivity, as is done in most empirical studies that make use of expectations data, is even 
more worrisome. Beliefs should then be approximated not by a probability measure but by 
a non-additive measure (Jaffray, 1989).    
Measures of expectations have been used to predict behavior and to understand 
heterogeneity in behavior in a wide variety of contexts (e.g. Smith et al 2001; Dominitz and 
Manski 2007; Hudomiet et al 2011; Kaufmann 2014; Wiswall and Zafar 2015; Armantier et 
al 2015). Caplan (2016) has made a cogent argument that the measurement of beliefs could 
and should assume a central role in the testing and development of economic theory. 
Consistent with this, we demonstrate that a simple extension of the standard survey 
instrument used to elicit expectations can greatly improve the information content of the 
data. The proposed method can be applied widely and is relevant for different domains. The 
sample we used is rather homogeneous. It consists of highly educated respondents with a 
degree in Economics who have some knowledge of probabilities. Since there is evidence 
that people become more sensitive to probabilities when they gain experience working with 
them (van der Kuilen 2009; Wakker 2010), it is expected that less educated respondents will
have a greater tendency to report expectations that are subadditive. Given that application of 
the method will typically require adding only one sub-question to the expectations module 
of a survey, it offers a high benefit-cost ratio to survey researchers.
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Appendices Chapter 5 
Table A5.1. Median regression of estimated subadditivity factor (a) on covariates
Female 0.062***
(0.013)
Has partner 0.015
(0.015)
Female * Has partner -0.098***
(0.016)
Age: young -0.002
(0.011)
Age: old -0.034
(0.022)
Income >= 60,000 0.014
(0.010)
Financial sector 0.015
(0.017)
Constant 0.029*
(0.015)
Observations 229
Notes: Estimates of subadditivity factor obtained from individual-specific nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimates of the 
corrected model (Eq. 5.6). 40 (/269) respondents not used because NLS returned an error. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
138
Figure A5.2 Cumulative distributions of individual-specific nonlinear least squares 
estimates of the uncorrected model using 8 and 10 responses
A1 a. Mean (ߤ௜)62                                                             
A1 b. Standard deviation63 (ߪ௜)
62 The distribution using 8 responses is truncated at -1 (2 observations) and 1 (2 observations). The 
median, mean and standard deviation are computed before truncation
63 The distribution using 8 responses is truncated at 2 (4 observations). The median, mean and standard 
deviation are computed before truncation
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7DEOH $ 0HGLDQ UHJUHVVLRQ RI HVWLPDWHG PHDQ ȝ RI WKH VXEMHFWLYH SUREDELOLW\
distribution of the stock market returns
Uncorrected Corrected
model model
Female 0.001 0.014
(0.026) (0.022)
Has partner -0.003 0.012
(0.011) (0.011)
Female * Has partner -0.023 -0.046*
(0.029) (0.023)
Age: young 0.005 -0.004
(0.009) (0.007)
Age: old 0.034** 0.025**
(0.013) (0.012)
Income >= 60,000 0.004 -0.009
(0.009) (0.007)
Financial sector -0.009 -0.010
(0.008) (0.006)
Constant 0.027** 0.021*
(0.013) (0.012)
Observations 224 224
Notes: Values of dependent variable are individual-specific nonlinear least squares estimates of mean of subjective 
distribution obtained from uncorrected model (Eq. 5.5)  and corrected model (Eq. 5.6). Sample restricted to respondents 
IRUZKRPHVWLPDWHVRIȝDQGıDUHREWDLQHG IURPERWKPRGHOVRobust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5.4 Median regression of estimated standard deviation (ı) of subjective probability 
distribution of the stock market returns
Uncorrected Uncorrected
model model
Female 0.034 -0.013
(0.031) (0.015)
Has partner -0.013 -0.011
(0.015) (0.013)
Female * Has partner -0.064* -0.013
(0.036) (0.023)
Age: young 0.008 -0.005
(0.012) (0.009)
Age: old 0.012 0.004
(0.021) (0.018)
Income >= 60,000 -0.000 -0.007
(0.013) (0.009)
Financial sector -0.003 -0.002
(0.012) (0.008)
Constant 0.122*** 0.113***
(0.017) (0.015)
Observations 224 224
Notes: Values of dependent variable are individual-specific nonlinear least squares estimates of standard 
deviation of subjective distribution obtained from uncorrected model (Eq. 5.5) and corrected model (Eq. 5.6). 
6DPSOH UHVWULFWHG WR UHVSRQGHQWV IRU ZKRP HVWLPDWHV RI ȝ DQG ı DUH REWDLQHG IURP ERWK PRGHOVRobust 
standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5.5 Probit estimates of marginal effects on probability of owning risky assets, 
robustness to sample selection
Uncorrected Corrected
model model
0HDQȝRIWKHILWWHGVXEMHFWLYHSUREDELOLW\GLVWULEXWLRQ 0.607 1.070**
(0.421) (0.453)
6WDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQıRIWKHILWWHGVXEMHFWLYHSUREDELOLW\GLVWULEXWLRQ 0.163
(0.213)
0.822*
(0.463)
Female -0.195 -0.182
(0.238) (0.308)
Has partner -0.004 -0.010
(0.068) (0.074)
Female * Has partner 0.123 0.044
(0.260) (0.319)
Age: young -0.362*** -0.350***
(0.048) (0.055)
Age: old -0.124 -0.157
(0.099) (0.096)
Income >= 60,000 0.136** 0.158**
(0.053) (0.062)
Financial sector 0.090 0.129**
(0.056) (0.059)
Trust -0.009 -0.022
(0.054) (0.058)
Risk averse -0.058 -0.054
(0.054) (0.054)
Optimistic -0.030 0.022
(0.071) (0.071)
Observations 248 229
Notes: Compare with estimates in Table 5.4. In Table 5.4, the same respondents are used in the two regressions 
– WKRVHIRUZKLFKHVWLPDWHVRIȝDQGıDUHREWDLQHGIURPERWKPRGHOVBootstrapped standard errors with 500 
replications in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5.6 Probit estimates of marginal effects on probability of owning risky assets, sample 
restricted to respondents giving consistent responses
Uncorrected Corrected
model model
0HDQȝRIWKHILWWHGVXEMHFWLYHprobability distribution 1.131 1.237
(1.169) (1.052)
6WDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQıRIWKHILWWHGVXEMHFWLYHSUREDELOLW\GLVWULEXWLRQ 0.378
(0.517)
0.898
(0.670)
Female -0.070 -0.055
(0.367) (0.366)
Has partner -0.003 0.009
(0.101) (0.105)
Female * Has partner -0.021 -0.037
(0.401) (0.392)
Age: young -0.399*** -0.372***
(0.075) (0.135)
Age: old -0.071 -0.084
(0.113) (0.163)
Income >= 60,000 0.159** 0.176**
(0.080) (0.089)
Financial sector 0.038 0.081
(0.085) (0.080)
Trust -0.023 -0.036
(0.084) (0.081)
Risk averse -0.025 -0.013
(0.073) (0.076)
Optimistic -0.042 -0.026
(0.112) (0.115)
Observations 135 135
Notes: Compare with estimates in Table 5.4. In this table, regressions only use respondents who report 
subjective probabilities that satisfy weak monotonicity and the sum of probabilities of a gain and of a loss is 
less than or equal to 100%. The sample coQVLVWV RI WKRVH UHVSRQGHQWV IRUZKRPHVWLPDWHVRIȝ DQGı DUH
obtained from both model (5) and model (6). Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
This thesis contributes to an accumulation of research that uses behavioral economics to 
provide insights into social issues of substantial policy interest. The main body of the thesis 
uses data on non-standard risk and time preferences, as well as subjective beliefs of medical 
expenditure that I collected as part of a nationwide household survey in the Philippines. I 
used these data to explain the discrepancy between estimates of large potential gains from 
health insurance in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) that are derived from standard 
economic models and low observed take up of voluntary health insurance. Chapter 2 
examined the association of elicited risk preferences defined by prospect theory and time 
preferences defined by quasi-hyperbolic discounting with health insurance enrollment. 
Chapter 3 introduced and applied a new decomposition of the willingness to pay (WTP) for 
insurance into its fair price and four behavioral deviations from that price that arise from 
subjective beliefs about the distribution of medical expenses, two dimensions of risk 
attitudes consistent with prospect theory and a residual term representing determinants not 
captured by the behavioral model. Chapter 4 added to the meagre literature that tests whether 
temporary incentives can permanently change behavior and so continue to have effects, in 
this case on health insurance enrollment, after they are withdrawn.
The main, most consistent finding of chapter 2 is that individuals who discount the 
future more are less likely to insure. This suggests that one reason many Filipinos do not 
take out health insurance is because they value the premium they must pay when enrolling 
above the highly discounted benefit they will only enjoy, if at all, at some time over the 
course of the following year. This finding is in line with evidence from the randomized 
experiment in the Philippines presented in chapter 4 demonstrating that reducing the indirect 
costs of insurance (application) at enrollment can be highly effective in increasing take-up,
at least in the short run (Capuno et al 2016). Amongst individuals with some knowledge of 
how health insurance operates low take-up of insurance is also association with present bias. 
This suggests that a financial device that facilitates commitment to enrollment at a later date 
might raise take-up once people are aware of how insurance operates.
The findings from chapter 2 also demonstrate that, consistent with prospect theory, 
the majority of respondents have a strong convex curvature of the utility function in the 
domain of losses. Chapter 3 quantifies the extent to which this decreases the perceived value 
of health insurance. Such risk seeking in the domain of losses would suggest that framing 
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insurance in terms of gains as opposed to losses, focusing more on the reimbursements 
received if insured, as opposed to the expenditures one may incur if uninsured, would be an 
effective strategy to raise demand. However, chapter 2 reveals that respondents who exhibit 
more risk seeking in the domain of losses are actually more likely to insure. This appears 
counterintuitive, although it is consistent with evidence on risk preferences and demand for 
other forms of insurance. Since these results are not robust to controlling for socioeconomic 
factors, an alternative explanation could be a spurious relationship between insurance and 
risk preferences arising from correlation of each with socioeconomic factors. Most studies 
on correlates of risk preferences are cross-sectional and it is therefore hard to determine 
whether socioeconomic characteristics antecede risk preferences or vice versa.
The decomposition of WTP in chapter 3 reveals that, in addition to risk seeking in 
the domain of losses, the transformation of probabilities into decision weights reduces the 
perceived value of insurance. Chapter 2 demonstrates that respondents who overweight 
moderate and large probability losses are more likely to purchase health insurance, which is 
consistent with the relatively high average probability of medical expenditure that is 
demonstrated in chapter 3. About 80% of people report out of pocket medical expenditures 
in the past year. 
Inconsistent with claims that optimism bias is highly prevalent, low WTP for health 
insurance in the Philippines is not explained by downwardly biased expectations of medical 
expenditures. Most people seem to be aware of the risk they face of incurring medical 
expenses. Hence, efforts to communicate this risk would not be effective in raising insurance
take-up. The decomposition shows that WTP is reduced by factors not included in the 
behavioral model based on prospect theory. The findings of chapter 2 suggest that time 
preferences are an important driver of the demand for insurance that is not captured by the 
standard single-period expected utility model of insurance, or even a prospect theory 
counterpart. 
Elicitation of preferences and beliefs in large household surveys in LMIC is still very 
rare. This thesis introduced methods that are applicable in a time constrained survey 
administered to low educated respondents. Compared with relying on the assumptions of 
standard economic theory, I believe this approach has advantages and that these are evident 
from partial success in explaining low WTP for and take up of health insurance in the 
Philippines. However, this approach also requires the imposition of various assumptions, 
such as those implicit in the functional forms chosen for the preferences. Although it is
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becoming much more common to collect data on beliefs and preferences in the context of a 
survey conducted in the field in LMIC, most tests of the suitability of these functional forms 
have been conducted in western countries, and usually with student samples. As such, there 
is a need to test the extent to which the implicit assumptions match with the behavior of 
representative samples on low income populations. 
The explosion of research activity in development economics and other fields that 
uses randomized field experiments to test the effectiveness of policy interventions has 
provoked two serious criticisms. First, demonstration that policy X works in setting Y is of 
little use if we do not learn why it works and so are not in a position to consider whether it 
will be as effective in setting Z. Second, the financing of many interventions cannot be 
maintained in perpetuity. In which cases, a temporary intervention is only interesting if it 
can permanently change behavior. This thesis makes a small contribution to addressing both 
criticisms.
Examination of the role of risk and time preferences to explaining why people make 
certain economic decisions, such as insuring, can complement and inform targeted policy 
interventions and their randomized evaluation (Cardenas and Carpenter 2008; Deaton 2010). 
Investigating preferences alongside experiments can potentially provide insights into why 
they do or do not have the intended effect, potentially increasing generalizability (Deaton 
2010). While the associations estimated in this thesis between elicited preferences and 
beliefs regarding medical expenditures do not support causal inference, they do suggest the 
broad mechanisms through which innovations in policy design might try to operate in order 
to be effective in raising take up. First, many will likely remain unpersuaded of the 
advantages of health insurance unless the balance between upfront costs and future, 
uncertain benefits becomes more appealing. Second, insurance that promises to deliver 
reimbursement benefits may be more appealing than the same insurance marketed as 
covering losses.
Examination of long-term effects of policy interventions is important not only 
because one wants to know whether short-term positive effects are sustained, but also 
because there may be a risk of unintended, negative effects in the long run. For example, a 
one-off subsidy, such as that offered for health insurance in the Philippines evaluated in 
chapter 4, could potentially result in recipients anchoring their WTP on the discounted price 
(Dupas 2014). I did not find any evidence to support this hypothesis in the context of the 
experiment in the Philippines. But I did find that the short-term relative effectiveness of two 
146
interventions was a very poor guide to their relative effects in the long-term. A substantial 
temporary price subsidy had a sustained long-term impact on insurance enrollment. 
Reducing the indirect costs of enrollment by providing one-time assistance with completion 
and submission of the insurance application had a much stronger short-term impact, and yet 
its long-term effect was smaller than that of the subsidy. This is an important finding. It alerts 
us to the possibility that an intervention has a strong immediate effect because of the offer 
of high-powered incentives during an experiment without having any permanent impact on 
behavior. Another intervention may be less impressive in the short-term but have a lasting 
effect through changing preferences or overcoming fixed costs that need not be incurred 
again in the future.
While the nationwide nature of the data analyzed in this thesis makes the findings 
more generalizable than much of the existing evidence, obviously one must be careful about 
drawing inferences about behavior in quite different contexts. Preferences and beliefs will 
vary across settings, as will short- and long-term effects of health insurance inducements. 
The degree of financial protection a health insurance scheme offers, and the (quality of) 
health services accessible, might differ substantially and could, in turn, influence beliefs and 
the demand for health insurance coverage. 
Chapter 5 stands apart from the others because it is the only one not to examine the 
demand for health insurance and use the data collected in the Philippines. However, it is 
connected to the other chapters through the focus on belief elicitation. The simple method 
of correcting the common subadditivity bias in estimates of subjective probability 
distributions introduced in this chapter can potentially be widely applied in survey research, 
such as the expectations modules now included in surveys such as the US Health and 
Retirement Study and related ageing studies. The finding that correcting reported 
probabilities for subadditivity improves their ability to explain (stock holding) behavior 
demonstrates the potential return on the method. Although the sample used in chapter 5 is 
rather homogeneous and it would be interesting to see how the results replicate in different 
domains, the proposed method can be applied widely. Given that application of the method 
will typically require adding only one sub-question to the expectations module of a survey, 
it offers a high benefit-cost ratio to survey researchers.
I started this thesis with the observation that in recent years economists have begun 
to widen their horizons from the collection and analysis of objective data on constraints and 
outcomes to the elicitation and analysis of data on the more subjective concepts of beliefs 
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and preferences. I hope this thesis can make a small contribution to encouraging others to 
join this exciting trend in economic research.
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Summary
This thesis contributes to an accumulation of research that uses behavioral economics to 
provide insights into social issues of substantial policy interest. The main body of the thesis 
uses data on non-standard risk and time preferences, as well as subjective beliefs of medical 
expenditure collected as part of a nationwide household survey in the Philippines. This data 
is used to explain the discrepancy between estimates of large potential gains from health 
insurance in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) that are derived from standard 
economic models and low observed take up of voluntary health insurance.
Chapter 2 examines the association of elicited risk preferences defined by prospect 
theory and time preferences defined by quasi-hyperbolic discounting and examines their 
associations with health insurance enrollment. It finds consistent evidence that individuals 
who discount future returns more aggressively are less likely to enroll. In the full sample, 
insurance take-up is not related to present bias. But it is among individuals with some 
knowledge of how health insurance operates. Respondents who exhibit more risk seeking in 
the domain of losses, characterized by more convex utility, are more likely to insure. This 
appears counterintuitive, although it is consistent with evidence on risk preferences and 
demand for other forms of insurance. Respondents who overweight moderate and large 
probability losses are more likely to purchase health insurance, which is consistent with the 
relatively high average probability of medical expenditure in our sample. Both findings 
concerning the association of insurance with risk preferences are not robust to controlling 
for socio-economic factors.
Chapter 3 introduces and applies a new decomposition of the willingness to pay 
(WTP) for insurance into its fair price and four behavioral deviations from that price that 
arise from subjective beliefs about the distribution of medical expenses, two dimensions of 
risk attitudes consistent with prospect theory and a residual term representing determinants 
not captured by our behavioral model. Low WTP is not explained by downwardly biased 
expectations of medical expenditures. Both convex utility in the domain of losses and the 
transformation of probabilities into decision weights push the WTP below the fair price, 
reducing the demand for insurance. WTP is further reduced by other factors not included in 
our model. Time preferences and self-insurance options could be amongst these.
Understanding of preferences and beliefs regarding medical expenditure risk can be
used to (better) design policy interventions that aim to raise health insurance take up. 
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Increasingly, randomized field experiments are being conducted to test the effectiveness of 
inducements to enroll. There is some evidence of a positive immediate effect. But this may 
be insufficient to establish cost-effectiveness if the effects last only as long as the 
interventions are offered. In Chapter 4, a randomized experiment is used to establish whether 
a one-off premium subsidy of up to 50% and another intervention that reduced the indirect 
costs of enrollment by providing one-time assistance with the insurance application had 
sustained effects on enrollment up to four years after the inducements were withdrawn. 
Although the second intervention had the stronger impact in the short term, only the effect 
of the premium subsidy was maintained in the long run. This shows that the short-term 
effects of interventions may not be indicative of their long-term impacts.
Chapter 5 stands apart from the others because it is the only one not to examine the 
demand for health insurance and use the data collected in the Philippines. However, it is 
connected to the other chapters through the focus on belief elicitation. Elicitation of 
preferences and beliefs often involves respondents undertaking tasks that requires them to 
make decisions. If they do so using heuristics, then the design of the task could affect the 
results. A common bias in the reporting of probabilities is subadditivity: the reported 
probability of the union of two disjoint events is smaller than the sum of the reported 
probabilities of those events. This subadditivity bias can result in overestimation of the 
probability of an unlikely event and violation of monotonicity. Chapter 5 introduces a simple 
correction that preserves sample power and representativeness by avoiding the common 
practice of dropping a substantial fraction of respondents who report inconsistent 
probabilities. Application to forecasting of stock market returns demonstrates that our 
correction improves data fit and gives estimates of beliefs that are more closely associated 
with stock ownership.
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